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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effect of friendship 
(between negotiators) and job status (of an individual 
negotiator) in cross-cultural negotiation. In addition, 
the Chinese business negotiation context was selected as 
the focus of this research. It is expected that findings 
obtained could guide multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
their future decisions concerning China business talks. 
The literature in marketing and in social psychology 
relating to the boundary position of negotiators was 
reviewed. Specifically, (1) the inter-group relationship 
between a negotiator and the negotiation partner and (2) 
the intra-group relationship between a negotiator and 
other constituent members within the organization were 
studied to lay down the theoretical foundation of this 
study. 
Two of Hofstede's (1980a) Chinese work values, namely 
collectivism and power distance, were examined too. They 
served as a base to id~ntify salient independent variables 
that could explain the indigenous Chinese negotiation 
behavior. In addition, descriptive works, case studies, 
and survey findings relating to Chinese social behavior, 
China business deals and negotiations were studied to 
suggest constructs and hypotheses to be tested in the 
study. 
i 
The literature tends to suggest that, under the 
influence of collectivism and power distance, friendship 
(an inter-group factor) and job status (an intra-group 
factor) would explain the variation in perception, atti-
tude, and behavior of Chinese and western executives in 
China business negotiation. 
ii 
A sample of 120 Chinese executives and 120 western 
(U.S. and British) executives participated in this 2x2x2 
(friendship x job status x nationality) experimental 
study. The results of this study indicate that (1) 
friendship causes "perceived satisfaction" and a "win-win 
attitude", (2) job status induces "risk aversion", (3) 
nationality generates "conformity", "perceived 
efficiency", and "perceived satisfaction", and, (4) the 
interaction of nationality and friendship affects 
"conformity" and "risk aversion". 
The findings of the study are discussed in relation 
to previous accepted norms, and implications for 
multinational corporations' external and internal 
marketing strategies. Directions for future research are 
proposed too. 
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MNC and China Business Negotiation 
Global Business 
Globalization is a watchword in many business 
enterprises nowadays. Practitioners, researchers, acade-
micians, and policy-makers have increasingly turned their 
attention to this hot issue (Kaynak and Lee 1989, p.xxxi). 
By comparing the world trade figure with the world GNP 
figure, Porter (1986, p.15) notes that the growth in world 
trade has far exceeded the growth in world GNP. In addi-
tion, the foreign direct investment by multinational firms 
has grown very rapidly in the last decades. 
This ~ significant growth in world trade and foreign 
direct investment has been attributed to the vast opportu-
nity in the global market place, and firms are beginning 
to regard developing nations as integral parts of the 
world order and the world market. In this connection, 
some firms are forced to look abroad for new opportunities 
due to intensive competition in their home market, while 
others seek to globalize for the sake of enhancing oppor-
tunities for growth (cf. O'Reilly 1988; Takada and Jain 
1991; Ostry 1992). According to Kaynak (1989), enter-
prises are increasingly entering global markets in order 
to attain their growth and profit goals, as well as to 
maintain and improve their market position. They are 
thinking as if the whole world is their market and are 
identifying every lucrative market niche within this 
enormous market. 
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The multinational corporation (MNC) is regarded as 
the primary agent to generate this huge growth in world 
trade and foreign direct investment. On this issue, Ohmae 
(1989a) argues that as people everywhere are more and more 
able to get the information they want from all parts of 
the world, they have become global citizens, and companies 
are forced to become globally oriented in order to be 
competitive. In addition, he denounces the myopic view of 
some managers marketing in the world arena, and suggests 
that effective global operations require a genuine equi-
distance of perspective. 
On the other hand, Porter (1986, p.16) attributes the 
growing importance of international business activities to 
MNC's ability to utilize know-how and expertise gained in 
one country's market (~.g. home market) in other countries 
(e.g. foreign markets) at low costs, thereby cutting the 
total costs of doing business in a totality sense. Ostry 
(1992) supports this view and claims that the growth is 
enhanced by improved efficiency, more rapid production, 
and the adoption of new technology. 
Considerable research on the operation of global 
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business is being done, reflecting the importance of this 
subject matter. These works include: Ohmae (1989b); 
Porter (1992); Cravens, Downey, and Lauritano (1992). 
They aim at providing practitioners and researchers with 
guidelines for doing abetter job around the world. 
The China Market 
China is a country with considerable potential. 
Opportunities in the China market are growing dramatically 
(Kirpalani and Robinson 1989). As we all know, before 
1979, the administrative system of China's foreign trade 
basically followed the Soviet model. Foreign trade was 
made to remedy shortfalls in domestic production; imports 
were "growth-oriented"; and exports were treated as means 
to finance imports. 
The reform measures taken in 1979 were designed to 
revitalize China's economy after a long period of stagna-
tion growth. The "Open Door Policy" was adopted to help 
achieve the modernization of the nation before the end of 
the century. It included, among other things, the utili-
zation of foreign loans, the introduction of various types 
of foreign direct investment, the development of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), and the attraction of foreign 
participation in enterprise management. since then, 
foreign business relations have become less centralized, 
and businesspeople have more flexibility and freedom to 
develop their business in China. In addition to this, the 
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scope and size of China's foreign economic relations have 
been enlarged greatly, especially when the law of compara-
tive advantage making use of international division of 
labor to improve market efficiency has been allowed to 
flourish in the country (Hsueh and Woo 1991, p.62j Ng et 
al. 1988). 
The determination to open to the outside world is 
well documented in the Eighth Five-Year Plan of the People 
Republic of China (PRC) (1989-1993). According to this 
important plan, China will expand its foreign economic and 
technological exchanges and stress greater progress in 
foreign trade, utilization of foreign funds, and import of 
useful technology. The foreign funds obtained would be 
used mainly to support projects in agriculture, water 
conservation, energy, transport, telecommunications and 
important raw materials. Export-oriented projects and 
projects using advanced technology are also key items in 
the priority list. 
In speeding up the economic development of the 
country, strategies including coastal open cities and SEZs 
have become institutionalized. In fact, Shenzhen and the 
other SEZs have played an important role as window, 
bridge, and base in developing the nation's foreign trade 
and in helping the nation to acquire foreign technology, 
management know-how, and funds. So far, the SEZs have 
absorbed sUbstantial amount of foreign investments, helped 
transfer of the needed .technology, expanded export, de-
veloped international economic cooperation, and demon-
strated the sincere motive of the PRC to open to the 
outside world (Jiang 1991). 
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The following describes the growth in foreign trade, 
foreign loans, and foreign direct investment in the PRC. 
(This adds support to our earlier contention that China is 
full of opportunities.) First, according to the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), in 1984 
China's imports and exports totaled U8$49.97 billion 
(US$25.53 billion for imports, and US$24.44 billion for 
exports), an increase of 22.7% over 1983 and an increase 
of 142% over 1978 - the year preceding the introduction of 
the open door policy. However, this figure is much less 
than the total import and export volume in the year 1990: 
US$85.118 billion. 
In the six years between 1979 to 1984, U8$13.25 
billion was channeled into the PRC (in the form of foreign 
loans) to finance projects in energy, transportation, 
communication, agriculture and raw materials. In the year 
1990, the agreement value of various foreign loans hit 
U8$5.1 billion, and the actual used foreign loan totaled 
U8$6.53 billion. As far as foreign direct investments are 
concerned, around U8$4 billion was invested from 1979 to 
1984 by foreign investors in areas comprising wholly 
foreign-owned business, equity joint ventures, contractual 
joint ventures, cooperative development of offshore oil, 
and equipment/technology contributed by foreign partners 
in compensation trade deals. From 1984 onwards, the PRC 
has achieved steady development in absorbing foreign 
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investment -- during the year 1990, a total commitment of 
U5$6.596 billions of foreign direct investment was ap-
proved, with the realized amount of foreign investment 
totaled U5$3.487 billion. All these figures are consid-
ered record highs (Directory of Chinese Foreign Trade 
1986; Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relation and 
Trade 1991). 
Efforts have been made by the PRC to foster a better 
business environment for MNCs. They are: (1) speeding up 
economic legislation to protect foreign investment, (2) 
improving transportation and communication facilities, (3) 
establishing service corporations, (4) opening more chan-
nels to facilitate exchange of information, (5) building a 
fair competition environment, (6) allowing decentraliza-
tion of decisions, (7) supplying enterprises with more 
foreign exchange, and (8) making the China trade system 
more compatible with international trade practice (Almanac 
of China's Foreign Economic Relation and Trade 1991). 
Despite these supports from the Chinese government, 
doing business in China is by no means an easy task. 
According to Wang (1986), while the developments in China 
are most significant in historical perspective, and the 
dream of a billion-odd customers appears to be finally 
approaching reality, we do in fact witness numerous horror 
stories and frustration. Even good intentions on both 
sides may lead to backfire, and China has been sometimes 
referred to as the worst hardship place for foreign busi-
nesspeople .. Among the various difficulties of doing 
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business in China, the following are typical: (1) western-
ers are pursuing individual well-being while the Chinese 
are trying to achieve state, province, and enterprise 
benefits, (2) the Chinese demand the acquiring of western-
ers' proprietary secrets at a relatively low cost, (3) 
rigid policy constraints, (4) inefficient bureaucracies, 
(5) desire of the Chinese to have ventures not incurring 
foreign exchange, (6) the PRC's preference to render only 
labor and resources, not market, (7) lacking of needed 
secondary and primary information, (8) a different negoti-
ation style and the long negotiation process, (9) the 
socialist principle that the means of production should be 
state owned frequently still prevails, (10) markets diffi-
cult to be assessed and reached, (11) local authorities 
are unclear about their power, (12) China's demand on 
exporting a majority of the production output, and, (13) 
risk averse attitude of Chinese officials (cf. Ruggles 
1983; Holton 1985; Daniels, Krug, and Nigh 1985; Wang 
1986; McGuinness, Campbell, and Leontiades 1991). These 
hurdles pose big challenges to global managers who would 
like to do business with PRC -- a country having a quarter 
of the world's population. 
MNC and China Business 
From the literature on China business deals, it is 
not uncommon to find parties having great difficulties in 
negotiating major projects. Good proposals that are 
beneficial to both parties have often been delayed or 
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canceled due to various reasons. In this connection, more 
vigorous studies are needed to help bridge the gap between 
these two parties, and to help actualize the objectives of 
the two groups. In any successful business venture, each 
side has to make a contribution in the hope of adding the 
partner's competence to its own (Blodgett 1991). However, 
the various concerns, competence, and contribution of both 
MNCs and the China side are far from clear. According to 
Teng and Wang (1988), the precise role of MNCs and the 
rationale of the China open door policy have not been 
brought together and studied with care. In the following, 
we shall discuss (1) China's needs and concerns, (2) 
disputes between PRC and MNCs (3) the problems embedded in 
China business deals, (4) China's moves to build up a 
better business environment, (5) benefits of MNCs, and (6) 
the role of MNCs in China business, as these issues are 
related to business negotiation in China. 
In the section above, we have discussed the motives 
behind China's open door policy. To summarize, we can see 
that the government has formulated a set of broad objec-
tives, and foreign investors are expected to be able to 
lend a helping hand in' ,realizing these objectives. Simyar 
and Argheyd (1986) have cited various desiderata of the 
PRC: industrialization, technology transfer, effective 
employment, increased productivity, conservation and 
creation of foreign exchange, self sUfficiency through 
export-orientation, import sUbstitution and domestic 
market development. Nevertheless, Chinese managers dealing 
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with MNCs are facing a dilemma. On the one hand, they are 
instructed to conclude deals with foreign businessmen so 
as to obtain the benefit generated from international 
business activities. On the other hand, they are incapa-
ble or unwilling to make key decisions which might in the 
future bring loss to the country. In a sense, the open 
door policy and the traditional bureaucratic practices are 
not entirely compatible, thus leading to the failure of 
many promising business negotiations (Teng and Wang 1988, 
p.ix). 
Simyar and Argheyd (1986) also summarize the 
different objectives and concerns of MNCs doing business 
in China. A partial list comprises: short-term 
profitability, long term profitability, local market 
penetration, cheap labor, cheap resources, creation of an 
export base, control of managerial decisions, control of 
technology, maintenance of flexibility, and risk aversion. 
When PRC managers compare this listing to that of theirs, 
they would find it difficult to figure out a deal which is 
both highly acceptable to the MNC and to their Chinese 
superior. 
The traditional Chinese perception of multinationals 
is affecting the negotiation process too. First, foreign 
business is attached to the notion of imperialism. Sec-
ond, foreign businessmen will generate exploitation and 
unfair competition with Chinese enterprises. Third, 
foreigners are unfriendly or unsympathetic to the country. 
A foreign businessperson will have a difficult time in the 
10 
negotiation exercise if the Chinese side brings the above-
mentioned mentality to the table. In addition, the long 
prevailing zero-sum thinking is so deeply rooted in the 
Chinese hierarchy that MNCs have to work harder, if they 
want to conclude any deals in China (Wang 1988). 
Wang (1984; 1986; 1988) has given a detailed descrip-
tion of the origin and nature of the problems faced by 
MNCs while they are doing business with the Chinese. A 
clear understanding of them can help MNCs appreciate the 
complexity of the endeavor and, hopefully, think about 
ways to overcome t 'hem. The following is a summary of his 
views: 
1. China's philosophy and methods will continue to 
differ from the Western concept. 
2. Social and political policies generally override 
economic policies. 
3. The Chinese have no common frame of reference with 
multinationals. 
4. The development of human resources is not emphasized. 
5. Malpractices exist in the management hierarchy. 
6. Legal and law-abiding traditions are lacking. 
7. Feudal ideologies .still exist throughout the 
management ladder. 
8. China is slow to adopt chahges. 
9. China is reluctant to alter their system merely to 
suit the multinationals. 
10. Age-old cultural traits cannot be handled easily by 
legislation. 
11. Expertise and experience are limited, especially in 
the localities. 
12. Managers are reluctant to make decisions -- to do 
nothing is to do no wrong. 
13. Information needed is lacking. 
11 
14. Chinese managers tend to overestimate cost and under-
estimate benefit. 
15. Time cost is neglected. 
16. Non-productive and costly negotiation sessions are 
usually found in business deals. 
17. The Chinese are over-sensitive about giving away too 
much to a foreign firm. 
From such a long list, we can appreciate the compli-
cations and frustrations of multinationals working in 
China. That is why Wang (1988) notes that foreign expa-
triates are having a difficult time talking business in 
China. 
Many academics have suggested ways to avoid the 
possible problems and conflicts between Chinese and 
multinationals so that the benefits brought forth by the 
open door policy could be realized. Teng and Wang (1988 
p.ix) promote the contention that the precise role of MNCs 
and the rationale of the Chinese open door policy should 
be brought together and articulated in the first place. 
The better they understand one another, the greater will 
be the probability of closing a good deal. Under the 
principle of mutual benefit, and the adoption of a posi-
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tive sum game philosophy, the difference between the 
objectives of socialist PRC and the demands of profit-
seeking multinationals could be reconciled (Wang 1988). 
Mun (1988; 1989) has made several suggestions to both the 
multinationals and PRC officials: (1) appropriate specifi-
cation of terms in a contract, (2) choice of a good part-
ner, (3) a cooperative attitude to understand the other's 
goals, motivations, and expectation, (4) a win-win mental-
ity, (5) a stable set of policies and rules in China, (6) 
less administrative interference, (7) more flexibility (8) 
development of the financial market, (9) less bureaucrat-
ic, (10) more autonomy in pricing and wage setting, (11) 
mobility of labor and improvement in productivity, (12) 
fair treatment to both local and foreign enterprises, and, 
(13) a healthy legal system. The implementation of the 
above would help induce more MNCs to come to China, there-
by improving the competitiveness of the two parties. 
In fact, MNCs have their distinct competence in this 
Chinese connection. China's modernization requires fi-
nance, technology, management know-how, selling skills, 
and marketing contacts. MNCs are in a good position to 
speed up this modernization move by channeling their 
competence to supplement the China side at a relatively 
low cost. Specifically, MNCs have the practical hands-on 
experience in business operations, which is badly needed 
in the PRC. In addition, transmission of this knowledge 
would be continuous and adaptive to changes. Furthermore, 
this experience covers various functional areas including 
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general management, finance, marketing, production, re-
search and development (Wang 1988). While these areas are 
of paramount importance to the Chinese side, they are not 
costly to the multinationals. If the two parties can 
wholeheartedly join force together to develop their aggre-
gate competence, the result would be highly fruitful. 
In meeting the hurdles in China trade, some guide-
lines have been suggested by academics. First, it has 
been suggested that presentation of important documents in 
both languages with many copies can give relevant decision 
makers a chance to appreciate the possible benefits that 
could be generated from the venture. Second, multination-
als should take the initiative to approach and understand 
the concerns of the Chinese, and try to present to them 
the resultant benefits in the most simple and direct way. 
Third, high level foreign executives should try to visit 
China, as the Chinese are hierarchy-minded. Fourth, all 
relevant Chinese parties should be catered to, as both the 
central authority and the localities are important groups 
when the business is significant. Fifth, as the Chinese 
team would include engineers and technical people, foreign 
negotiators should be prepared to answer technical ques-
tions. Sixth, the inclusion of American-Chinese personnel 
on the MNC side is usually suggested, though there may be 
pros and cons (this will be covered in the next section). 
Finally, MNCs can utilize trade linkages (people, institu-
tion, or place) to match the competing needs and concerns, 
thus facilitating a more effective and efficient business 
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outcome (cf. Wang 1984; Wang 1988; Mun and Chan 1986). 
In any event, if MNCs are willing to commit 
themselves in China business, and are successful in 
demonstrating their value of existence before the Chinese, 
the potential opportunities can be realized. As the 
Chinese are relationship oriented (the word "guanxi" is 
commonly used to describe this web of interpersonal rela-
tionships), he who has developed initial bonding with them 
will be better protected from future competition. In 
fact, though the existing business size in the PRC may not 
be highly significant, many MNCs are attracted by its big 
potential in the decades to come. That is why some opti-
mists have expressed that China is a key link in the 
global competition game (Wang 1986). 
Cross-Cultural Marketing Negotiation 
From the above discussion, we can see that the 
potential in China business is great, but the problems 
attached to it are also numerous. Wang (1964, p.113) 
notes that negotiation is an integral part in China trade 
deals. At the negotiation tablei each side possesses some 
important monopolistic power and each side also perceives 
many uncertainties and issues to be discussed. Renegotia-
tion is usually involved, as the relative bargaining power 
varies from time to time. The situation they are facing 
is not whether they should negotiate, but whether the 
negotiated terms and conditions are acceptable to both 
parties. In China, general policies and rules are not 
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specific, leaving a lot of room for interpretation and 
clarification. Besides, the Chinese view every situation 
and company from a particularlistic perspective, thus 
generating numerous deliberations and lengthy talks. 
The cultural gap is probably the most widely dis-
cussed issue as far as negotiation with the Chinese is 
concerned. First, the Chinese may be lacking the informa-
tion about multinationals -- due to years of isolation 
from the outside world. Second, they are not familiar 
with the general environment, the strategies, and negotia-
tion style of the companies with which they are dealing, 
not to mention the intrinsic motives behind foreign nego-
tiators' behavior. Third, they tend to think that multi-
nationals are extremely rich and generous, and that they 
reap extraordinarily high profits. 
On the other side of the fence, the foreign 
negotiators find it difficult to understand the Chinese 
. language even with interpreters. The issue of body 
language often generates a lot of misunderstanding. 
Manners and gestures are generally misinterpreted, espe-
cially when the Chinese prefer to express their points in 
a subtle way. To alleviate this cultural gap, scholars 
have suggested many alternatives: writing a cogent job 
description analysis; preparing a work force specification 
list; and putting the right man in the post. We shall 
discuss these issues in the next section. 
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Negotiators in China Business Deals 
The issue of cross cultural marketing negotiation has 
received limited scholarly attention in the marketing 
literature. with few notable exceptions, the research in 
this area is considered as fragmentary and anecdotal (Kale 
and Barnes 1992). In their paper, it is suggested that 
congruence of national character and organizational cul-
ture between the two parties would facilitate a harmonious 
business environment which would lead to greater satisfac-
tion and a higher chance of closing of deals. Specifical-
ly, they recommend the fine tuning of organizational 
culture to help the firm's boundary personnel (business 
negotiators) in dealing with executives in another coun-
try. In addition, the recruitment and training of appro-
priate staff to fill the negotiation team would be an 
important element in a MNC's agenda. This contention is 
parallel to the suggestion made by Wang (1986): reducing 
the cultural distance and putting the right man in the 
foreign negotiation team. 
As far as selecting the right man is concerned, much 
has been said on the usefulness of friendship in trade 
deals. In the marketing and social psychology literature, 
the benefits brought forth by friendship are well docu-
mented: reciprocity, integrative attitude, win-win orien-
tation, attractiveness, and coordinative behavior. These 
will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter. At the 
outset, we may claim that friendship will be highly bene-
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ficial at the Chinese negotiation table. 
In fact, the status of a boundary person and the 
relations between him and his colleagues would also affect 
his perception, attitude, and behavior too. The issue of 
accountability, constituent surveillance, and relative job 
status are factors which would affect the behaviors and 
outcomes of the negotiation talk. In addition, there is 
ample evidence that a subordinate would tend to behave 
differently vis-a-vis his superior. Generally speaking, 
boundary persons with a lower job status will be more 
risk-aversive and more conforming to others. This issue 
will be discussed in detail in the literature review 
chapter. 
Besides friendship and job status, another important 
element in China business negotiation is, of course, the 
"nationality" of the foreign negotiator. The importance 
of employing ethnic Chinese in China trade talks is men-
tioned often in the literature, and the following are some 
examples. pye (1981, p.62) suggests the use of overseas 
Chinese interpreters because PRC officials tend to believe 
that they will have the feeling of patriotism and will be 
unlikely to cheat the mother country. 
Tung (1982b, p.63) recommends the inclusion of Chi-
nese in the U.5. team, as they are familiar with the 
Chinese culture and the "silent language" used. They will 
be in a better position to make suggestions regarding the 
presentation of certain point of views that involve cul-
tural differences. In a study by Tung (1982a), it was 
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found that "familiarity with Chinese culture" was one of 
the factors accounting for the success of business negoti-
ation in China. The hiring of one "Chinese" executive on 
the negotiation team is also proposed in Lee and Lo 
(1988), but for a different reason -- Chinese executives 
in a MNC can make significant behind-the-scenes contribu-
tions in China trade negotiations, as PRC officials would 
like to approach these American-Chinese if the Chinese 
side has queries or wants to solve any issues: PRC offi-
cials prefer not to call upon us executives informally. 
As we know, the Chinese have the habit of making the real 
decision before the formal meeting; this behavior in-
creases the value of having a Chinese in the foreign team. 
Besides adding an ethnic Chinese to the foreign 
negotiation team, another common strategy is to use a 
Chinese related middleman to bridge the various needs and 
concerns of the two parties. In this regard, Hong Kong 
and its executives are playing a very important role (Mun 
and Chan 1986). The various benefits attached to Hong 
Kong as a middleman include: (1) connections with Chinese 
trading companies, (2) a strategic location for analyzing 
China's policy changes, (3) availability of China experts, 
(4) collection of information about China's development, 
and (5) agent for transferring technology to China. 
According to Mun and Chan (1986), Hong Kong executives 
will continue to play an important role in China's modern-
ization, either by serving as a supplier or intermediary 
in China's technology transfer. They also argue that, 
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among other things, the success of a global marketer will 
probably relate to whether the firm can fully utilize the 
bridging function of the Hong Kong executives who have a 
good knowledge of both the PRC and MNCs. 
Though we can find many arguments supporting the 
inclusion of ethnic Chinese personnel in the negotiation 
teams, there are other worries. Wang (1984, p.117) be-
lieves that the value of ethnic Chinese in MNCs depends 
mainly on what that individual can do rather than on his 
ethnic origin. When the American-Chinese deal with PRC 
managers, the question of cultural distance may arise for 
them too. That distance may be magnified if both parties 
are holding wrong assumptions on each other. Sometimes, 
the China side may query whether the ethnic Chinese have 
any real decision making power. It has been said that 
even if an American-Chinese is the head of the negotiation 
team, the PRC managers may still pay all of their atten-
tion to the Caucasian subordinate. In addition, the 
American-Chinese are expected to be more "understandable" 
and they are expected to give excessive favor to the 
Chinese side (Wang 1986). 
On the issue of the function of ethnic Chinese in 
China business negotiation, Lee (1989; 1990) has made a 
thorough analysis. Specifically, he studied three aspects 
relating to hiring of overseas Chinese executives for the 
American MNCs: (1) What are the positive cultural impacts 
rendered by overseas Chinese executives? (2) Are there 
any negative cultural impacts attached too? (3) Is there 
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a split-loyalty problem inherent in hiring these Chinese 
executives to work for MNCs? In relation to the positive 
impacts, dimensions under investigation were: a sincere 
and friendly attitude, a motivation to do a good job for 
both parties, and China's preference towards interacting 
with people of the same nationality. Regarding the issue 
of negative impacts, dimensions under investigation were: 
China might demand that the ethnic Chinese favor the 
Chinese side more, and the second-class treatment as 
mentioned above. The split loyalty issue refers to the 
role conflict of the ethnic Chinese -- he theoretically 
has to be faithful to both his motherland and to his 
company, which are constantly competing for profit, power, 
and control in the venture. 
In summary, findings in Lee (1989; 1990) indicate 
that American MNC Chinese executives and Chinese working 
for Hong Kong firms are having practically the same sort 
of attitude towards the following dimensions, namely, (1) 
they perceive a bright prospect for China trade, (2) the 
existence of positive as well as negative cultural impacts 
on recruiting American-Chinese in the negotiation team. 
These findings have two important implications to both 
researchers and practitioners. First, as both positive 
and negative impacts are operating in China business, the 
"linking-pin" function of ethnic Chinese has to be more 
rigorously studied to determine the real nature and degree 
of its influence on cross cultural marketing negotiation. 
One obvious extension is to compare the function and 
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effect of an ethnic Chinese negotiator vis-a-vis an 
expatriate. Second, as Chinese working for MNCs and 
Chinese working for Hong Kong firms display virtually the 
same attitudes, we may deduce that working place bears an 
insignificant effect on this sort of China negotiation 
study, and nationality alone would explain most of the 
variation in the study. Under this scenario, using MNCs 
as a context in future China business negotiation study 
would not be inappropriate in the sense that MNC per se 
would not moderate the research findings significantly. 
This will be further discussed in the chapter on Method. 
While the issues discussed so far (friendship between 
negotiators, job status of the negotiator, and nationality 
of the negotiator) have clear effects on the various 
perceptions, attitudes, and outcomes of Chinese business 
negotiation, it is also logical to think that nationality 
might have an interaction effect on friendship and job 
status. According to Hofstede's (1980a) finding on col-
lectivism and power distance, the two major cultural 
values of the Chinese people, it would be natural to . 
speculate that Chinese will treat their friends compara-
tively better. In addition, Chinese subordinates would 
tend to be more conforming and risk-aversive, especially 
when they are involved in big venture talk which is full 
of demands, concerns, uncertainties, indeterminations, as 
well as pros and cons. 
This study will center on these several core issues: 
friendship, .job status, nationality, and their interac-
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tions. (A more detailed description will be given in the 
next chapter on Literature Review) . 
To summarize, China's vast market size and open door 
policy represent big opportunities for MNCs to further 
develop and sustain their competitive advantage in a 
global setting. While many have claimed that China is one 
of the most difficult "hardship" countries, the great 
potential there is something no MNCs can afford to ne-
glect. As China is lacking in experience in modern mar-
keting activities, it is the multinational's responsibili-
ty to take the initiative to bridge the gaps between the 
two parties. By so doing, both the PRC and MNCs would be 
benefited. Though success in China talk depends on many 
issues, the staffing of the foreign negotiation team is 
certainly a key one. Nevertheless, practitioners (and 
researchers too) are not fully guided as to which sort of 
negotiators would be the most successful in negotiation 
with the Chinese. This study is the first of its kind to 
investigate the actual causal impacts (and interactions) 
of various key attributes of a China business negotiator. 
It is hoped that this study can develop a framework to 
guide future research and practices. 
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Business Negotiation 
Definition of Negotiation 
The focus of this study is negotiation. The concept 
of negotiation has been defined in various ways by various 
academics. The following are examples of definitions 
provided by different authors. 
Walton and McKersie (1965, p.3):-
Negotiation is the deliberate interaction of two or 
more complex social units which are attempting to 
define or redefine the terms of their 
interdependence. 
Bazerman and Lewicki (1983, p.7):-
When two or more parties within one or in different 
organizations jointly make decisions and do not have 
the same preferences, they are negotiating. 
Nierenberg (1986, p.16):-
Whenever people exchange ideas with the intention of 
changing relationships, whenever they confer for 
agreement, they are negotiating. 
Lewicki and Litterer (1985, p.2):-
A negotiation situation is one in which two or more 
parties have to make a decision about their 
interdependent goals or objectives; in which the 
parties are committed to peaceful means for resolving 
their dispute; and in which there is no clear or 
established method or procedure for making the 
decision. 
Pruitt (1981, p.1):-
Negotiation is a process by which a joint decision is 
made by two or more parties. The parties first 
verbalize contradictory demands and then move toward 
agreement by a process of concession making or search 
for new alternatives. 
Instead of giving a formal definition of negotiation, 
Deutsch (1973, p.4-7) describes seven key variables which 
affect the resolution of conflict: (1) the characteristics 
of the parties in conflict, (2) their prior relationship 
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to one another, (3) the nature of the issue giving rise to 
the conflict, (4) the social environment within which the 
conflict occurs, (5) the interested audiences to the 
conflict, (6) the strategy and tactics employed by the 
parties in the conflict, and (7), the consequences of the 
conflict to each of the participants and to other inter-
ested parties. 
From a managerial perspective, Lax and Sebenius 
(1986, p.11) define negotiation as a process of 
potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more 
parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better 
through joint decision than they could otherwise. By 
integrating all these ideas, we may gain a better appreci-
ation of how negotiation researchers view the concept of 
negotiation. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of 
negotiation is given by Raiffa (1982). His most primitive 
form of negotiation looks something like this: 
There are two negotiators, each monolithic; they are 
engaged in a one-time bargaining situation with no 
anticipated repetitions with each other; they come to 
the bargaining table with no former "favors" they 
have to repay, and this bargain is not linked with 
others that they are worrying about; there is a 
single issue (money) under contention; they can break 
off negotiations a~d not arrive at an agreement; 
neither party must get a proposed contract ratified 
by others; breaking off negotiations is their only 
threat; there is no formal time constraint (such as a 
strike deadline); agreements made are legally 
binding; negotiations are private; and each expects 
the other to be "appropriately honorable." Finally, 
the parties do not use the services of an interyener. 
(p. 34) • 
The coverage of this definition can be enlarged by 
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changing anyone or more of the following ingredients: (1) 
from "two parties" to "more than two parties", (2) from 
"internally monolithic" to "not internally monolithic", 
(3) from "one-time bargaining" to "repetition 
anticipated", (4) from "no former favors involved" to 
"former favors involved", (5) from "absence of linkage 
effect" to "presence of linkage effect", (6) from "one 
single issue" to "multi-issues", (7) from "agreement not 
required" to "agreement required", (8) from "ratification 
of agreement not required" to "ratification of agreement 
required", (9) from "breaking off is the only threat" to 
"other threats are possible", (10) from "no formal time 
constraint" to "existence of time constraint", (11) from 
binding agreements" to "non-binding agreements, (12) from 
"private negotiation" to "public negotiation", (13) from 
"the other party is appropriately honorable" to "the other 
party is not so", and (14) from "no third-party interven-
tion" to "third-party intervention possible". Throughout 
this research, this comprehensive contention will be 
adopted. 
Negotiation in the Business Context 
The study of negotiation in the business context has 
been documented in various papers. Broadly classified, 
these studies can be grouped under: (1) descriptive 
analyses, (2) experimental studies, and (3) international 
business negotiation experiments. The following is a 
summary of these three types of studies. Based on these 
studies, we can be in a position to identify further 
directions for investigation. 
Descriptive Analyses 
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Five descriptive studies are identified and a brief 
summary of each of them is made in the following. Assael 
(1968) notes that differing economic objectives among 
members of a channel of distribution often result in 
conflicts in the system. In resolving such conflicts, the 
retail and trade associations are playing a special role. 
On the other hand, Rosenberg and stern (19?O) claim that 
little is known about the causes, measurement, management, 
and consequences of conflict in distribution and the 
effect of conflict on performance in the channel of dis-
tribution. Specifically, they consider disparity of 
goals, dissensus in role conceptions, and differences in 
perceptions of reality as major causes of conflict. 
Negotiated pricing is another area receiving attention by 
negotiation researchers. Evans and Beltramini (198?) 
propose a theoretical model of consumer negotiated pricing 
which incorporated three conditions as pretransaction 
conditions on a consumer's negotiated pricing orientation. 
These conditions are (1) background conditioning (negotia-
tion expertise, attitude between parties, and psychologi-
cal characteristics and perceived roles of negotiators), 
(2) antecedent conditions (goal issue, perceived outcome 
expectations, incentives to initiate negotiation, and 
perceived power/dependency relationship), and (3) concur-
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rent conditions (situational and structural). This orien-
tation will in turn affect participant interchange and 
negotiation outcome. 
Pennington (1968) studied 210 retail transactions and 
examined how bargaining behavior would be related to 
purchase outcome. In his study, three bargaining 
variables were studied: frequency of commitment to 
concession limits, relative frequency of attempts to 
change concession limits, and frequency of direct offers. 
They were found to be related to timing of purchase -- the 
purchase outcome in the study. In another study to 
investigate conflict in the distribution channel, 
Rosenberg and stern (1971) surveyed 110 channel members 
and concluded goal incongruity, domain dissensus, and 
perceptual differences as three major causes of conflict 
in a channel. In fact, this study confirmed their 
contention made in a previous study (Rosenberg and stern 
1970) . 
Experimental Studies 
To unambiguously identify the causal relationship 
between an explanatory variable and the dependent 
variable, the experimen~al approach is usually considered 
as superior to the simplistic descriptive and 
correlational approaches. In business negotiation 
research, the experimental method is constantly adopted 
for several reasons. First, the real causal relationship 
could be more confidently identified due to randomization 
of subjects and the manipulation of treatments in the 
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study. Second, covariates could be applied to handle the 
effects of confounding variables. Third, the issue of 
interaction between treatments could be revealed at ease. 
Thirteen experimental studies are summarized in Table 1.1 
with respect to their subjects included, independent 
variables considered, and also the dependent variables 
under investigation. From Table 1.1, we can see that the 
traditional studies relied more on student subjects while 
the more recent ones used mainly business executives as 
subjects. Basically, independent variables cover a wide 
range of constructs .comprising cooperative behavior, 
information possessed, internal monitoring, relative 
power, gender, similarity of characteristics, 
superordinate goals, conflict conditions, group size, and 
trustworthiness. On the other hand, dependent variables 
under consideration are: integrative agreements, profit, 
satisfactions, time spent, process variables, efficiency, 
and post-negotiation attitudes. 
International Business Negotiation Experiments 
The study of business negotiation behavior in the 
cross-cultural context is mainly advocated by Graham and 
his colleagues. Starting from the eighties, Graham has 
generated many international business negotiation 
experiments using cultural difference as an important 
independent variable to explain the difference in 
international negotiator's satisfaction, behavior, and 
profit. In his studies, business executives of various 
29 
Table 1.1 
. BUSINESS NEGOTIATION STUDIES: EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
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cultures were allowed to participate in a negotiation 
game, and their responses to various attitudinal state-
ments, together with the attained profit levels, were 
recorded. with a few exception (e.g. Graham 1983), other 
treatments were not included, and culture/nationality of 
the subjects was postulated as the only major treatment 
that would affect various dependent variables. Table 1.2 
presents a summary of the significant works by Graham and 




























































International Marketing Negotiation 
As marketing transactions involving exchange and 
negotiations between buyers and sellers have increasingly 
taken place in' the world arena, there is a need to 
understand more fully the negotiation process between 
negotiators from different countries and cultures (Sheth 
1983) . 
Heiba (1984) advocates the need for negotiators' more 
active role to play in the understanding of environmental 
determinants, styles, and tactics of international 
business negotiations, if they want to achieve the desired 
outcome. He denounces American businessmen's outdated 
attitude of bargaining overseas and the John Wayne 
approach in dealing with foreign businessmen. Sufficient 
time and effort should be spent to acquire the art of 
negotiation and to understand the cultural differences 
among countries. "Go native" and "adaptability" would be 
the key words if businessmen want to be successful in 
international business negotiations. 
Similarly, Ghauri (1986) also suggests the 
utilization of problem solving approach for successful 
international business negotiation. By adopting an 
integrative problem solving orientation (Pruitt and Lewis 
1975; Pruitt 1981; Deutsch 1983) to the negotiation 
process and paying attention to the overall implications 
of the transaction for the negotiator and for the 
counterpart, better strategies and tactics can be derived. 
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In preparation for the negotiation work, a negotiator 
should carefully identify the contents of the deal, the 
concepts at stake, and the relationship of the deal with 
organizational objectives of both parties. with a better 
understanding of the effects of the above issues, we can 
determine the implications (monetary and non-monetary) of 
the deal to the parties, and then come up with more 
appropriate alternatives in the negotiation. 
Ghauri (1986) also promotes the contention of putting 
ourselves in the shoes of our business partner. When we 
can more clearly understand the other party's position, we 
can better foresee his reactions to our tactics. This, in 
turn, will help us to formulate better arguments or 
strategies in our business talk. The better we can 
develop our understanding on the partner's position, the 
more receptive the business partner will be to our offers. 
This actually stimulates flexibility and cooperation in 
the business negotiation through the development of "more 
acceptable alternatives for potentially conflicting 
issues. According to Ghauri, a good agreement is one 
which leads to long range successful implementation. A 
good outcome should be a deal which is beneficial to both 
parties, and no party should feel that it has a less 
advantageous contract. To him, business negotiations 
should be defined as a process through which two or more 
parties interact to reach an agreement which provides 
terms and conditions for the future behavior of the 
parties involved. The main idea is to avoid 
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misunderstanding and trouble in the future. Stated 
differently, it is not a question of win or lose, but a 
question of how two parties cooperatively solve the 
problems in their negotiation exercise. In all regards, 
we should try our best to respect different perspectives 
and concerns, to be aware of differences and to give them 
due respect and acceptance. More often than not, deci-
sions in favor of a deal are often based upon the person-
ality of the negotiators and not on the quality of the 
product. It is suggested that negotiators should try to 
foster the development of long-run relationship and be 
flexible to potential discrepancy which might occur in the 
future. 
Hall (1960) also emphasizes the importance of 
understanding various people around the world. He 
criticizes American international businessmen's lack of 
experience in dealing with a stranger who behaves 
differently from the local norm. They quite 
unintentionally insult, or annoy the native with whom they 
are attempting to do business. He proposes that 
negotiators should spend time and effort to learn the 
silent and hidden languages of foreign cultures which can 
act as a frame of reference to sorting out what is 
significant and relevant in their business dealings. 
Specifically, Hall notes five different languages in 
overseas business: time, space, things, friendship, and 
agreements. For the language of time, the meaning of (1) 
delay in ans~ering a communication, (2) deadline, and (3) 
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time spent waiting in outer office would have surprisingly 
different implications in a foreign context. with respect 
to the" language of space, we have to understand clearly 
the actual implication of (1) location and size of an 
office, (2) nearness and proximity, (3) conversation 
distance, and (4) business talks at home or in social 
occasions. In terms of the language of things, Hall 
suggests the searching of the real meaning of both money 
and material possessions in foreign countries as compared 
to the simple-minded "money talks" concept. As far as the 
language of friendship is concerned, a general rule is 
that friendships are not formed quickly in foreign coun-
tries, but, once formed, they go much deeper, last longer, 
and involve real obligations. It is also equally impor-
tant for negotiators to know the language of negotiating 
agreements in various countries including: (1) rules that 
are technically or legally spelled out, (2) moral prac-
tices, and (3) informal customs to which everyone con-
forms. In summary, it is suggested that executives should 
strive to master these five key languages which actually 
offer a starting point from which they can acquire the 
basic understanding to do business in a foreign culture. 
While Hall (1960) emphasizes the value of playing an 
active role in understanding the differences in culture 
when one is doing business abroad, Jastram (1974) stresses 
the use of Nakado (marriage broker in the Japanese 
language) to improve the negotiation outcome when one 
operates in countries with different political, economic, 
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cultural and social systems. Basically, a more 
cooperative business environment could be built with the 
help of Nakado. Its advantages include: (1) principals 
are able to talk through a Nakado in an uncommitted and 
emotion-free manner, (2) more "thinking time" are allowed 
for developing a more considered view to be taken by both 
parties, (3) the Nakado may be able to see the problems 
encountered from both sides and discover from both sources 
what the real objections are, and (4) the Nakado is 
concerned with the satisfaction of both parties and he can 
speak more frankly to the principals without offending 
them. Actually, Jastram (1974) is suggesting the use of a 
middleman to create a more cooperative negotiation 
environment and to bridge the gap between the two 
international business partners. 
Kapoor (1974) views negotiation as the use of common 
sense under pressure to achieve institutional objectives. 
A business negotiation is typically characterized by four 
issues: common interest (something to negotiate for), 
conflicting interest (something to negotiate about), 
criteria (determining the objective and the criteria), and 
compromise (give and take on issues). He illustrates two 
main types of mistakes commonly committed by international 
business negotiators and suggests that a MNC change its 
attitude in order to achieve a better negotiation outcome. 
First, the MNC has failed to place itself in the other 
person's position. Generally there is insufficient under-
standing of the partners' thinking. Sometimes a MNC has 
38 
placed too much emphasis on "winning" the negotiation and 
has forgotten the issue of saving face for the other 
party, thus affecting the long run relationship between 
both parties. Lack of understanding of the role of per-
sonalities and personal relations has also affected the 
effectiveness of business negotiation. 
On the issue of cross-cultural influences on the 
international negotiation process, Sheth (1983) provides 
us with a conceptual framework which includes both the 
"content" and "style" aspects of the negotiation process. 
A MNC should adjust its negotiation tactics depending on 
whether content-specific or style-specific cultural 
determinants are present in a given business deal. 
According to Sheth (1983), the content dimension 
represents the sUbstantive aspects or the set of product 
values for which the two business parties get together. 
The specific product value exchanged may either be 
functional (representing the instrumental values 
associated with the product) or non-functional (social, 
emotional, or epistemic). The negotiation process and the 
subsequent exchange are presumed to be driven by at least 
one of the abovementioned values. Outcomes of a 
negotiation exercise will depend greatly on whether needed 
values are envisaged and actually exchanged. 
The style dimension represents the ground rules which 
the parties choose to adopt for making the exchange of 
values. A task oriented style represents preference for 
accomplishme~t of negotiations in the most efficient and 
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pr6ductive manner with respect to time, money, and effort. 
On the other hand, a people oriented style represents 
preference for rules set by the personal interests and 
backgrounds of the parties involved in the negotiation. 
Parties are more interested in the personal and social 
preferences, habits and backgrounds rather than in 
efficiency and productivity considerations. It is 
suggested that a negotiator should be able to determine 
which specific style prevails and adjust his negotiation 
activities accordingly. 
with respect to the style dimension, Sheth (1983) has 
suggested some implications. First, a negotiator should 
try to be cooperative and be aware of the significant 
differences in the silent languages as proposed by Hall 
(1960). When facing an unfamiliar, centralized and 
bureaucratic foreign institution, a negotiator should be 
able to adjust his attitude and appreciate its 
philosophies of conducting business transactions. In so 
doing, better outcomes could be expected. Second, a 
negotiator has to take into account other cultural 
differences including collective decisions and attitude 
towards risk. It is suggested that an individualistic 
negotiator should try his best to comprehend the 
collective and risk avoidance culture operative in the 
partners' country. Lastly, a task oriented negotiator is 
advised not to neglect or underestimate the importance of 
the people oriented style emphasizing the notions of 
"who is who" and "who knows whom". If not, he will 
encounter a lot of difficulties in business deals in a 






In cross cultural business negotiations, the issue of 
cultural difference has become an usual item in the 
managers I agenda. About thirty years ago Hall (1960, 
p.S?) warned the American businessman: "When the American 
executive travels abroad to do business, he is frequently 
shocked to discover to what extent the many variables 9f 
foreign behavior and custom complicate his efforts." As 
of to-day, his warning is still valid. When a businessman 
travels abroad, and not knowing the prevailing local 
norms, he may quite unintentionally insult, annoy, or 
amuse the local counterpart with whom he is attempting to 
do business. 
Hofstede (1983), in his 11-year research on national 
cultures, concludes that there are major differences in 
people's work-related values among 50 countries; and 
ethnocentric (based on one particular country) management 
theories are untenable. According to him, activities 
like management are culturally dependent because 
management involves the ~anipulation of symbols ,(rather 
than tangible objects) which have meaning to the people 
who are managed. As the meaning of symbols is primarily 
affected by what have been learned in family, school, work 
place, and society, the management process is affected by 
culture from the beginning to the end. We should 
understand our own culture and the other culture in which 
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we have to adapt to. Management theories are culturally 
sensitive and we cannot take the cultural environment for 
granted. In addition, he also proposes learning from 
Japanese and Chinese scholars as they represent sources of 
wisdom and ideas which complement practices and mentality 
of the European and American. His idea is shared by 
Negandhi (1983), who, from the data generated during the 
last three decades, is convinced that attitudes, belief, 
values, and need hierarchies are different in different 
societies and nations. 
In a study to investigate whether a manager's home 
culture will significantly influence his or her 
international marketing decisions, Tse et al. (1988) 
confirmed that home culture had predictable, significant 
effects on the decision making of executives from the 
People's Republic of China and Canada. The Chinese 
values, including saving face, long-term exchange 
relationship, unquestioned respect for leaders, and pan-
ethical views were well reflected in their marketing 
decisions. They suggest that ethnic cultures do matter in 
marketing endeavors. Basically, culture makes a 
difference in problem identification and in the objectives 
which motivate strategies and choice making. 
Although the marketing negotiation process is 
receiving increasing attention among the marketing 
scholars, there is a paucity of literature on the 
influence of the cross-cultural settings on the outcome of 
negotiation. To shed light on this issue, Sheth (1983) 
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developed a conceptual framework which specified the 
cross-cultural influence on the buyer-seller interaction 
process. In his paper, the "content" (or substantive) and 
the "style" (or ground rules) aspects of the dynamic 
negotiation process are identified. The "content" 
dimension, reflecting the functional, social, personal and 
epistemic values of a product, is influenced by five 
cultural determinants namely: resource vs. need 
orientation, physical climate, traditional vs. modern cul-
tures, economic development, and Maslow's needs hierarchy. 
On the other hand, the "style" dimension, reflecting 
task-oriented, tradition-oriented, or people-oriented ways 
of managing business negotiation, is affected by four 
culture attributes, namely: silent languages, 
individualistic vs. socialistic cultures, institutional 
norms and practices, and inner-directed vs. outer-directed 
orientation. 
According to the consulting experience of Wells 
(1977), American and European managers have usually 
misread the local culture of foreign countries, especially 
third world countries. They often fail to recognize a 
different negotiating style and make corresponding cultur-
al adjustment. Misunderstandings result from the igno-
rance of the host country's technical aspects and business 
practices. Wells suggests the adoption of a spirit of 
compromise and understanding to reduce the friction and to 
solve the impasses that can arise in international negoti-
ations. 
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Likewise, Beliaev, Mullen, and Punnett (1985) also 
identify differences between the negotiation style of the 
soviets and that of negotiators from other western 
countries. According to them, cultural misunderstanding 
is still more common than cultural understanding, as 
people are the "product" of their own particular culture 
and value system, which serves as a frame for under-
standing and interpreting their environment. To help 
understanding how specific cultural differences are likely 
to affect the negotiation process, they contrast the views 
of the American and soviet with respect to 5 cultural 
values namely individualism, time, human resources, risk 
aversion, and result orientation. Table 1.3 summarizes 
these 5 different cultural values that influence the u.s. 
and U.S.S.R. negotiation styles. International 
businessmen should try to put themselves in the context of 
the host country's cultural environment as a key to 
improving understanding and thus, facilitating 
international business. 
As far as international business negotiation is 
concerned, perhaps Japan is the country that receives the 
most attention. since J~pan is one of the world's richest 
markets, much effort has been spent to seek to understand, 
and to adapt to the Japanese ways. To help U.5. business-
men adapt to the Japanese ways of negotiation, Van Zandt 
(1970) describes 13 important Japanese behavioral charac-
teristics and advises Americans on how to negotiate more 












SUMMARY OF CONTRASTING VALUES: 
AMERICAN VS. SOVIET VIEWS 
Amer; can Vi ew 
stress individuality 
decisions often made on 
the spot with guidelines 
established in advance 
by superiors 
time conscious and 
future oriented 
time is money 
expenditure of time 
should achieve measurable 
results 
limited to human and 
financial resources 
available to firm 
often use fixed group for 
negotiations 
relatively more willing 




focus primarily on 
results rather than 
process 
emphasis on tangible 
results as signifying 
progress 
Soviet View 
stress needs of state 
decisions must be approved 
by superiors 
exact schedules impossible 
state plan is the measure 
of time 
coordination between and 
within state organizations 
controls time 
resources available from 
many areas within society 
use resources to carry on 
concurrent and competitive 
negotiations simultaneously 
many change members on 
negotiating team as 
perceived needs change 
individuals and team 
measure risk against 
possible loss of status on 
multiple levels 
often under strict 
instructions and therefore 
unable to take risks 
results orientation 
determined by state plan 
in effect at the time 
lengthy time cycles enable 
negotiators to move through 
process slowly 
preallocation of money 
shifts emphasis away from 
results to process 
Note: Adapted form Beliaev, Mullen, and Punnett (1985, p.106) 
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tics which have been singled out for attention are: emo-
tional sensitivity, hiding of emotions, power plays, 
paternalism, group spirit, group decision, special inter-
ests, delays in decisions, government involvement, bureau-
cratic problems, avoidance of "no", value of friendship, 
and reluctance to argue. Negotiation in Japan will 
involve many complications unknown to the westerners. In 
addition, the Japanese culture seems especially persist-
ent, and there is little likelihood that it will change 
rapidly. 0 
Based on a study conducted by Tung (1984), it is 
found that familiarity with the Japanese business 
practices and social customs is a necessary condition for 
success and Japanese negotiating experience will enhance 
the probability of success in future negotiations. 
Ignoring the cultural differences may often have a 
detrimental effect on the outcome of a negotiation. 
stated differently, the inability to overcome the cultural 
barrier could often lead to negotiation failure. To 
further aggravate the situation, Japanese businessmen are 
usually better versed in western business practices than 
westerners are in theirs _0 The American have only recently 
begun to study the Japanese negotiation style while the 
Japanese have studied and researched on the American 
system for several decades_ 
The most comprehensive research on cultural 
differences and the unique Japanese negotiation style is 
done by Graham and his colleagues (Graham 1981; Graham and 
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Herberger 1983; Graham and Sano 1984; Graham and Sano 
1986). His study included two major parts. First, he 
interviewed experienced executives and observed their 
sales interaction in both the u.s. and Japan. Then, he 
conducted a laboratory experiment to simulate the essen-
tial elements of the sales negotiations observed in the 
field. His experiment involved more than 100 Japanese 
and American businessmen playing a two-person business 
negotiation game. Based on his findings, he reminds U.S. 
negotiators to be aware of and to anticipate the big 
cultural differences between the two nations. western 
businessmen should adjust their negotiation style to cope 
with the Japanese behaviors. 
According to Graham and Sano (1984), the Americans 
always want to settle things quickly and leave no loose 
ends to the bargain. In the American educational system, 
children are taught to compete, and competitive and adver-
sarial relationships are essential themes of the American 
socialization process. students are not taught how to ask 
questions, how to get information, how to listen, and how 
to use questioning as a persuasive tool. The combination 
of these attitude, expec~ations, and behaviors constitutes 
the so-called "John Wayne negotiation style". In the eyes 
of the foreign negotiator, this John Wayne style hinders 
the American to gain a deeper appreciation of the other's 
more subtler form of negotiation. 
Table 1.4 presents the major differences in the two 







SUMMARY OF JAPANESE AND 
AMERICAN BUSINESS NEGOTIATION STYLES 
Japanese 
Most Japanese executives 
understand English, although 
interpreters are often used. 
The Japanese interpersonal 
communication style includes 
Americans 
Americans have less time to formulate 
answers and observe Japanese 
responses because of a lack of 
knowledge of Japanese. 
American business people tend to 
"fill" silent periods with 
less eye contact, fewer negative arguments or concessions. 
facial expressions, and more 
periods of silence. 













Considerable time and expense 
devoted to such efforts is the 
practice in Japan. 
This is the most important step-
high first offers with long 
explanations and in-depth 
clarification. 
Persuasion is accomplished 
primarily behind the scenes. 
Relatively shorter periods are 
typical. 
Information is given briefly and 
directly. "Fair" first offers are 
more typical. 
The most important step: Minds are 
changed at the negotiation table 
Vertical status relations dictate and aggressive persuasive 
bargaining outcomes. tactics used. 
Concessions are made only toward 
the end of negotiations - a 
holistic approach to decision 
making. Progress is difficult 
to measure for Americans. 
Concessions and commitments are 
made throughout - a sequential 
approach to decision making. 
Note: Adapted from Graham (1981, p.14) 
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. for U.S. negotiators closing business deals in Japan. 
social Psychological Perspective 
According to Bazerman and Lewicki (1985), the social 
psychological perspective generates an important strategy 
for understanding the decisions of negotiation. This view 
constitutes a broad and stable research base for our 
current appreciation of negotiations in organizations. As 
far as this perspective is concerned, much of the early 
works were developed by Walton and McKersie (1965), 
Oeutsch (1949), and Deutsch and Krauss (1960). 
Walton and McKersie (1965) discussed the issue mainly 
in the labor negotiation context. They conceive labor 
negotiation as an example of social negotiations. Topics 
in labor negotiations usually include a mixture of 
conflictful and collaborative concerns. The decision on 
bargaining strategies involves defending of one's self-
interest and at the same time the engaging in joint 
problem solving. Attitudes, human values, temperament, 
and tone of the relationship are the usual important 
issues in negotiations. More often than not, constituent 
members are involved and other social units are having 
strong influence over the negotiators. Specifically, four 
subprocesses or systems of activities are included in 
labor negotiations. The first subprocess is distributive 
bargaining in which two parties are assumed to be in 
conflict and .the major aim of them is to resolve that 
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conflict. The second subprocess is integrative bargaining 
in which the two parties can identify common or 
complementary interests and solve problems confronting 
both parties. The third subprocess is attitudinal 
structuring and its function is to influence the attitude 
of the parties toward each other and to change the basic 
relationship which bonds the two groups together. The 
fourth subprocess, intraorganizational bargaining, has the 
function of achieving consensus within the party itself. 
It helps to bring the expectation of constituent members 
and principals into alignment with those of the chief 
negotiator. 
The most influential proponent of adopting the social 
psychological approach in the resolution of conflicts is 
Deutsch. Several key notions in his social psychological 
approach are: 
1. Participants respond to the other in terms of his 
perceptions and cognition of the other. 
2. Participants are influenced by their own expectations 
concerning the other's action and also by his 
perceptions of the other's conduct. 
3. Social interactions . are initiated by motives which 
will further generate new motives. 
4. Social interactions take place in a social 
environment that has developed values, rules, 
symbols, categories, and techniques. ' 
In fact, the significance of the concepts of "co-
Sl 
operation" and "competition"were initially noted in 
Oeutsch (1949) for the understanding and control of social 
processes. Later, three types of motivational 
orientations, namely cooperative, individualistic, and 
competitive were propos-ed (Deutsch 1958; Deutsch 1960). 
In the co-operative context, a person feels that the 
welfare of the other person as well as his own welfare is 
of concern to him and that the other person feels the same 
way. In the individualistic context, a person feels that 
his only interest is to do as well as he could without 
regard to how well the other person does and that the 
other person feels the same way. Finally, in the 
competitive context, the person feels that he wants to do 
as well as he could for himself and he also wants to do 
better than the other person and that the other person 
feels the same way. 
Based on these seminal works, bargaining is further 
recognized as a situation in which the parties have mixed 
motives toward each other: each has an interest in cooper-
ating so that an agreement could be made and, they have 
competitive interest with regard to the nature of the 
agreement they reach. In addition, agreement made is not 
only based on the motivational orientation (co-operation, 
individualistic, and competitive) but also on the situa-
tional and cognitive factors which facilitate or hinder 
the development of a bargaining agreement (Deutsch and 
Krauss 1960; Deutsch and Krauss 1962). 
In summary, Deutsch (1985) and Deutsch (1973) predict 
the differences between the groups adopting different 
motivational orientation in terms of communication, 
perception, attitudes toward one another, and task 
orientation. The following is a number of predictions 
relating to co-operative groups: 
1. More effective inter-member communication. 
2. More friendliness, more helpfulness, and less 
obstructiveness. 
S2 
3. More coordination of effect, more division of labor, 
more orientation to task achievement, more 
orderliness in discussion, and higher productivity. 
4. More feeling of agreement, greater sense of 
similarity in beliefs and values, and more confidence 
in one's own ideas and value. 
S. Defining conflicting interests as a mutual problem to 
be solved collaboratively. 
In an attempt to propose a formal theory of exchange, 
Bagozzi (1978a) introduced social psychological processes 
and modeled exchange as a function of several broad 
determinants: (1) the characteristics of the social 
actors, (2) the social influence exercised by the actors, 
and (3) the situation constraining the exchange. Exchange 
is represented as a dynamic social process functioning 
under economic and psychological constraints. Buyers and 
sellers (or negotiators in this context) are not solely 
isolated actors emitting or responding to stimuli. On the 
contrary, marketing behavior is regarded as a social 
53 
activity and the outcomes of exchanges are contingent upon 
bargaining, negotiation, power, conflict and the shared 
meanings between the social actors. His theory of 
marketing exchanges was further modified in Bagozzi 
(1983a). To explain exchange, four classes of 
determinants are hypothesized: social influence, social 
actor characteristics, third-party effects, and 
situational contingencies. The model is presented in 
Figure 1.1. 
Negotiation can be viewed as a set of personal and 
interpersonal dynamics which interact to form outcomes of 
various sorts. According to Spector (1977), negotiators 
are required to communicate, make demands and concessions, 
respond to stimuli, and arrive at .outcomes. From a 
psychological perspective, the resolution of conflict 
through negotiation is motivated by: 
1. personality needs of negotiators, 
2. personality compatibility among negotiators, 
3. negotiator perceptions and expectation of the 
opponent, and, 
4. persuasive mechanisms to modify the bargaining 
positions and values of the opponent. 
The negotiation model discussed in Spector (1977) 
attempts to hypothesize the ability of personality, 
perception, expectation, persuasion, and the interaction 
of these determinants to explain and predict the process 
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Figure 1.1 
THE DETERMINANTS OF EXCHANGE 
Situational 
contingencies 
e.g., laws, norms 
, r 
Characteristics Exchange Social influence 
of between actors 
social actors e.g., outcomes, e.g., threats, 
experiences, promises, 
e.g., decision ,..."", and actions ~ warnings, ~ acquired, ~ 
rules, source or felt, or performed mendations, 
receiver attributes, by individuals or ingratiation, 







Note: Adapted from Baqozzi (1983a, p.329) 
- -- ~---.------------------
and the outcome of negotiation. His dyadic model of 
negotiation is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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The social-psychological approach has been applied in 
the context of crisis bargaining too. In Gladwin and 
Kumar (1987), crisis management is seen as a dynamic and 
complex process in which psychological variables are 
interactively affecting each other. Linkages in the model 
suggested by them are developed mainly from past research 
and laboratory experiments on social psychology and 
bargaining behavior. Figure 1.3 presents their model of 
crisis bargaining which describes a set of interrelated 
theoretical propositions that highlight the dynamic 
processes, complex interactive relationships, 
psychological biases, and limitations of the capacity of 
negotiation alone to solve the severe business crises. 
Important variables contained in their model are: crisis 
perception, crisis-induced affect, bias cognition, 
informative exchange, joint problem solving, concession 
making, crisis escalation, stalemate, and third party 
intervention. 
Parallel to the work by Gladwin and Kumar (1987), 
other marketing scholars have also criticized the 
traditional assumptions in industrial marketing (Bonoma 
and Johnston 1978), namely: 
1. industrial buying behavior can be studied in 
isolation, 
2. the validity of the stimulus-response model, and, 
3. the industrial market is "rational" with emphasis 
B 
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placed on cost and economical justification only. 
It is argued that the tradition approach takes a rich 
and complex problem and breaks it down into isolated 
component pieces. In so doing, many of the relational 
parts of the industrial marketing processes are lost. 
Business transaction and interaction, being a particular 
form of social behavior, is seldom performed in isolation 
as a single unit. Hence, an interactive perspective is 
required to more accurately and precisely describe, 
explain, and control the industrial buying behavior. 
Several relationships are emphasized in their model on 
industrial marketing interactions: sales representatives 
and purchase agents, sales representatives and the selling 
firm, purchase agents and the buying firm, purchase agents 
and the selling firms, and, the buying firm and the 
selling firm. The model is presented in Figure 1.4. 
In the following, we will discuss research relating 
to the application of the social psychological perspective 
in the cross-cultural negotiation setting. Based on 
research data from managers of five European countries 
(Denmark, Spain, Sweden, switzerland, and the united 
Kingdom), the effects of cultural differences on strategy 
development, role perception, negotiation behavior, and 
negotiation outcomes are identified (Porat 1970). The 
differences among the countries advise against collapsing 
of samples of geographical proximity or assumed cultural 
similarities~ 
Figure 1.4 
EXCHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL MARKETING 
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In another study to investigate cultural differences 
in bargaining behavior, Druckman et al. (1976) contrasted 
various experimental studies and found that 15 of which 
had indicated a significant cross-cultural effect. They 
further studied the bargaining behavior from three cul-
tures (India, Argentina, and the united states) and found 
that the strongest effect originated from culture. Basi-
cally, bargaining differences resulted from variations 
among cultures and orientations. Nevertheless, the effect 
is also found to be contingent upon other variables in-
cluding age, sex, and other experimental conditions. 
The most comprehensive analysis of cross-cultural 
negotiation from a social psychological view is given in 
Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965). Their work is influential in 
the sense that it generates a background framework for 
future analyses in the subject (e.g. Druckman 1977; Graham 
1980). In Graham (1980), it is suggested that sales 
situations can be thought of as negotiations between 
buyers and sellers. Economic and psychological variables 
and their interaction can be employed to explain and 
predict the outcome of negotiations. By viewing how 
external conditions and internal processes are effecting 
the negotiation outcome, the model can derive rich 
implications for both practitioners and researchers. In 
the same vein, Druckman (1977) notes that: (1) negotiation 
is a method of social decision making, (2) negotiators 
face situation where they have to arbitrate between 
alternatives and priorities, (3) negotiators act to 
61 
maximize their ~ interest and to increase common 
interests, and (4) negotiation behavior is conditioned by 
issues, complexity, team structure, and style which are 
part of a larger setting for negotiation. In sum, 
negotiations are made in terms of interactions, power, and 
interests of actors, and that explanation of outcomes are 
found in process, structure, and communication of the 
parties. 
In Sawyer and Guetzkow (1967), negotiation is 
regarded as composed of five aspects: (1) goals, which 
motivate the parties to enter and sustain (2) the process 
of negotiation itself, which involves communications and . 
actions leading to (3) certain outcomes, which are also 
influenced by (4) background factors and relations between 
and within the negotiating parties, and (5) specific 
situational conditions within which the negotiation is 
conducted. The model suggested by Sawyer and Guetzkow 
(1967) is shown in Figure 1.5. 
The issue of culture is included in the Sawyer and 
Guetzkow model under the background factors aspect. In 
many cases of international negotiation, broad cultural 
differences will affect the way different nationals 
understand and react to each other. In fact, national 
character is related to many aspects of a country's 
social-cultural system, which consequently influences the 
types of goals and processes the society pursues in 
negotiation. According to them, there are national 
differences in terms of uncertainty of others' motive, 
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Figure 1.5 
A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF NEGOTIATION 
I I Antecedent I Concurrent I Consequent 
r-------I--~---+---~---------l 
+ I t I 
I PROCESS 
00 I Preparation for negotiation 00 
I Intersection of alternatives OUTCOME 
GOALS I and utUIties 
I ModIfication of utllities Clarity of outcomes Communality of goals Communication Criteria for 
Specificity of goals I .:. evaluating outcomes 
I Persuasion Continuity of negotiation Modification of alternatives 
I Threats and promises 
I Fait accompli 




I CONDITIONS I 
BACKGROUND FACTORS I The setting of negotiation I 
Cui tural variation I Types of negotiation I 
Attitude between parties f Open vs. secret diplomacy I 
Relations within parties I The nwnber of participants I I The number of parties The negotiator Information: Estimating I Status and background I the other's utilities I Personality I 
I Stresses upon negotiation I 
I The timing of negotiation I 
I I 
Note: Adapted from Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965, p.468) 
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desire to cooperate in reaching a group goal, and, 
trustfulness. These cultural differences will likely 
influence the progress of a negotiation, particularly when 
the disparity and behavioral discrepancies between the two 
parties are large. 
In international negotiations, each party may be 
considered to hold a certain attitude towards the other. 
When systematic differences in attitude exist between the 
two groups, it is likely that the attitude of one's own 
group is considered to be superior. This sort of negative 
attitude will predispose a negative interpretation of 
subsequent actions. When the interpretation is allowed to 
further reinforce one's negative attitude, negative 
actions will become likely to occur. In fact, studies and 
experiments have found that the images of different 
parties are consistently related to both the process and 
outcome of their interaction/negotiation (Sawyer and 
Guetzkow 1965). 
Using this social psychological model of negotiation 
as a theoretical base, Graham and his colleagues have · 
developed a series of research studies in sales negotia-
tions in a cross-cultural context. The sales situation is 
considered as the negotiation between the buyer and the 
seller. situational factors and psychological character-
istics of the parties and the interaction of these varia-
bles are posited to explain the process and outcome of 
international negotiation. Their approach and findings 
have provided insights into international sales negotia-
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tions. 
According to Graham (1980), cross cultural sales 
negotiations have not been investigated systematically. 
with a few exceptions, the literature which addresses the 
matter is largely anecdotal and descriptive. 
Nevertheless, he was able to identify seven quality 
negotiation studies in the marketing setting (Graham 1980, 
p.29). These studies included: Fouraker and Siegel 
(1963); Green, Gross, and Robinson (1967); Pennington 
(1968); Mathews, Wilson, and Monoky (1972); Pruitt and 
Lewis (1975); Lewis and Fry (1977); and Angelmar and stern 
(1978). In aggregate, these studies can serve as a good 
base to outline the evolution of both the theory and 
method of sales negotiations in the social exchange con-
text (Bagozzi 1978). 
Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) notion of "interference" 
also helps to provide a plausible explanation by positing 
that interferences reduce rewards and increase cost of 
transaction. Interferences are defined as competing or 
incompatible responses which might occur as a consequence 
of, for example, a confusion of the content (e.g., words) 
or context (e.g, gestures) of communications in cross-
cultural sales negotiations. cultural differences, a 
source of interpersonal dissimilarities, can lead to 
interactional interferences which will consequently reduce 
the likelihood of favorable outcomes in a negotiation. 
starting from 1980 onwards, Graham and his colleagues 
have proceeded further and generated a number of cross 
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cultural business negotiation studies. They are 
summarized in Table 1.5. These studies provide an 
excellent reference for negotiation researchers to obtain 
a comprehensive review on the application of the social 
psychological perspective in a cross cultural marketing 
negotiation context. 
The Chinese context 
If we accept the tenet that cross-cultural differ-
ences do exist in international business negotiations, a 
natural mov~ would be~ for us to investigate how two major 
cultures .differ in negotiation style and what are the 
respective antecedents for negotiation successfulness. 
While numerous studies have been conducted in the past to 
shed light on issues related to international negotia-
tions, there is a paucity of empirical studies to investi-
gate how marketing decisions and negotiations are deter-
mined in a collectivistic Chinese cultural context. In 
this study, we hope to fill the gap and select Chinese 
culture as a basic subject for investigating international 
business negotiations. 
In recent years, a ·lot of theoretical and empirical 
work has been done to investigate how the Chinese behave 
differently towards westerners in various social contexts. 
According to Hwang (1987), the universal assumption of 
western research on social behavioral patterns and rules 
of exchange should be challenged, as recent studies show 


















A SUMMARY OF WORKS BY GRAHAM 
AND HIS COLLEAGUES ON 
CROSS CULTURAL SALES NEGOTIATION 
Explanatory variables! 
findings 
Japanese: role(buyer vs. seller) 
Brazilian: deceptive strategies 
U.S.: problem solving strategies 
Japanese: role(buyer vs. seller) 
U.S.: information content of 
. . strategies 
representational strategies 
mediate the influence of cultural 
variation 
substantial differences in 
bargaining style exist across 
culture 
Graham and Andrews (1987): 
[6 Japanese cultural variation influences 
the process and outcome of 
marketing negotiation 
6 Americans 
6 U.S.-Japanese dyads] 
Adler, Graham, 





negotiation styles of Francophone 
Canadian and Mexican are different 
from the American and Anglophone 
Canadian styles 
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Table 1.5 (cont'd) 
A SUMMARY OF WORKS BY GRAHAM 
AND HIS COLLEAGUES ON 
CROSS CULTURAL SALES NEGOTIATION 
Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, 





Graham, Kim, Lin, 
and Robinson (1988): 
[54 Chinese . 
42 Japanese . 
38 Koreans 
138 Americans] 
American process of negotiation is 
different from that of the 
European 
Chinese: competitive strategies 
Japanese: role (buyer vs. seller) 
Korean: role (buyer vs. seller) 
U.S.: problem solving strategies 
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follow patterns that differentiate them from those of the 
West. In fact, the collectivism-individualism dimension 
as a useful way to contrast the Chinese and the Western 
cultures is supported by much evidence. Hofstede (1980a) 
has empirically identified the individualism-collectivism 
dimension of national culture, and found that the united 
states attained the highest score on individualism. 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong (societies of a Chinese 
background) are on the extreme end of the collectivism 
scale. 
In general, collectivism suggests an emphasis on the 
social environment and individualism suggests an emphasis 
on the self. Leung (1987) gives a clear definition on 
individualism/ collectivism using "ingroup-outgroup 
differences" as a base of reference: 
Individualism refers to the tendency to be more 
concerned about the consequences of one's behavior for 
one's own needs, interests, and goals, whereas 
collectivism refers to the tendency to be more concerned 
about the consequences of one's behavior for in-group 
members and to be more willing to sacrifice personal 
interests for the attainment of collective interests. In 
individualist societies, the distinction between out-
groups and in-groups is relatively unimportant, and self-
sufficiency is emphasized more. In collectivist socie-
ties, behavior toward in-group members may be markedly 
different frombehavior toward out-group members, and 
values such as interpersonal harmony and group solidarity 
are more emphasized (p.899). 
Besides collectivism, power distance is another major 
dimension which differentiates the Chinese culture from 
the others (Hofstede' 1980a). This basic issue involves 
how different ' societies solve the question of human 
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inequality. In an organization, inequality is functional 
and inevitable. This inequality is often embedded in the 
supervisor and subordinate hierarchy. Usually, we will 
find subordinates trying to reduce the power distance 
between themselves and their superiors while the manage-
ment layer trying to maintain 'or even enlarge it. In 
different societies, the level of accepted power distance 
will be different. Hofstede's (1980a) definition of power 
distance is: 
The power distance between a Boss B and a subordinate 
S in a hierarchy is the difference between the extent to 
which B can determine the behavior of S and the extent to 
which S can determine the behavior of B (p.99). 
The power distance accepted by both Band Sand 
supported by the social environment is largely determined 
by culture. It deals with perceptions of the superior's 
style of decision making and of subordinates' fear to 
argue with superiors, and with the nature of decision 
making which subordinates prefer in their managers. In 
Hofstede's study on collectivism and power distance, it is 
found that countries dominated by the Chinese culture rank 
higher in the collectivism scale and lower in the power 
distance scale. These countries include Singapore, Tai-
wan, and Hong Kong. 
A number of authors have investigated how these two 
,Chinese main cultural differences would affect the social 
and marketing behavior of the Chinese. A summary of 
seven of such studies are presented in Table 1.6. The 











Tse et al. 
(1988) 
Table 1.6 
A SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL WORKS ON RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN COLLECTIVISM AND POWER DISTANCE WITH 
SOCIAL AND MARKETING BEHAVIOR 
Collectivist Antecedents 
Outcomes Collectivism Power Distance 
aggressive harmony harmony 
behavior conformity conformity 
ambivalence suppress 
equality aggression 
reward group social 
allocation solidarity evaluation 
procedural harmony animosity 
preference solidarity reduction 
social guanxi social norm 
behavior reciprocity Mianzi (face) 
negotiation harmony harmony 
behavior attraction control 
kinship hierarchy 




marketing harmony harmony 
behaviors mieutsu (face) mieutsu (face) 
interrelations modesty 
favor authority 
kinship risk averse 
mean 
international harmony harmony 





behavior (Bond and Wang 1983), reward allocation (Leung 
and Bond 1984), procedural preference (Leung 1987), and 
social behavior (Hwang 1987). These four studies can help 
to shed light on how likely a Chinese negotiator would 
behave, under a collective cultural influence. On the 
other hand, other authors have studied directly how these 
two factors have affected marketing and negotiation behav-
ior of the Chinese. Areas under investigation are: nego-
tiation behavior (Shenkar and Ronen 1987), marketing 
implications (Yau 1988), and international marketing 
decisions (Tse et al. 1988). All these studies indicate 
that collectivism and power distance, two concepts that 
differentiate the Chinese culture from the West, are 
affecting the social and marketing behavior of the people 
brought up in the Chinese cultural environment. 
In addition to these theoretical works, there are 
attempts to empirically verify the effects of various 
issues under collectivism on different social behavior. 
In this connection, eleven studies having relevancy to the 
negotiation behavior are identified and are summarized in 
Table 1.7 to give a comprehensive description of the 
confirmed evidence on how these unique cultural character-
istics influence the behavior of the Chinese. 
Table 1.7 
A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL WORKS ON 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLECTIVISM AND POWER DISTANCE 















and 30 U.S. 
college students] 
Bond, Leung, 
and Wan (1982) 
[108 Chinese and 
99 U.S. college 
students] 
Leung and Bond 
(1984) 
[96 Chinese and 
96 U.S. college 
students] 
Leung and Bond 
(1984) 
[144 Chinese 
and 128 U.S. 
college students] 
Leung and Lind 
(1986) 
[60 Chinese and 





















Chinese are more persuasible. 
Chinese are more traditional 
and conforming. 
There is a tendency towards 
moderation to support group 
harmony and integrity 
The Chinese make a more 
egalitarian assignment of 
rewards. 
For out-group, the Chinese 
follow the equity norm more 
closely than the Americans, 
when pressure of social 
evaluation are removed. 
For in-group, the Chinese 
follow the equality norm 
a~d regard such an 
allocation as fairer. 
The Chinese perceive that the 
confrontation and competitive-
ness inherent in the adversary 
procedure have mitigated their 
preference for it. 
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Table 1.7 (cont'd) 
A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL WORKS ON 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLECTIVISM AND POWER DISTANCE 





and 96 U.S. 
college students] 
Chiu, Tsang, 
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Chinese prefer bargaining and 
mediation as they are more 
capable to reduce the 
animosity between the 
disputants. 
The Chinese would be less 
likely to complain when direct 
confrontation is involved. 
The Chinese are less likely to 
pursuit a conflict with an in-
group disputant. 
Culture makes a difference in 
problem identification, 
objectives motivating choice, 




REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
China Business Deals and Negotiation 
The following sections contain a description of the 
literature which explains how the various cultural factors 
affect the respective outcomes attached to different China 
trade negotiations and deals. Based on these descrip-
tions, we will be better able to generate the pertinent 
hypotheses and measures to be incorporated in the study. 
China Business Deals Studies 
Numerous descriptive and prescriptive studies have 
been performed by many China trade researchers. They have 
tried to identify "what should be done" and "what should 
not be done" when one is doing business with the Chinese. 
Broadly classified, the~e studies could be grouped under 
four main categories: (l) trade and business, (2) joint 
venture, (3) cultural, political, and business environ-
ment, and (4) case study and actual experience. In order 
to save space, the scope and major suggestions of these 
descriptive studies are summarized in Table 2.1, Table 









A SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES ON 
CHINA BUSINESS DEALS (TRADE AND BUSINESS) 
Scope Major Suggestions to Businessmen 
Trade 1. ·offer proprietary technologies 
2. help China's import substitu-
tion drive 
3. take the initiative 
4. aware of competition 
5. be flexible 
Business 1. eliminate false impressions 
2. develop relationships 
3. establish friendship and trust 
4. develop "face" 
Business 1. compatible objectives 
2. long term objectives 
3. personal connections 
4. determination and patience 
5. high level talks 














A SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES 











Major Suggestions to Businessmen 
1. provide technology transfer 
2. generate foreign exchange 
3. economic growth 
4. aware of Chinese authority 
limitations 
5. aware of bureaucracies and 
delays 
6. long term business relation-
ship 
7. more understanding 
1. foreign exchange 
2. efficiency and technology 
3. create jobs 
4. foreign markets 
5. make personal trips 
6. longer negotiation process 
1. problem areas: currency 
problem, productivity, 
project expenses, slow 
return, socialist principle 
2. patience, understanding, and 
cooperation 
3. improve China's efficiency 
4. understand China's culture 
1. conforming to Chinese 
business customs 
2. develop guanxi 
3. patience 
4. ,create employment 





















A SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES 
ON CHINA BUSINESS DEALS 
(CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT) 
Major 
Scope Suggestions to Businessmen 


















2. take a long-term view 
3. establish good working 
relations 
1. socialist principle still 
applies 
2. vague line of authority 
3. long negotiation 
4. improve China's export 
5. China does not reward 
risk-taking 
6. slow to change 
1. transfer of technology 
2. employment and productivity 
3. foreign exchange creation 
4. self sufficiency 
1. reliance on market forces 
2. dealing with professional 
managers 
3. profit and loss responsi-
bilities 
1. personal connection 
2. past business relations 
1. emphasis on long term 
relationship 
2. patience 
3~ appreciate China's goals 
and constraints 
4. mutual benefits 
1. bonding by guanxi 
2. favor the Chinese in 
negotiation 
1. modernization drive 














A SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES 
ON CHINA BUSINESS DEALS 












Suggestions to Businessmen 
1. avoid debates 
2. face saving 
1. long term strategy 
2. risk taking 
3. low initial profit 
4. building guanxi 
1. advanced technology 
2. increase Chinese export 
3. earn foreign exchange 
4. China's move to assist 
foreign investors 
1. avoid conflict and disputes 
2. select a good partner 
3. develop good relationship 
4. avoid confrontation 
5. understand other's goal, 
motivation and expectations 
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tions of these studies can serve as a starting ground to 
generate important determinants for successfulness in 
doing business and negotiation with the Chinese. 
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In addition to the descriptive studies mentioned 
above, there are also a number of empirical studies that 
investigate the various factors surrounding China trade 
deals in general. Basically, business executives in China 
and in foreign countries were interviewed and their opin-
ions and perceptions were used as a base to suggest objec-
tives and strategies for other foreign businessmen doing 
business in China. A summary of these empirical studies 
are shown in Table 2.5. The table describes the scope 
under studied, samples involved, and also the basic find-
ings with respect to each study. 
When we combine the findings given in Table 2.1 to 
Table 2.5, we may be able to draw several preliminary 
conclusions. First, Chinese prefer doing business with 
in-group members. From the studies mentioned above, we 
can see that businessmen should try to become "good 
friends" with the Chinese if they want to do long-term 
business in China. Personal connection and relationship 
are always helpful; and ~o develop good guanxi is consid-
ered to be the "rule of the game". Business would be a 
more natural outcome if the Chinese treat a foreign part-
ner as an insider. Nevertheless, it usually takes years 
for a person to become an "old friend" of the Chinese. In 
the course of developing long term business relationships, 


























A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
















1. disregard value of time 
2. cultivation of guanxi 
3. time consuming talks 
4. cater to Chinese needs 
5. long-term commitment and 
cooperation 
1. authority is diffused in 
China 
2. personal approach 
3. connection is crucial 
1. long term commitment 
2. acceptance of risk 
3. willingness to transfer 
technology to China 
1. diffused decision making 
power 
2. meeting Chinese need 
3. long-term orientation 
4. cautious Chinese 
1. diverging business 
objectives 




















Table 2.5 (cont'd) 
A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
ON CHINA BUSINESS DEALS 
Scope of 
Study 








.. Impl ications 
1. friend's recommendation 
2. track record 
3. connections and guanxi 
4. personal approach 
5. reputation 
6. matching objectives 
1. stick to rules 
2. avoid criticism 
3. conform with authority 
1. long term commitment 
2. understand Chinese need 
3. state-of-the-art product 
4. good personal connections 
and guanxi 





He has to take the initiative to work out a smooth working 
relationship on one hand, and be patient on the other hand 
if the Chinese are not responding as fast as businessmen 
in their home country do. If a person wants to become an 
insider, he has to act like an insider who is willing to 
sacrifice personal interests for the attainment of collec-
tive interest (Leung 1987). 
Second, the Chinese are high in the power distance 
scale and they are not willing to challenge their superior 
or to radically change the existing system of doing 
business. In this regard, a foreign businessmen should 
be able to demonstrate to the whole hierarchy (including 
the top officials who influence greatly the decision) that 
the deal is beneficial to the Chinese side as a whole. 
From Table 2.1 to Table 2.5, we can see that the needs of 
the Chinese might include: proprietary technologies, 
import sUbstitution drive, foreign exchange, economic 
growth, job creation, efficiency, modernization, and 
sufficiency. Foreign businessmen who are able to help 
their business partners in China to justify their case 
before the top Chinese management layer would be in a 
better position to close their deals in the PRC. 
The Chinese are risk averse and are not willing to 
confront their superiors. Hence, foreign managers should 
be aware of the bureaucratic concerns and should always 
aim for higher level talks, if that is possible. If they 
can foster ~trong bonding with high officials, they can 
cut through the web-like layers of red tape and reach the 
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core of the business issue more easily. In any event, the 
face of the whole hierarchy should be protected, as the 
Chinese would prefer not to do anything rather than risk 
their reputation before colleagues and superiors. Howev-
er, as lines of authority are vague and unclear in China, 
a foreign manager has to invest a lot of time and energy 
in order to understand the particular goals, motives, and 
expectations of various people in the overlapping bureau-
cratic layers. 
China Business Negotiation 
The previous discussion focuses on China business 
deals in general. Here, we will take a closer look at the 
business negotiation in the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and see how different dimensions affect the success 
of business negotiations in a Chinese context. with a few 
exceptions (Brunner and Taoka 1971i Tung 1982ai Graham et 
al. 1988), studies on the Chinese business negotiation 
process are weakly developed, both conceptually and empir-
ically. Basically, we can find three drawbacks in Chinese 
trade negotiation researches. First, American attitudes 
and perceptions are usually overemphasized, and the Chi-
nese perspective is given much less attention. Second, 
research tends to be based on instruments developed in the 
West and applied unconditionally in the China negotiation 
context. Criticisms and concerns of this practice are 
discussed in',detail in Adler, Campbell, and Laurent 
(1989). Third, hypotheses in previous research are not 
rigorously developed and the determinants of success in 
China trade negotiation are usually taken for granted. 
Descriptive studies 
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In this section, we will try to study relevant works 
in this area and to generate from them potential 
determinants of success when a foreign negotiator is 
closing a business deal in China. Table 2.6 presents an 
overview of previous studies in this area. They can help 
shed light on various forces affecting the success of 
negotiation with the Chinese. Five main determinants are 
identified: friendship, positive attitude, long range 
view, competitive tactics, and risk averse behavior. 
Friendship 
Depauw (1981) emphasizes the issue of friendship in 
China trade negotiations, and stresses the Chinese 
inclination for dealing with "old friends". The Chinese 
usually place a premium on relationship, and "old friends" 
are those people who can be counted on personally and can 
be relied upon to recommend other trustworthy parties. 
Earning the term "old friends" should be a trader's goal 
in the negotiation exercise. Basically, Chinese distrust 
total strangers and will try to avoid them. However, they 
may welcome strangers whom they meet through relatives, 
good friends, or colleagues. They are interested in 
establishing guanxi, . a term meaning relationship and 
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Note: * = key factor under investigation in the study 
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The issue of friendship is also stressed by Tung 
(1982). He suggests that companies should continue their 
efforts to develop friendship with the Chinese partners, 
no matter how difficult the situation may be. The Chinese 
will favor old friends who have stood by them, and they 
will substantially benefit their old friends when a fa-
vorable situation comes. Chinese people are very appreci-
ative of those persons who have supported them in hard 
·times, and will duly reward them when opportunities arise. 
Long-term relationships or friendships are preferred by 
the Chinese. When China modernizes and the standard of 
living of its people rises, old friends of China would 
stand to gain by being able to obtain access to such a 
huge market. 
with respect to the issue of friendship, pye (1982) 
suggests that friendship in China includes the 
expectation of what friends should be willing to do for 
each other, and this goes well beyond the American notions 
of friendliness. Friendship is the constantly repeated 
theme of Chinese negotiators which is considered as a 
major element that shapes the atmosphere surrounding 
negotiations. The Chinese seem to have a compelling need 
to dwell on the subject of friendship, and reciprocity is 
a norm for doing business in China. Sometimes, the Chi-
nese will consider the other party as unfriendly if it 
does not give special treatment to China. 
'On the notion of relationship, Saunders and Chong 
, (1986) are o~ the opinion that Chinese place great 
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importance on the fostering of personal relationship 
between buyers and sellers. The personal and friendly 
approach is stressed by many successful businessmen 
working in China. For the Westerner, business and person-
al relationships are often kept strictly apart, but this 
is generally not true for the Chinese. For the Chinese 
people, loyalty and trust are high in their priority list. 
Based on the above, Saunders and Chong (1986) suggest that 
businessmen should try to establish friendship with Chi-
nese negotiators. They should never underestimate any 
member in a negotiation team. Courtesy and manners should 
be given the greatest attention at all times. 
In making deals in China, attention must specially be 
drawn to the Chinese notion of friendship (pye 1986). He 
suggests that a foreigner should not over emphasize, 
define, or seek unduly to constrain the Chinese partner 
with a formal contract. To the Chinese mind, a deal is 
seen to be shaped much more through human relationships 
established through the negotiations and actual conduct of 
the business than through the written word. One should 
understand that the Chinese place much value on loyalty 
and the contract is not as important as relationships. As 
a matter of fact, the Chinese can make heavy demands on 
friends, and not place many limits on how they can use 
friendships to materialize advantages. Discussions after 
the contract can be reopened after contract signing, 
because the Chinese might -consider the two parties now old 
friends who could bring matters up any time. 
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Brunner and You (1988) described thoroughly why a 
negotiator should consider the dynamics and consequences 
of "face" to the Chinese, and suggested that foreign 
negotiators should not cause Chinese to lose face, but 
instead endeavor to give face whenever appropriate. Face 
is closely tied to friendship. - If a negotiator is effec-
tive in developing a bond of friendship by "giving face", 
the Chinese will reciprocate by doing the same. A sense 
of guanxi may evolve and this bonding implies that "we all 
have face". Throughout the meeting, the Chinese group 
will emphasize the importance of mutual respect, coopera-
tion, and an enduring and deep friendship. Usually, 
gifts will be exchanged as a gesture of status, respect, 
and to "give face" to the recipient, which will help 
solidify friendship and business relations. 
However, the building of friendship with the Chinese 
may lead to negative impacts too. According to the above 
discussion, the Chinese will reward persons who have 
supported them, give special treatment to friends, and 
make significant sacrifice for good friends. The other 
side of the coin is that the Chinese will demand all these 
if a MNC negotiator is qualified as an old friend of the 
Chinese. In this circumstance, the Chinese may make 
"unreasonable" demands on the western negotiator. Being a 
"friend" of the Chinese brings both privileges and respon-
sibilities. 
The situation is further complicated if an ethnic 
Chinese is present in the MNC negotiation team. While 
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there are positive impacts if an ethnic Chinese is sitting 
on the negotiation table, negative impacts are introduced 
too (Wang 1986; Lee 1989; Lee 1990). One key question 
being asked by most MNCs in assigning ethnic Chinese in 
China trade talk is: will split-loyalty affect the ethnic 
Chinese negotiator? One speculation is that if friendship 
would imply excessive demand from the Chinese side, an 
ethnic Chinese would face the same pressure from the 
Chinese side, especially in behind-the-scenes discussion 
(Lee and Lo 1988). If the ethnic Chinese has already 
developed good friendship with .the Chinese side, the role 
conflict of that boundary person would be even greater 
the Chinese can make heavy demand on good friends, and an 
ethnic Chinese is expected to be patriotic and should give 
special favor to his or her motherland. Put differently, 
friendship between MNC ethnic Chinese and the Chinese side 
would have its pros and cons. It is the MNC's duty to 
determine whether ethnic Chinese should be employed and 
how they should be deployed under such circumstance. 
positive Attitude 
Besides friendship, Depauw (1981) also suggests the 
importance of adopting a -cooperative attitude when a 
negotiator is fostering a coordinative relationship with 
the Chinese counterpart. A negotiator should try his best 
to demonstrate his positive attitude which can help him in 
earning genuine respects from the Chines~. In 
establishing relationship with the Chinese, a lengthy 
period is necessary in most instances. This sometimes 
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reflects the Chinese emphasis on getting to know each 
other and their real concern to test a business partner's 
friendliness and sincerity. Whenever possible, a negotia-
tor should try to understand the value to the Chinese of 
aChieving a more favorable convergence of interests. In 
this connection, Depauw (1982) also suggests the use of a 
Chinese "old friend" to act as middleman in the negotia-
tion process. In all events, gestures of cooperation and 
good will are beneficial in the business negotiation. 
Tung (1982) likewise proposes the adoption of a 
cooperative attitude when one is negotiating with the 
Chinese. One should try to understand the need of the 
Chinese as far as technical knowledge, economic strength, 
self-reliance and social construction are concerned. A 
negotiator with a positive attitude will be more success-
ful, as the Chinese really mean it when they say that . 
business should be operated under the principle of "equal-
ity and mutual benefit". 
pye (1982) as well suggests the merits of a positive 
attitude in negotiation with the Chinese. Generally, 
Chinese would expect that senior executives should visit 
them -- that is, go to the place where the Chinese side is 
located -- as an indicator of a good attitude. They 
always view that all successful riegotiations require high 
degrees of mutual trust and respect. In all events, the 
businessmen should try to understand the real needs and 
concerns of the Chinese, and satisfy them accordingly. 
Usually, the Chinese are not only interested in just 
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buying advanced technology for the sake of production. 
They also like to use the acquisition as a means to obtain 
formal training for their engineers. The Chinese are 
looking for self-reliance, and they want the engineers to 
be able to use the latest technologies with minimum 
instructions from the foreign partner. Basically, a 
positive and co-operative attitude will improve the out-
come of a business negotiation. 
On the issue of cooperation, Wang (1984) stresses 
that the Chinese do insist on mutual benefit to both 
parties. A foreign negotiator should be able to put 
himself in the shoes of the Chinese and understand what 
the Chinese are faced with. It is to the foreign parties' 
advantage to find a way out from the bureaucratic layers 
and official guidelines. For example, incentives such as 
free technical assistance are valued highly by the Chi-
nese. In most cases, the making use of ethnic Chinese 
personnel can help narrow the cultural gap. Multination-
als with a positive attitude will perform better in their 
negotiation activities. 
Wang (1986) further suggests the adoption of a 
positive attitude by businessmen when they are doing 
business with China. First, they should try to understand 
the real needs of the Chinese. It is suggested that firms 
should be concerned with issues designated by the Chinese 
in the five-year and longer term perspective plans. The 
negotiation team should be able to answer the technical 
questions raised by the engineers and technical people on 
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the Chinese side. If possible, the team should approach 
both the trade corporations and the end users in China. 
Second, the team should try to eliminate the negative 
effect brought forth by the language barrier. They should 
understand what the Chinese are ,capable of understanding. 
Important documents should be prepared in both languages 
and ample copies should be made available to all of the 
relevant decision makers. The team may also use 
American-Chinese to serve as channels for communication 
and to interpret the real meaning of the hidden language. 
Third, a genuine willingness to help and a frank attitude 
can minimize the negotiator's worry that they may be 
caught by hidden implications. All these will help in 
building up a good business relationship in China. 
In a paper to discuss the common problems encountered 
by multinationals working in China, Tung (1986) mentioned 
ways to bridge the cultural and societal disparities in 
China trade negotiations. They are summarized as: (1) 
respect the people in China, (2) adapt to the new environ-
ment, (3) prepare to answer technical questions from 
Chinese engineers, (4) know the Chinese language and 
understand the subtleties ' in China, and, (5) assign 
better trained personnel to China. 
To obtain a successful joint venture, Hendryx (1986b) 
emphasizes the importance of building of cooperation and 
integrating objectives between the two parties involved. 
Managers must be able to locate the origins of problems 
and be able to lobby the local bureaucracy in order to 
strengthen the business relationship between them. In 
all, the rigorous and properly directed efforts of a 
foreign partner is required to generate more cooperation 
on the Chinese side, and to make the bureaucracy more 
receptive to the legitimacy of the MNC. 
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"Face" is gained if the president or other high 
official can initiate the negotiating process. If this 
high executive can also establish relations with the 
leaders in the local political hierarchy, such as mayor or 
trade minister, greater legitimacy can be established. 
This type of cooperative attitude will symbolize 
possession of "face" and a smooth business relationship 
can be fostered. 
Long Range View 
pye (1982) criticizes the Americans' short term view 
and myopic calculation of quid pro quo when they are doing 
business with the Chinese. The Chinese have a longer 
range view of things and are in less of a hurry. They 
have a different definition on the issue of timeliness ' and 
insist that "investment" in relationship cannot be hur-
ried. 
As far as time horizon is concerned, Wang (1984) 
suggests a willingness to develop business even if there 
is no immediate profit at all. If steps are not taken in 
advance, and friendships are not developed to a certain 
extent, the Chinese market may become too crowded for the 
MNCs to attempt an entry at a later stage of China's 
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development. In addition, the multinational should be 
careful not to project an image of deception and of being 
too clever~ The Chinese favor the gradual building up of 
relationships and consider some expedient measures as 
deceitful. A reputation of dishonesty is extremely harm-
ful in Chinese business negotiation, as information will 
be spread among officials and a new reputation cannot be 
established overnight. 
On the issue of patience, it was suggested that we 
should not undervalue the importance of preliminary 
discussions and talks outside Beijing. While big sales 
are usually made in Beijing, contacts and negotiations at 
other places such as the trade fairs are prerequisites. 
In some cases it may take months or even years for 
progress to be made; but if one wants to do business with 
the Chinese, patience and a long range view are necessary. 
Tung (1986) additionally comments on the short range 
orientation of US mUltinationals. Short stays and limited 
commitment in China will not result in high performance 
because the expatriate barely has the time to adjust to 
the cultural and business system in China. Furthermore, 
the building of constructive business relationship takes 
time in China. In this connection, a longer range in-
volvement is recommended if a foreign firm wants to estab-
lish something sUbstantial in PRC. 
Patience is the watchword also stressed by pye 
(1986). Businessmen should be patient in the actual 
negotiations ' and in designing an overall strategy. Impa-
~~ ------- ---
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tience will make a businessman vulnerable to manipulation 
and will produce premature agreements that can later lead 
to misunderstanding and conflicts. 
competitive Tactics 
Depauw (1981) considers th~ Chinese competitive 
tactics as critical factors which will influence the out-
come of a business negotiation in China. A businessman 
closing deals in China must place great emphasis on this 
issue in order to negotiate forcefully in the PRC. Basi-
cally, Chinese are tough negotiators and they like to rely 
on competition to ask for greater concessions. 
According to pye (1982), firms seeking markets in 
China will be facing strong competitors with aggressive 
sales practices. When the total number of business 
proposals far exceeds Chinese capabilities to pay, the 
Chinese will put up sales resistance. Japanese 
competitors often have an upper hand because they usually 
examine Chinese needs in detail and then seek to fit their 
offerin9s into these needs. They are more diversified, 
and have engaged in fundamental research about Chinese 
planning. American companies with a narrower range of 
specialization will have .a hard time competing with the 
Japanese. 
Sometimes, the Chinese negotiator will purposely 
stimulate other competitors to enter the scene by publi-
cizing the business negotiation, hence strengthening 
China's bargaining power. The Chinese believe that their 
bargaining position can be improved by keeping their 
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partners slightly uncomfortable. By encouraging passive 
trading partners to become more active, the current part-
ners will serve China's need better and will not take 
their successes for granted. To achieve this, the Chinese 
like to play the host's role which allow them to be able 
to play off competitors against each other. pye (1982) 
reported that in certain cases, various competitors were 
presenting their seminars at the same time on different 
floors of the same hotel. The Chinese went from one floor 
to the other, commenting to each rival about the selling 
points of the others. In such a situation, foreign 
companies become especially vulnerable. Generally, 
competitiveness, either natural or deliberately induced by 
the Chinese, will affect the successfulness of a foreign 
businessman negotiating in China. 
In addition to the competition coming from other 
businessmen, Chinese corporations negotiating for foreign 
deals have the backing from the entire state (Wang 1984). 
Internal competition among themselves is kept to a 
minimum. This sort of centralized endeavor gives the 
Chinese negotiators ~n upper hand when they are dealing 
with MNCs. Collusion among transnationals are rare and 
they generally compete with one another for the contract 
from China. 
Though the Chinese would prefer a slower pace in the 
negotiation process, they are by no means weak 
negotiators. In some cases, they will quite ruthlessly 
play off one company against another. The leaking of a 
firm's proposal to competitive companies is not uncommon 
(Saunders and Chong 1986). 
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In relation to the issue of competition, Wang (1986) 
highlights another key concern of U.S. businessmen: their 
competitors in China are suppo~ted by their government, 
but the US government is indifferent or even obstructive. 
In many other foreign countries, governments' concessions 
credit is often more readily available in promoting ex-
ports to China. In this regard, foreign competitors often 
have an upper hand when compared with the U.S. 
counterpart. 
pye (1986) also notes that the Chinese negotiators 
will play their cards "close to the vest" while at the 
same time insisting that visitors show their hands. It is 
a common strategy for Chinese to reveal information on 
competitors as a way of trying to pry out secrets. While 
the Japanese trading companies avoid this problem by 
refusing to bid against each other, the U.S. companies are 
not united in such a fashion. 
In addition, the Chinese are good in increasing their 
bargaining power by using friendship as a weapon. In 
China trade talks, it is common for the Chinese to demand 
extra favors or treatments from MNC negotiators to 
exchange for long-term friendship with the Chinese. If 
the negotiator is an ethnic Chinese, the China side may 
also appeal to the negotiator's patriotism, both in front 
of and behind the negotiation table, to exploit as much as 
they can in the trade deal. In this regard, though the 
use of ethnic Chinese in China business negotiator may 
have its advantages (cf. Tung 1982; pye 1982; pye 1986), 
MNC should pay special care in order not to be hurt by 
this double-edged sword. 
Risk Averse Behavior 
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When negotiating with the Chinese, a businessman may 
find himself facing a group of risk-averse persons. The 
Chinese tend to negotiate in very literal terms, as the 
complex Chinese bureaucratic structure demands this. 
Terms that are taken for granted in u.s. are given very 
careful and detailed treatment in China (Depauw 1981). 
This risk-averse behavior makes negotiations lengthy, 
difficult, and demanding. Before a decision is made to 
purchase a product, Chinese buyers will try to learn as 
much as possible about the product and the technology 
related to it. This will inhibit the efficient progress 
of a business negotiation. 
According to ' pye (1982), the Chinese negotiators take 
the issue of risk very seriously. They know that their' 
careers can be jeopardized, and they can be punished, if 
the negotiation results are criticized by others. Hence, 
they will try to back away from responsibility which, 
inevitably, delays or even hampers the negotiation 
process. The situation becomes even worse when a negoti-
ating team reports to other groups of officials who have 
similar concerns for safety. In China, the critical act 
in a bureaucratic process is to avoid responsibility. 
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More often than not, commands and decisions are diffused 
and not precise at all. No particular person can clearly 
cut through problems and procedures and produce effective 
decisions. The rules of the game are to leave nobody vul-
nerable to criticism. Moreover, layers of committees in 
China will allow no one to definitely say yes or no. 
In order to play it safe, the Chinese would move at a 
slow pace. They are cautious and suspicious as they might 
be prone to criticism, especially when they are dealing 
with unfamiliar foreign negotiators. In addition, they 
are strongly inclined to keep their objectives and 
positions secret throughout the whole negotiation process. 
Nonetheless, they like to insist that the other party 
reveals its interests first while the Chinese mask their 
interests and priorities. 
The Chinese concern for safety is manifested in their 
negotiation behavior. The Chinese would like to deal with 
the "number one" or the "best", regardless of cost. The 
Chinese culture ranks things hierarchically, and one 
should care for who is at the top (pye 1982). When the 
idea of "familiarity" conflicts with the idea of "dealing 
with the ·best", the latter usually wins out. The Chinese 
welcome ideologically friendly businessmen but will prefer 
doing business with enterprises that have been classified 
as among the best. In the Chinese system, clear 
requirements and specifications are lacking, so that 
negotiators must report upward the business situation and 
then learn whether their superiors find it of value. 
Though Chinese enterprises are now allowed to negotiate 
separately, Chinese negotiators still think that it is 
inappropriate for them not to consult with their 
supervisors and other parties concerned. To them, 
autonomy means vulnerability. 
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To evade potential criticisms and liabilities, the 
Chinese may at times play off foreign businessmen against 
each other. When more parties are involved, they will 
have a stronger argument for less responsibility. 
Based on these arguments, pye (1982) suggests the 
adoption of the following negotiating strategies: (1) do 
not over enthusiastically respond to Chinese phrases of 
friendship to avoid Chinese suspicions, (2) employ 
overseas Chinese interpreters as the Chinese officials 
tend to think that Chinese interpreters are patriotic and 
will not cheat the mother country, and (3) spell out in 
elaborate detail the possible benefits and risks in the 
venture to provide necessary tools to the Chinese 
negotiators to protect themselves and to win over their 
supervisors. 
Saunders and Chong (1986) in addition emphasize that 
negotiators should never show impatience. Patience is the 
watchword in Chinese trade negotiation as the Chinese feel 
that patience and time consuming talks can help one know 
the counterpart more and better. This will avoid comments 
from superiors and minimize the possibility of punishment. 
Wang (1986) as well stresses the risk-averse behavior 
of the Chinese business negotiators. Chinese prefer to 
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talk business with a party who has the reputation of 
putting all his cards on the table. When they have a 
slight suspicion on the hidden implication of the deal, 
they will hold back their decisions. Hence, even if a 
negotiator is asked to take charge of the whole deal, he 
may still want to get the "green lights" from his superior 
from time to time. 
Though China has adopted an open door policy, the 
Chinese are still cautious with Westerners (Tung 1986). 
This is attributed to, first, the traditional mistrust 
brought by the foreign exploitation in the mid-nineteenth 
century; and, second, wariness stemming from the impact of 
the cultural revolution that there may yet be other 
changes in policies. This consideration for safety limits 
the Westerner's ability to socialize and to develop 
personal relationship with the Chinese. In addition, the 
slow and massive bureaucracy concerning for criticism from 
above also affects the efficient progress of negotiations 
in China. 
One major problem described by Hendryx (1986b) is 
that it is difficult for a foreign business to figure out 
who is in charge and who is supposed to make the decision. 
To avoid criticism and responsibility, different 
departments will devise plans on their own, and then 
gradually reach a consensus with other departments from 
their respective positions. Generally, ideas are always 
submitted to different gr-oups for review, hoping for a 
consensus. One decision may require agreement among the 
heads of several departments within the enterprise. If 
the decision requires higher approval, a consensus among 
several bureau heads or other high officials may be 
necessary. 
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The situation is further aggravated by the fact that 
different departments in a Chinese company have more 
affiliation or ties with their counterparts in the 
planning and government bureaucracy than they have to 
other departments in their own organization. It is common 
to find a series of local functional bureaus overseeing 
. various functions within a company. The department heads 
report not only to the general manager of a plant but also 
to the respective municipal functional bureaus, and each 
local bureau reports to its corresponding ministry in 
Beijing (Hendryx 1986b). This sort of reporting system 
usually affects the effectiveness and efficiency of 
business negotiation in China. 
The issue of face also affects negotiators adversely. 
The Chinese prefer to work as a group and avoid losing 
"face". They like to proceed cautiously -- touch a stone 
first, then cross the river. As agreements and consulta-
tions from superiors are often sought during negotiation 
sessions, it is suggested that foreign businessmen have to 
exercise great patience. The Chinese negotiators must be 
certain that the agreement is beneficial to their enter-
prise as well as to their country. They cannot afford 
having their superior comments that his face is lost 
because of the subordinate (Brunner and You 1988). 
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As far as risk aversion is concerned, MNCs should 
also consider whether the ethnic Chinese employed in the 
negotiation team will be subject to this influence too. 
Under the Chinese cultural influence, the typical Chinese 
will be risk averse, and the lower ranked Chinese will be 
the most risk averse of all. An ethnic Chinese in the MNC 
is subject to two major forces: (1) he or she is in a firm 
having individualistic ideology in terms of performance 
appraisal and reward calculation, and (2) he or she is 
affected by the Chinese culture in family, in school, 
and/or via the peer groups. It seems that the boundary 
role of ethnic Chinese negotiators should be carefully 
studied by MNCs in order to realize the advantages of them 
on. the one hand, and to avoid the disadvantages of them on 
the other. 
To summarize, we can see that the first four issues 
mentioned above (friendship, positive attitude, long range 
view, and competitive tactics) are related to collectivism 
while the fifth one (risk averse behavior) is related to 
power distance. If long-run friendship or kinship is 
developed between the foreign negotiator and the Chinese, 
the collective value will prevail which is greatly 
beneficial to the foreign negotiator. When the Chinese 
regard a person as an insider, they may be willing to 
sacrifice part of their personal interest to exchange for 
collective interest. This sort of advantage is usually 
attached more to the person than to the terms of the deal 
(Shenkar and Ronen 1987). Inexperienced businessmen doing 
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business in China will be puzzled about why their sales 
pitch fails even if their terms are more competitive than 
their competitors. 
Conversely, if the Chinese treat a foreigner as an 
outsider, the Chinese can be very competitive. Sometimes, 
the Chinese will encourage more competitors to join so as 
to gain more bargaining power. Tough tactics will be used 
which will lower the profit margin of a foreign company. 
This factor interacts with the accepted power distance of 
the Chinese to further aggravate the situation. They are 
unlikely to challenge their superior and to change to a 
new way of doing business. Lines of authority are vague 
and nobody is absolutely certain as to who has the real 
decision making power. The more the negotiator 
understands about the power structure of the Chinese 
hierarchy, the better he is able to jump over the 
bureaucratic hurdles and reach the closing stage of the 
negotiation exercise (Warrington and McCall 1983; Shenkar 
and Ronen 1987). 
In relation to the boundary role position of ethnic 
Chinese in a MNC, it is argued that the ethnic Chinese can 
help generate a more efficient and satisfactory 
negotiation environment than a western negotiator. 
Nevertheless, they are subject to negative impacts 
including (1) a second class image and (2) the Chinese 
side will take advantage of them. In addition, split-
loyalty may be another concern that hinder the ethnic 
Chinese from making the most appropriate decision for the 
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venture. To realize the benefits generated from employing 
ethnic Chinese in China trade talks, the specific pros and 
cons of them should be carefully studied by MNCs. 
After looking at these descriptive studies, let us 
take a look at the reported case studies to further 
identify the critical issues behind the negotiation table 
in the PRC. 
Case Studies 
To identify various important determinants of success 
in China trade negotiation, we can look at different 
successful cases documented in various pUblications. By 
reviewing such cases, it is possible for us to visualize 
which factors seem to have significant effects on the 
performance of foreign negotiators in the PRC. When we 
combine the broad conclusions from descriptive studies and 
case analysis with respect to China trade negotiation, we 
can come up with more realistic and important dependent 
variables for inclusion in the hypotheses of this 
research. Altogether nine case studies have been selected 
from various publications. Background and information of 
these cases are drawn from the following sources. Details 
and descriptions of the cases are included in Appendix I. 
Case 
1. otis Elevator Company 
2. McDonnell Douglas 







4. SPD Medical Technologies Grow (1987b) 
5. PepsiCo Kraar (1986a) 
6. Occidental Petroleum Tung (1982) , 
Langston (1984) , and 
Langston (1985) 
7. Control Data Corp Depauw ( 1981) 
8. Electronic Associates Tung (1982) 
9. American International Group Tung (1982) 
From the cases presented above, we are able to come 
up with two main observations. The issues of collectivism 
(to build up closer tie with the Chinese) and power dis-
tance (to appeal to superior for decisions) discussed in 
previous sections are again vividly reflected in these 
cases. 
First, the issue of building up friendship with the 
Chinese should not be underestimated. In the PepsiCo Case 
(Case 5), the major objective of the company was to devel-
op personal and friendly relationship with the Chinese, in 
particular the top Chinese officials. The friendly dele-
gation was very successful and the working and negotiation 
atmosphere was greatly improved with this tactic. In the 
CDC Case (Case 7), the issue of friendship was constantly 
emphasized. To develop better linkage with the Chinese, 
CDC cooperated with a US consulting firm, mainly because 
this firm had good contacts with China Resources Company 
in Hong Kong and officials in the PRC. CDC also contacted 
Chinese officials whenever -they could to familiarize the 
Chinese with ~he company and also its product. In addi-
tion, the company also established a series of technical 
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seminars for the Chinese to build up friendship between 
the two parties. These actions had good payoff eventual-
ly. 
A long run commitment and a cooperative attitude are 
of paramount importance too. In the otis Case (Case 1), 
the company wanted to transfer more primitive products and 
technology to China to meet local requirement with least 
technical problems and at a lower cost. On the contrary, 
the Chinese side hoped to gain the technique to produce 
more advanced products in China in order to sUbstitute for 
imports. They wanted to import more advanced technology 
and produce more advanced items in the first place. To 
help close the deal, the company took a cooperative move 
and drew up a technology transfer schedule emphasizing 
both demands of the Chinese market and operational feasi-
bility. 
In the National Products Case (Case 3), the American 
team tried to be as cooperative as possible. They strived 
to develop good working relationship with the Chinese 
engineers, and they spent a lot of time and effort to 
design a new production configuration scaled particularly 
to the specif ic needs of-_ the Fuyang plant. The U. s. 
selling points included: (1) hands on training (some in 
the U.S.), (2) lower cost structure in the long run, and 
(3) a tailor-made proposal to suit Fuyang's specific 
problem and requirements (contrary to the 'Japanese offer). 
To establish a better relationship with the Chinese, Elec-
tronic Associates (Case 8) also adopted a highly coopera-
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tive attitude. Mr. Sanders, V.P. of marketing, specially 
made an appointment with the Director of the Bank of China 
in Hong Kong to foster better linkage with the PRC. The 
company asked the Chori Trading Company, a Japanese trad-
ing corporation (which happened to be China's old friend), 
to help channel EAI's literature to the proper technical 
agency in the PRC. In addition, the International 
Marketing V.P., in conjunction with EAI's office in Japan, 
conducted a very successful seminar on analog and hybrid 
simulation with officials in China. All these cooperative 
moves resulted in the company's receiving an invitation to 
Beijing for further technical discussion and negotiation. 
From these three cases, we can see that a strong commit-
ment and a cooperative attitude are necessary for a for-
eign company to become successful in China trade negotia-
tion. 
In order for a negotiation to become successful in 
the PRC, a foreign negotiator must obtain support from 
high-ranking officials. In this regard, a foreign manager 
should see to it that the needs of high ranking decision 
makers are being catered to and that the key officials are 
involved in the negotiation. In the McDonnel1 Douglas 
Case (Case 2), in addition to supplying the PRC with 
cheaper aircraft, the company also assisted in actualizing 
the Chinese desire to develop a manufacturing base for 
commercial aircraft and helped in selling the Chinese 
products into the international market eventually. While 
seemingly a cheaper product was the major selling point, 
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it was the company's ability to show to the top Chinese 
officials that the Americans can assist in realizing their 
long run motive that actually paved the way to closing the 
deal. 
In the PepsiCo Case (Case 5), the Chairman of the 
company, Donald Kendall, led a strong delegation to China. 
His delegation was supported by a letter from former 
President Nixon (China's "old friend"), which helped them 
to cut through the bureaucratic hierarchy to meet Zhao 
Ziyang, the then Premier of the PRC. The delegation 
included ten of Pepsico's directors, and an accompanying 
crew of 49 people. They were backed up with information 
which described who had the real power to make key deci-
sions in China. In the big cities in China, the delega-
tion was also able to develop relationships with key 
people in the PRC including Liang Xiang and Ye Xuanping. 
In Beijing, U.S. Ambassador Winston Lord joined with the 
delegation and visited Premier Zhao Ziyang. with strong 
involvement from the top officials, the business 
environment of PepsiCo was improved greatly. 
For the Occidental Case (Case 6), we can see that a 
key point for the company I .S success was that Occidental 
Chairman Armand Hammer was able to involve key leaders 
such as Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, and Deng Xiaoping in the 
deal. The negotiation environment turned favorable when 
Deng confirmed the involvement of China in the venture, 
and that China would back up its commitment in respect to 
international business cooperation. Moreover, the ability 
of . the company to meet China's high level need -- to 
establish its energy resources and to obtain advanced 
equipment and technology -- was another reason for its 
success in the negotiation. Similarly, the AIG people 
(Case 9) also adopted this high level persuasion tactic 
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and achieved good results. The strong delegation of the 
company, represented by Mr. Greenberg, president and 
C.E.O., Mr. Manton, Executive V.P.~ and Mr. Freeman, . 
regional head for Far East operation, was able to generate 
a reciprocal exchange agreement from the Chinese which 
paved the way for further.negotiation and business. Their 
success reflects that the Chinese negotiators have a due 
respect for power and authority, either to their own 
superiors and to their negotiation parties. 
As most Chinese negotiators would prefer to accept 
orders from high ranked officials and not to take 
excessive risk, foreign negotiators may want to, whenever 
possible, help the Chinese counterpart to justify the 
venture before their bos~es. Of course going straight to 
the decision maker in the top would be useful, but in the 
Chinese context it is often difficult to judge who is the 
decision maker or who has the final say. In the SPD Case 
(Case 4), SPD requested contractual assurance that its 
proprietary formulas and manufacturing techniques would be 
kept in confidence. SPD lawyers wanted to include 
provisions in the contract that would set remedial 
measures in motion if the conditions were violated. This 
hurdle was solved by the fact that an outside agency, a 
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municipal economic organization, was invited to assist in 
the drafting of the guarantees. By so doing, 
responsibility was shifted outward and the Chinese felt 
more secure. 
The reluctance of the Chinese to take risk and to 
make prompt decisions is also indicated in Case 7, the CDC 
Case. In many situations, CDC tried hard to illustrate to 
the negotiation team that the company's technology would 
continue to be the state-of-the-art. The company also 
answered the detailed queries from the Chinese with 
comprehensive answers and forceful arguments which helped 
the Chinese negotiators to face possible criticisms or 
enquiries from their own superiors. To minimize risk, the 
company included a third party to the negotiation table: 
the Compagnie Generale de Geophysique (CGG). CGG had sold 
oil exploration equipment to the Chinese for a long time 
and was regarded by the Chinese as their old friend. In 
the closing stages, much of the talk was handled by the 
CGG personnel. Ultimately, a contract was finally signed. 
In the AIG Case (Case 9), we can also see that the 
Chinese reluctance to accept risk has strong implications 
to their final decision . . AIG won the acceptance of the 
Chinese mainly because of: (1) AIG being the biggest 
insurance company in the world, (2) the company's long 
association with China, and, (3) AIG's having offices full 
of Chinese in the Far East. All these contributed to the 




In the following, five important surveys on China 
trade negotiation are identified, and a brief description 
of each of them is made here to obtain a clearer picture 
of what is known about the issues under consideration. 
Here, the method of analysis, the respondents involved, 
the instrument used, and also the major findings will be 
described and discussed. 
Brunner and Taoka (1977) sought to evaluate the 
various aspects of the business opportunities and 
peculiarities of negotiation in China as viewed by foreign 
businessmen in the Canton trade Fairs. Self-administered 
questionnaires were mailed to people who had attended one 
or more of the Canton Trade Fairs, and 139 usable 
questionnaires were received. Another 35 usable 
questionnaires were obtained by referring to a 
confidential list of businessmen knowledgeable on trading 
with China. The basic research instrument was 38 Likert-
type statements pertaining to initial trade efforts, 
activities, contacts, impediments to trade development, 
competitive perceptions, and negotiation practices. 
Several major findings resulted. First, tbe Chinese 
are becoming more flexible and have sincere interest in 
expanding trade with the U.S. Second, a cooperative 
attitude is important in China trade negotiation. 
Businessmen should try to ~understand China's history and 
culture, to develop interaction with the Chinese, and to 
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establish long-term relationship with the officials. 
However, if the Chinese negotiators do not take a 
cooperative stance, they can be extremely tough and 
competitive. It is extremely difficult for a foreigner to 
develop close personal relationship with the Chinese 
negotiators; sometimes they even decline to reveal their 
actual positions and titles. Last, the Chinese 
negotiators usually require more interaction than is 
expected and they take a longer time to reply to u.s. 
proposals. Group decisions are preferred to individual 
decisions and negotiators will follow strictly the rules 
and guidelines supplied by their superiors. 
Tung (1982) developed a 19-page, 72-item 
questionnaire and sent it to all members of the National 
Council for U.S. - China Trade (n=1156). A total of 138 
usable questionnaires were received and they were 
completed by the CEO in charge of foreign operations or 
the China expert of respective organizations. Basically, 
the National Council is a private, nonprofit making 
organization that assists member firms to develop business 
with China. The 72 items in the questionnaire were 
included to investigate factors responsible for success 
and failure in China trade negotiation. Based on the 
study, two major findings emerged. 
First, the Chinese are interested in trading products 
and services which fit in with national or party 
priorities. China negotiators will follow strictly the 
party polices and all major foreign trade activities are 
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centrally planned and are controlled by state agencies. 
Furthermore, most Chinese would not be willing to accept 
risk, and in general time-consuming group consensus is 
required even for small decisions. Second, familiarity 
and experience with Chinese business culture and practices 
enhances the probability of succ~ss of negotiation in 
China. The Chinese are concerned with building long-term 
relationship and a foreign negotiator must have a genuine 
willingness to join with the Chinese to work towards a 
common goal. There is a need for a strong commitment to 
comprehend the complications involved in .trading with 
China and to surmount the idiosyncratic cultural differ-
ences between the two countries. 
Lee and Lo (1988) replicated the Brunner and Taoka 
(1977) study in late 1985 to provide a longitudinal 
perspective on the issues surrounding China trade 
negotiation. The survey was conducted among corporate 
members who were voting members of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Hong Kong in 1985. The 38 core questions used 
in the Lee and Lo survey were practically the same as the 
Brunner and Taoka questions. The questionnaires were sent 
by mail to 397 firms and a total of 136 useful responses 
were obtained. Basically, only the questionnaires 
completed by respondents who had actual China trade 
experience and/or whose companies were involved in China 
trade were included in the analysis. 
Findings in the Lee and Lo study can be broadly 
classified into two dimensions. First, a lot · of time and 
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expense would have to be spent in non-task related issues 
so as to establish and intensify relationships. The 
foreign businessmen have to interact informally and to 
obtain agreement and acceptance well before the formal 
meeting. Once a long-term relationship is established, 
the Chinese will compensate the -damaged foreign partner by 
giving them more favorable treatment in future dealings. 
If possible, it is beneficial to include a "Chinese" 
executive in the foreign negotiating team who can provide 
extra bonding and act as an informal bridge between the 
two parties. Second, the Chinese are reluctant to make 
individual decisions. A foreign negotiator should see to 
that all relevant parties (particularly the high ranked 
officials) are clearly communicated and understood. As 
decisions would be formalized under a group basis, with 
the consent of high rank officials, the foreign negotiator 
should avoid the impatient mentality which will generate 
unnecessary stress and frustration. In addition, it is 
important for a foreign negotiator to do some favors to 
his Chinese negotiation partner, who can in turn justify 
to his Chinese superiors that he is doing a good job. 
Brunner and Koh (1988) empirically investigated the 
perceptions of negotiation behavior held by both American 
and Chinese negotiators. Questionnaires were mailed to 
180 major Chinese organizations and corporations located 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Luoyong. For the 
American side, 150 questionnaires were sent to corpora-
tions who are primarily members of the National Council 
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for united states - China trade. A total of 158 useful 
responses were solicited : 85 from the Chinese and 73 from 
the American corporations. The questionnaire covered 52 
Likert-type attitudinal statements concerning perceptions 
held by Americans on Chinese negotiation styles and 
activities. From the study, several findings emerged. 
First, the Chinese bureaucracy has a long chain of 
authority, and negotiators must seek approval from their 
superiors, thus causing delays in reaching decisions. In 
this regard, patience and a long term view are necessary 
for a negotiator to become successful in the PRC. More-
over, companies with goodwill and reputation have a 
competitive edge. As high level approvals are required, 
negotiators must make sure that the agreements concluded 
are for the benefit of the whole state (and of the party), 
in addition to the particular Chinese negotiation team 
with whom they are dealing. 
The Chinese always stress on building long lasting 
friendship and strong guanxi ties which will bind both 
parties to assist each other when requests arise. Whether 
the us negotiators feel comfortable or not with it, the 
Chinese will generally offer friendship, and endeavor to 
build up strong ties with the foreign businessmen. The 
issue of face is crucial in China and friendly American 
negotiator must not make the Chinese lose face. Whenever 
practical, the American businessmen in the PRC should try 
to give "face". The 'Chinese will be annoyed if they feel 
that they are 'not treated fairly, and their business 
• 
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partners are not friendly to them (e.g. special favors are 
not given to them). 
In the stewart and Keown (1989) study, a sample of 50 
China traders from a variety of western countries in North 
America and Europe, and in Australia were interviewed. 
Respondents in the study had participated in at least one 
completed negotiation with a PRC organization during the 
year and a half before the interview. The instrument used 
was a set of seven point Likert statements on factors for 
both successful and unsuccessful negotiations in the PRC. 
The -prenegotiation process, pricing strategies, 
negotiation content and advertising strategies were also 
asked. From the findings, stewart and Keown came up with 
several observations. They noted that negotiations in the 
PRC are full of surprises and that the process and proto-
cols will continue to be unique to the Chinese environ-
ment. The negotiation practices of the Chinese are becom-
ing more mature, and non-personal factors such as product 
and finance are becoming more important. An inordinate 
amount of time has to be invested in the negotiation 
process, and negotiators have to prepare for sudden 
demands from the Chinese team. A major discount should be 
given to the Chinese to serve as face-giving device to 
illustrate the negotiation performance of the Chinese team 
to their superiors. 
Looking at these five studies, several preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn. -Nearly all studies indicate 
that foreign negotiators should try to understand the 
118 
Chinese culture and to develop interaction, guanxi, and 
long-run relationships with the Chinese. In many cases, 
the decision to cooperate is not made at the negotiating 
table; agreements and acceptance are established in 
informal gatherings or even social encounters. A 
"Chinese" executive from the home country would be helpful 
to further build up the atmosphere of kinship. In all 
events, a strong commitment and a genuine willingness to 
work with the Chinese towards a collective goal is 
mandatory to establish a successful deal. When strong 
ties are established: and the Chinese officials take a 
person as their in-group member~ discussions will be more 
open and hurdles will more easily be eliminated. To build 
up close bonding, one common- method is to give "face" or 
deliver some favors to the Chinese negotiator. Though it 
is difficult to build up friendship with the Chinese, it 
will last for a long time once it is built up. This 
friendship is particularly useful to a foreign negotiator 
as the Chinese will try to compensate an "old" friend who 
knows how to give "face" and who has helped the Chinese in 
their difficult times. However, if a person is not 
classified by the Chinese as their friend, the Chinese can 
be extremely tough and competitive. In this connection, 
being "in-group" or "out-group" does make a lot of 
differences. 
These studies also indicate that the Chinese 
negotiators would prefer to follow directly the 
instructions from superiors and are reluctant to accept 
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risk. ' Individual decisions are deemphasized and nobody 
would like to "rock the boat". Rules and guidelines 
should be observed and the party policies should always 
take a dominant position. within such a system, only 
officials of a very high rank can actually interpret the 
decision rules and make concrete decisions. To minimize 
risk, the Chinese will rely heavily on time-consuming 
group interaction, deliberation, and consensus. A simple 
decision may have to go through numerous bureaus and 
agencies which make the negotiation very inefficient. , In 
China, the rule of the game is to think long-run and help 
every individual concerned to justify his case in front of 
his superiors and other influential bodies. Foreign 
negotiators who are impatient and who are unable to help 
the Chinese minimize their risk exposure in the hierarchy 
would seldom become successful in the Chinese business 
culture. 
Another issue closely related to obtaining support 
from high officials in China is that the venture must be 
able to benefit the state, the party, and the team 
concerned. The PRC is always looking for ways to expand 
its trade volume and to obtain foreign exchange. If the 
plan is convergent with the state policy, the foreign 
negotiator will have a better chance to close a deal. 
Prompt approval will be given when the venture fits the 
national or party priorities. Moreover, goodwill and 
reputation of the foreign company would be an asset when 
its negotiators call on the PRC officials. By negotiating 
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with the market leader in the industry, the Chinese 
negotiators can evade responsibility by claiming that they 
are dealing already with the biggest company which offers 
the state-of-the-art technology. 
When we take a comprehensive view at the methodology 
of the five survey studies mentioned above, we might come 
up with several observations. First, usually only the 
perceptions of the U.S. (or other foreign) side is studied 
and the Chinese side is neglected. without considering 
the Chinese aspect, it would be dangerous to generalize 
the whole picture with respect to negotiation in China 
trade deals. Second, the generation of hypotheses, in 
most cases, is ad hoc in nature and a systematic survey of 
past literature and constructs is lacking. When the core 
Chinese values and perceptions are not taken into account, 
. the research is not theoretically rooted and we cannot be 
sure as to what we are measuring or whether we are measur-
ing the right thing. An issue related to the above is 
that most constructs used in the previous studies are not 
operationalized in a rigorous manner. Most concepts are 
not tested as to their reliability and validity (Churchill 
1979). When the constructs are fuzzy, we cannot obtain 
concrete generalizations and make meaningful recommenda-
tions to foreign negotiators in the PRC. 
with one exception (Tung 1982a), the studies 
mentioned earlier have not considered the relative 
influence of different factors in affecting the 
effectiveness of negotiation in China trade deals. To 
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summarize, these studies are in fact exploratory or 
descriptive in nature, and the issue of causality is not 
explored. In this regard, it would be difficult to 
confidently suggest how foreign negotiators should proceed 
from this point onwards. At present, as the number of 
descriptive studies have accumulated to certain extent, it 
would be more fruitful for us to explore more deeply to 
locate the real determinants of the indigenous Chinese 
negotiation behavior and what actually contributes to the 
success of a business negotiation in China. 
Boundary position 
Arndt (1979) examines three different perspectives 
towards marketing: the traditional marketing model, the 
dyadic model, and the domesticated markets model. The 
traditional marketing model looks - at marketing processes 
from a stimulus-response point of view and marketers are 
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urged to satisfy consumer wants profitably by coordinating 
the 4 PiS. However, this view has entered a crisis stage 
as there are sUbstantial discrepancies between the world 
of theory and real life observations. 
The dyadic model challenges the one-directional 
assumption of the traditional model and suggests that 
focus should be placed on the transactional relationship 
between the buyer and seller (rather than on either the 
buyer or seller individually). Exchange relationships 
under this view would include interdependencies, interac-
tions, and reciprocities. 
The domesticated markets view point extends the 
dyadic perspective further to all exchanges within an 
organization and exchanges between an organization and its 
environment. The characteristics of this view are as 
follows. First, the approach focuses on the long-term 
relationship in which each transaction is embedded. 
Second, the role of marketing is to work out acceptable 
exchange ratios for the various interest groups (staff, 
customers, distributors, bankers, government, etc.). 
Third, marketing is mainly a boundary function and a 
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marketer has to negotiate a tentative agreement with the 
outside boundary persons and to have the agreement 
ratified by the internal constituents. In such a / 
circumstance, the marketer is both the influencer and the 
person being influenced by the external boundary 
marketers. Last, the functioning of internal markets 
(constituents) and their interaction with external markets 
(outside bodies) is the center of marketing. This view 
point is further developed in Arndt (1983) which notes 
that focal social units (organizations, departments, 
customers, families, etc.) can be conceived as political 
coalitions of internal and external interest groups having 
partly common and partly conflicting goals. The simple-
minded traditional microeconomic paradigm actually 
distorts reality as it ignores that social units will 
establish networks of long-term co-operation, partly as a 
result of their own initiatives and partly as a result of 
outside influences. In this study, the political economy 
approach and the boundary position perspective will serve 
as guiding frameworks for identifying salient variables , 
and defining research questions. 
Spekman (1979) has given a detail description of the 
issue of boundary position. According to him, boundary 
role persons (BRPs), are (1) one means by which organiza-
tions are linked to crucial elements in their firm's 
relevant environment, (2) a point of contact between 
organizational and environmental contingencies, (3) and an 
interface through which organizations and environments 
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affect each other. As a BRP, he or she is more distant 
from the organization than other internal counterparts. 
This distance will, on the one hand, give the BRP greater 
freedom and, on the other hand, foster a higher level of 
anxiety. In addition, the BRP has external representation 
function, internal representation function, and individual 
self-serving objectives which might be inconsistent to one 
another. 
The issue of boundary position has frequently been 
mentioned in the sales management and marketing litera-
ture. Bonoma (1979) divides sales management problem into 
"internal relations" and "external relations". To him, 
internal relations occurs between the sales managers and 
the sales staff, and they are relating to issues concern-
ing recruitment, selection, training, directing, compen-
sating, and control. External relations address on the 
buyer and seller interface. He argues that if the inter-
nal relations are not handled properly, sales will be 
suboptimal, motivation will be poor and interaction will 
be strained. If the external relations are mismatched, 
buyer satisfaction will be low, sales will be suboptimal, 
and rebuys will be low. From an interaction point of 
view, if internal relations are inconsistent with external 
relations, sales will decrease and staff will be less 
motivated. 
Based on role theory, Solomon et al. (1985) claim 
that, first of all, the dyadic interaction between a 
marketer and a ' .customer is an · important determinant of the 
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customer's global satisfaction. In addition, a marketer 
should consider both customer-marketer interactions as 
well as marketer-organization interactions. As a rule, 
the emphasis should be placed on the joint behaviors of 
groups of BRPs in the marketing processes. Basically, the 
content of the marketer's role is determined by (1) the 
setting of the organization, and (2) the implicit and 
explicit cues that the organization gives to the marketer. 
This role, in turn, will have an impact on, and will also 
be affected by the role of the customer whom the marketer 
is trying to satisfy. 
The concern of both internal and external forces is 
well noted in the selling arena. According to Pruden 
(1969), a business representative is acting as an inter-
face between his own employer and his customers. In 
general, salespeople are considered as occupying positions 
at the boundaries of their firms. They receive demands 
from parties which are usually diverse and incompatible. 
Usually they are caught in the middle, and their success 
depends very much on their ability to bridge the gap 
between his constituencies and his negotiation partners. 
Usually, his constituent members have little appreciation 
for the expectations and goals of his negotiation 
partners, and vice versa (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 
1990, p.353). 
Besides the role conflict mentioned above, a BRP also 
has problems in role ambiguity and role accuracy. 
Compared to int.ernal constituents, the BRP will have less 
126 
frequent contact with other role partners. Moreover, 
interaction of a BRP with other people is often too brief 
to allow him or her to unambiguously realize what actually 
is expected of him or her. In sum, the very nature of a 
BRP makes him or her experience more problems relating to 
role conflict, role inaccuracy, role ambiguity and role 
expectations (p.351). 
In the negotiation literature, ample evidence has 
indicated the effect of the negotiation counterpart (the 
person negotiating with the marketer) and the 
ihtraorganizational forces (constituents'. influences) on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the whole negotiation 
process. Intraorganizational bargaining, a major 
subprocess in the framework suggested by Walton and 
McKersie (1965), is the set of activities aiming to 
achieve consensus within each of the interacting parties. 
In their book, they proposed that the expectations of 
principals within the company must be in alignment with 
those of the chief negotiator. 
Deutsch (1973) also emphasizes the need to investi~ 
gate both inter-group and intra-group cooperation. In 
other studies, the pressure generated by constituencies is 
postulated to have an effect on negotiators' concessionery 
behavior. Pressure for loyalty to the company, commitment 
to the team, and advocacy of a particular position will to 
a great extent affect the mentality, behavior, and inter-
est of the negotiator~ Researchers are reminded to place 
more attention .to the impact of "external" variables on 
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internal negotiations as well as to the impact of "inter-
nal" variable on external negotiations (cf. Neal and 
Bazerman 1985; Bazerman and Lewicki 1985). 
In his book on the art and science of negotiation, 
Raiffa (1982) raises two important questions: (1) are 
there more than two parties? and (2) are the parties 
monolithic? These two questions are based on the politi-
cal economy paradigm in marketing (Arndt 1983,; stern and 
Reve 1980) which addresses conflicts, coalitions, and 
power play among several conflicting parties (e.g. the 
buyer's organization, the BRPs of the buyer's organiza-
tion, the seller's organization, and the BRPs of the 
seller's organization). At times, there are situations in 
which even the disputing parties are not well specified. 
A coalition may initially exist, but during the 
negotiation process the members may not agree among 
themselves, and new coalitions are established, each 
having their own self-serving objectives, internal and 
external representation roles (Spekman 1979). In other 
circumstances, it is common to observe that a dispute is 
not internally monolithic (Raiffa 1982, p.12). The 
negotiation parties will comprise people, though sitting 
on the same side of the negotiation table, who are having 
sharply different views and considerations. Nevertheless, 
these internal conflicts are not necessarily inefficient, 
as one would have expected. It is not uncommon to find 
that the more diffuse the opinions are on one side of the 
fence, the easier it would be to achieve agreement with 
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the outsider. In this regard, we can see that there is no 
magic formula for marketing negotiation:-- both internal 
and external relations must be considered in a political 
economy perspective. 
To summarize, we can say that a marketing negotiator 
is in a unique situation in which he or she has to 
interact with many social systems. An entire array of 
social exchanges are operating when a negotiator shares 
with the "inter" and "extra" parties a web of conflicting 
influences and forces pulling from different directions. 
These exchanges can be informal, nonroutine, and sometimes 
signifying symbolic meanings (Bagozzi 1978b). This 
generates greater problems to BRPs in terms of role 
expectancy, role ambiguity, role accuracy, and role 
conflict. A marketer who fails to recognize this 
mechanism will become vulnerable when he or she is sitting 




From a social psychological perspective, the economic 
focus on negotiation analysis is not rich enough, and is 
far from accurate. Negotiation ~hould be studied in terms 
of relational considerations, and one should try to estab-
lish and sustain good relationship in negotiation talks. 
As one rarely negotiates in the absence of future 
consequences, fostering of ongoing relationships should be 
the key to success in the long run. According to Rabin 
(1989), even if we are to meet once and once only, our 
reputations in this exchange will affect the expectations 
that others will have on us in the future. 
On the issue of the salesman-client relationship, 
Evan (1963) says that the selling of a product involves 
the particular dyadic interaction of a BRP and his 
prospect, but not the individual qualities of each party 
alone. He criticizes the traditional microeconomic 
perspective of concentrating only on the salesman's point 
of view. Specifically, he denounces approaches like: (1) 
the sales personality:-- what the salesman must be, (2) 
the persuasive salesman:--. how to persuade or manipulate 
prospects, and (3) the adaptable salesman:-- be whatever 
the prospect wants. In addition, he suggests the analysis 
of selling from psychological and sociological views. 
Specifically, the unit of analysis in personal selling 
research would be the interactive salesman-prospect dyad, 
but not the unilateral salesman's perspective. This 
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argument is shared by Davis and silk (1972) who note that 
the result of the sales contact depends on how the two 
parties perceive and react to each other. They also 
suggest that this view has important implications to sales 
management in: (1) recruitment, selection, manpower 
planning, (2) sales training, (3) allocating salesmen to 
customers, (4) using interpersonal influence in selling, 
(5) and the use of group pressure in selling. 
The adoption of the win-win bargaining strategy has 
constantly been promoted by marketing scholars. Nielsen 
(1989) notes that mutual gain negotiating strategies can 
complement the process of, and analytic techniques in, 
negotiation. Organizations using mainly competitive 
strategies should consider mutual gain negotiation 
strategies as a balancing approach to the risks of 
competitive win-lose strategies. According to Dion and 
Danting (1988), cooperative negotiation skills are related 
to negotiation performance. A cooperative emphasis, such 
as long-term relationships and an awareness of the needs 
of the other party, is found to be closely linked to 
performance. Openness and honesty,as opposed to success 
at exploitation of the other party, would be a major 
negotiation strategy one should follow. In this regard, 
management should stress the development of negotiators' 
a~ility to formulate integrative, or win-win bargaining 
solutions. The same notion is also supported in the 
broader international negotiation context. Basically, a 
bargaining methodology based on the win-win logic is held 
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to be more successful than the traditional exploitative 
approaches. In the present international business 
environment, the use of distributive bargaining approaches 
employing win-lose logic to negotiate has often produced 
unsatisfactory long term outcomes for negotiators. 
Innovation in contract forms, changing attitudes, advances 
in the theory of the multinational corporations, the 
relationship between businessmen and the host government, 
and the increasing influence of third parties are all 
factors recommending the utilization of the more 
integrative approaches (Banks 1987). 
The interactive emphasis is found in other works of 
scholars on marketing theory, in the sales and service 
contexts. In their paper to delineate exchanges as the 
core concept in marketing, Houston and Gassenheimer (1987) 
argue that our attention should not be limited to the 
study of single and isolated exchanges. The building of 
long-term relationships between marketers and customers 
should be the heart of what is called "marketing". They 
also examine the issue of reciprocity in the exchange 
relationship. To them, reciprocity is a between-party 
relationship involving an initial action by one group 
followed by a reaction by the other. It is a process 
whereby the mutual exchange of acceptable terms in a dyad 
is actualized; it is also a social interaction in which 
the movement of an entity evokes a compensating movement 
in another entity in · the dyad. The concept of reciprocity 
is important in the sense that for exchanges to be 
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satisfying, each entity must feel that he or she has 
received more than he or she has yielded. An economic 
exchange will not be successfully consummated if each 
entity has not perceived that his or her holdings have 
increased in value, and that the reciprocity relationship 
is not balanced. 
In the service marketing context, Solomon et al. 
(1985) point out the increased recognition of the fact 
that the person-to-person encounter between client and 
service provider will affect the overall success of the 
firm. A successful service encounter requires the purpo-
sive and coordinated acts of both parties. Stated differ-
ently, the quality of the "product" produced -- the 
subjective service experience -- is determined by the 
mutual coordination of both parties in the service 
encounter. The traditional assumption of a static 
consumer and a static service provider is no longer valid. 
More recent works in sales and marketing which ana-
lyze the issue of inter-group relations include the fol-
lowing: 
(1) "Customer-salesperson relationship" is an antecedent 
of "effectiveness in sales interaction" (Weitz 1981). 
(2) "Interpersonal relationship" will insure the 
"continuity of the dyad" (Weitz 1989). 
(3) Adaptations made by one party will be reciprocated by 
adaptations by the other party (Hallen, Johanson, and 
Seyed-Mohamed 1991). 
(4) If the inter-group relationship is typified by trust, 
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coordination, open communication, and relational 
exchange norms, the channel members are likely to 
adopt the win-win attitude and engage in coordinative 
behaviors in conflict settlement (Dant and Schul 
1992) . 
(5) "Relationship quality" will affect "customers' 
anticipation of future interaction". Sellers 
adopting relational selling are more successful in 
soliciting more information, generate a reciprocating 
and cooperative perception (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 
1990) . 
Many studies have been carried out by social-
psychologists to determine the effect of the integrative 
approach and the co-operative orientation on bargaining 
outcomes (e.g. Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 
1977). In sum, a problem-solving orientation and a 
concern for mutual benefit will produce more integrative 
solutions and higher joint outcomes. After reviewing 122 
studies on the relative effectiveness of cooperative, 
~ompetitive, and individualistic goal structures, Johnson 
et al. (1981) found that cooperation was considerably more 
effective than interpersonal competition and 
individualistic efforts. 
There are reasons why it is important to study 
integrative bargaining. As noted in Pruitt and Lewis 
(1977, p.163), integrative bargaining (1) appeals to the 
satisfaction of . human needs and , values, which has ethical 
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interest intrinsically, (2) it reduces the chance that 
negotiations will fail, by making it possible to locate 
options that meet parties' ultimate limits, (3) it lowers 
the probability that parties will repudiate the agreement 
made, (4) relationships built will be cohesive, per-
sistent, and mutually satisfying, ' and (5) satisfaction 
among different units in an organization will contribute 
to overall organizational effectiveness. These 
contentions are parallel to the theory of Deutsch (1983) 
on cooperation and competition in conflict resolution. 
Three specific areas (trust, concession, and reci-
procity) relating to inter-group relationships are 
discussed in the following. They are drawn mainly from 
literature in social psychology and marketing, and 
insights generated are deemed to be useful in the 
negotiation context. By blending the following results 
with what we have discussed so far, we could be able to 
generate important variables and hypotheses for this study 
as far as inter-group influences are concerned. 
Trust has been defined as the belief that a party's 
word or promise is reliable and that a party will fulfill 
his or her obligations in an exchange relationship (Schurr 
and Ozanne 1985). Trust will lead to constructive 
dialogue, cooperative problem-solving, better goal 
clarification, greater exchange of information, and 
increased commitment to implement agreements. If a person 
perceives trust in an 'negotiation, he will tend to cooper-
ate, behave trustworthily in the talks, and try not to 
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double-cross the negotiating partner. otherwise, he might 
behave defensively and not cooperatively (Loomis 1959). 
In an empirical study to investigate the effects of trust 
on negotiation tactics, it was found that the effect of 
trust (defined as belief that the other negotiator is 
cooperatively motivated) produced self-consciously 
. cooperative behavior under high aspirations. On the other 
hand, low trust produced self-consciously distributive or 
competitive behavior (Kimmel et al. 1980). 
Concession and conciliatory strategy are found to be 
quite effective in generating a cooperative atmosphere in 
bargaining talks. A bargainer's concessions have an 
effect on the concessions of the opposing bargainer. In 
Yukl (1974a) and Yukl (1974b), it was revealed that 
subjects conceded less when the opponent made smaller 
concessions than when the opponent made larger ones. In 
addition, when the opponent made small concessions, the 
bargainer would perceive the opponent to be tougher than 
when he made large concessions. On the effect of 
concession-making and conflict resolution, Komorita (1913) 
notes that costly conciliatory acts might facilitate the 
communication and perception of cooperative intent and, 
thereby, facilitate a mutually cooperative solution. 
While concession making is considered as effective in 
producing integrative outcomes in bargaining, it has 
another long term effect -- reciprocity. Gouldner (1960) 
notes that the norm of reciprocity functions differently 
in some degree .in different cultures (weaker in the U.S. 
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as friendship relations are less institutionalized). In 
its universal form, it will predict that (1) people would 
help those who have helped them, and (2) people would not 
injure those who have helped them. It is also noted that 
when future interaction is anticipated, the negotiators 
will be less exploitative than when such anticipation is 
absent. Basically, a reciprocating strategy also leaves 
the door open to mutual accommodation and reduces the 
likelihood of "locking-in" to an escalatory pattern of 
mutual confrontation (Marlowe, Gergen, and Doob 1966; Leng 
and Walker 1982). 
Several psychological studies are documented to shed 
light on the issue of reciprocity in bargaining and 
negotiation. Examples include Brehm and Cole (1966), 
Pruitt (1968), Wilke and Lanzetta (1970), and Galinat and 
Muller (1988). In general, favor given to· a party will 
increase the likelihood that the party will perform a 
favor in turn. The more reward one has taken in the past, 
the more reward he will provide to the previous reward 
provider. When a party uses a soft bargaining approach, 
the other party will reciprocate with attempted 
cooperative influence or moves, and more concessions will 
be made. In fact, the amount of reciprocated help was 
shown to be a monotonic increasing function of the amount 
of prior help received (Wilke and Lanzetta 1970). 
Comparatively speaking, voluntary help is more 
powerful than compulsory help in generating a better 
outcome (Goranson and Berkowitz1966). In the same vein, 
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in-group members will receive more cooperative choices 
than do out-group members. Ratings on partners' motives, 
personality, and ability traits tend to be more favorable 
for partners (in-group) than for opponents (out-group). 
In fact, the subjects in Wilson, Chun, and Kayatani (1965) 
made competitive strategy choices toward the outgroup more 
than twice as often as toward the in-group. 
In summary, we can see that by taking a dyadic view 
on the issue of inter-group relationship between marketers 
and customers (or between BRPs) , better exchange relation-
ship and outcome could be achieved. In the marketing . 
literature, the following dimensions are considered under 
the heading of "a satisfying dyadic interaction": long-
term relationship, reciprocity, purposive coordinative 
acts, interpersonal relationship, adaptations, trust, open 
communication, win-win attitudes, and relationship 
quality. In social psychology literature, ample evidence 
is found to support the notion that a coordinative 
negotiation attitude is positively affected by trust, 
concession, and reciprocity. 
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Intra-group Relationship 
Parallel to the thoughts of Arndt (1979, 1983) and 
stern and Reve (1980), Bacharach (1983) also criticizes 
the rational, cohesive notion of organizations in conven-
tionalorganizational theory. Because researchers of 
organizations have tended to ignore the intra-group polit-
ical conflicts and tensions inside organizations, the 
theory generated is not congruent with the way organi-
zations operate in the real world. The view that the 
organization is a holi§tic entity and the absence of 
subunits united as interest groups and coalitions is not 
realistic. Actually, whether researchers admit it or not, 
subsystems or coalitions having diverse interest, goals 
and aspirations do exist in any organization, and a 
political perspective of intraorganizational behavior is 
needed in organizational theory. According to Bacharach 
(1983), players in an organization are no less political 
in their organization life at work than they are in life 
outside their organizations -- they have different 
interests, they think, they calculate, they coalesce, they 
make strategy, and they bargain. 
Being a BRP, a negotiator has to deal with both 
outsiders and internal constituents. This dual duty makes 
a negotiator face more perceived role conflict than other 
internal members in the company. with respect to role 
conflict, Churchill, Ford, and Walker (1990, p.351) quote 
the example that a customer may demand of the salesman 
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unusually liberal credit terms or delivery schedules that 
are unacceptable to the salesperson's boss. As the BRP 
has to simultaneously satisfy the diverse needs and 
concerns of many parties (including at least the client, 
the superior, and himself), · role conflict is unavoidable. 
It is, of course, a sales manager's duty to clearly 
understand how the intra-forces are affecting his salesmen 
and to find ways to help his BRPs in their selling 
endeavors. 
In developing a model to explain the relationship 
between different antecedents and sales effectiveness, 
Weitz, Sujan, and Sujan (1986) propose that organization 
culture developed through management practices can build 
up an intrinsic reward orientation in the sales team, thus 
resulting in more effective adaptive selling. Specifical-
ly, management practices would include control mechanisms 
(implicit vs. explicit) and a decision-making style 
(collective vs. command). A good set of management 
practices can achieve the following virtues in a sales 
team: cooperation, involvement, goal congruency, and a 
climate of trust and involvement. If these virtues are 
actualized, the salesman would be able to perform his 
boundary role more effectively and efficiently. 
This contention is also supported by Kale and Barnes 
(1992) who note that organization culture would .have a 
discernible impact on the buyer-seller interaction. They 
point out several important aspects embedded in organiza-
tional culture: 
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(1) externa·l vs. internal - whether the organization puts 
greater emphasis on satisfying customers or on inter-
nal organization activities, 
(2) task vs. social - whether the organization puts 
greater emphasis on organizational workings or on the 
personal and social needs of the salesman, 
(3) conformity vs. individuality - the degree of 
tolerance of distinctiveness and idiosyncrasy within 
the sales team, and, 
(4) risk vs. safety - the organization's response to 
risk, new methods r and new practices. 
It was found in their study that lack of congruence 
in organization culture, among other things, would result 
in a mismatch of communication and a collapse of the 
negotiating process. Based on the findings, the authors 
suggest (1) choosing national markets for doing business 
(inter-group decision), (2) fine-tuning of firms' 
organization structure (intra-group decision), and (3) 
recruiting and training negotiators for overseas business 
(another intra-group decision). 
Recent studies in sales management and marketing 
negotiation have revealed various intra-group influences, 
and the more important ones are summarized below: 
(1) "Consideration" -- or the degree to which supervisors 
develop an organizational climate of psychological 
support, mutual trust and respect, helpfulness, and 
friendliness is related to salespeople's (a) satis-
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faction and (b) role clarity (Kohli 1989). 
(2) "Trust and support" -- or the extent to which a BRP 
has feelings of trust and confidence in a sales 
supervisor, and the extent to which the supervisor is 
aware of and responsive to the needs of BRPs -- is 
related to BRPs' (a) intrinsic motivation and (b) 
work performance (Tyagi 1985). 
(3) "Interaction facilitation" -- or the supervisor's 
behavior which encourages the development of close, 
mutually satisfying relations within the superior-
subordinate dyad -- is related to (a) intrinsic 
motivation and (b) work performance of salespeople 
(Tyagi 1985). 
(4) Propensity to leave a firm is negatively related to 
salespeople's satisfactions towards co-workers and 
their supervisor (Futrell and Parasuraman 1984). 
(5) Supervisors' monitoring strategy (process vs. 
outcome) is related to behavior of a negotiator in: 
(a) proportion of systematic concession, (b) number 
of different proposals made, and (c) proportion of 
low priority concessions made (Clopton 1984). 
Studies in organizat~on behavior and social psycholo-
gy were also examined to help generate more understanding 
on how the intra-organizational factors would affect a 
negotiator's perception, attitude and behavior. Three 
prominent areas (representational role, effects of con-
stituents, and status of negotiators) were selected and 
are discussed below. They can shed additional light on 
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the salient variables one must pay attention to as far as 
intra-group negotiation (interaction) is concerned. 
A negotiator is constantly facing a dilemma: on the 
one hand, he is representing the special interest of his 
own reference group, and, on the other, he is trying to 
reach agreement with the opposing side which usually has a 
conflicting motive. In Vidmar (1971), it was found that 
the presence of negotiator representational role 
obligations was detrimental to negotiation performance. 
This is supported by Lamm and Kogan (1970), who found that 
when ' negoti'ators have been designated as "principal 
bargaining agents" by the groups, their negotiation 
behavior would differ quite distinctly from the 
corresponding behavior of persons in the control group. 
When the negotiation is on a competitive base, such 
as the usual international negotiation and labor-
management collective bargaining, a representative is not 
entirely "free" to act in accord with fact or even to 
engage in compromise, for the act of doing so would be 
recognized by group members as bringing them "defeat". 
Hence, the loyalty of representatives to in-group 
positions will frequently end in deadlock (Blake and 
Mouton 1961)~ When two parties are evaluated under win-
lose conditions, loyalty to an in-group position will 
replace the exercise of logic or rationality. , Basically, 
a representative is motivated to win, or at least to avoid 
defeat, even if the outcome is not logical from a totality 
standpoint. If a representative cannot win, chances are 
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that he will try to avoid group defeat through deadlocking 
tactics. In another study by Kogan, Lamm and Trommsdorff 
(1972), they confirmed that prior issue commitment to 
ingroup members would increase the difficulty of a 
negotiated agreement and would decrease decision 
satisfaction. 
within the context of representational roles, it was 
also found that post-negotiation evaluation by a cohesive 
group would produce longer negotiation time (Klimoski 
1972). Here, group cohesiveness means that the amount of 
interpersonal attraction that exists among members of a 
group and a person in such an atmosphere will act 
consistently with expectations and according to the team's 
responses. 
Organ (1971) and Major, Carrington, and Carnevale 
(1984) suggest the notion that perceived visibility from 
constituents has a significant effect on people's 
psychological state. People will tend to deviate from the 
constituency norm more often when they think that their 
bargaining behavior is not observed by constituents. 
Kogan, Lamm, and Trommsdorff (1922) attribute this to the 
fact that presence of observers seemed to increase the 
"loss of face" motivation which alters people's behavior 
to act otherwise. 
constituent surveillance will encourage the 
negotiator's using competitive tactics as threats, 
persuasive arguments, and putdowns (statements derogating 
the other's status or power). The negotiator apparently 
chooses these tactics in order to look tough in the eyes 
of their own team members. However, these tactics may 
well result in diminished joint and individual outcomes 
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(Carnevale, Pruitt, and Britton 1979; Pruitt et al. 1986). 
Studies also confirm that accountability also affects 
a person's negotiation behavior. Roloff and Campion 
(1987) delineate the debilitating effect of accountability 
which predicts that bargainers held accountable to a 
constituency will make more extreme offers, think they are 
perceived to be less integrative, take more time to 
negotiate, are more likely to deadlock, and are less 
satisfied with the outcomes. Nevertheless, negotiators 
who are given moderately difficult profit constraints 
achieve more profitable transactions than negotiators 
without such constraints (Bazerman, Magliozzi, and Neale 
1985). In this regard, limit setting might have a 
positive effect in improving a negotiator's performance. 
A survey of literature also indicates that the status 
of negotiators (or BRPs) with respect to their constituent 
members also affects the perception and behavior of the 
negotiators. Duchon, Green, and Taber (1986) 
differentiate two types of vertical dyad linkage which 
exist between negotiators and their constituent members. 
One type is described as a partnership characterized by 
reciprocal influence, mutual trust, respect, liking, and a 
sense of common fate. The second type is characterized by 
unidirectional downward influence, role-defined relations, 
tight control, and outgroup relationship. 
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The status of a negotiator (a subordinate or a 
superior), will affect his behavior in a negotiation. As 
a subordinate, the negotiator's perception and interests 
will differ according to the resources, information, and 
backing from his boss. In any level in the hierarchy, a 
person will have his particular goals coming from personal 
visions, experience, and background. Nevertheless, these 
goals mayor may not be converging with those of their 
boss. A lot of interdependency will occur when the subor-
dinate bids for finance, personnel support, power, and 
agreement from his superior (Lax and Sebenius 1986 p.22). 
Their mutual dependence will generate conflict and 
maneuvering, which will in turn affect the subordinate in 
his negotiation practice. On the other hand, the 
influence of subordinate constituency is not unimportant. 
In the first place, authoritative command does not 
necessarily guarantee good outcomes. When interdependence 
is high, when information is needed, and when expertise is 
called for in a negotiation talk, management by edict 
would be ineffective. 
Hermann and Kogan (1968) found that a negotiator's 
role in his institution would affect the way he 
represented that group when bargaining with other 
representatives. Basically, subordinates are reluctant to 
change much from their initial positions while leaders 
manifest a significant change in the risky position. For 
the subordinates, the nature of their previous intra-group 
negotiation will determine much of their strategies. On 
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the contrary, the leaders will pay more attention to the 
nature of the ongoing inter-group negotiation for refer-
ence. For the leaders, the element of personal 
responsibility to the constituency is not a major concern. 
By virtue of their higher status, they are less concerned 
about the displeasure of subordinates for shifting from 
previous negotiation decisions. In this regard, they can 
afford to listen and be persuaded by their negotiation 
partners. 
Two other studies also shed light on the effect of 
the status of a negotiator on his negotiation strategies 
(Kogan, Lamm, and Trommsdorff 1972; Jackson and King 
1983). First, subordinate negotiators, relative to leader 
negotiators, consult more with their dyadic partner and 
more often fail to achieve consensus with their partner. 
Second, higher status member will have their negotiation 
talks completed in less time. Though the evidence is 
limited, the literature tends to suggest that a leader 
will be more efficient and more flexible in his 
negotiation talks than a subordinate. 
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Boundary Role Interaction 
A negotiator is not only a member of his parent 
organization and subject only to influence of internal 
constituent members. In fact, he is also a member of a 
boundary interaction system. A boundary role person is 
the target of potential conflicting demands, originated 
from his constituents and persons outside his organization 
(Wall and Adams 1974). Along the same perspective, Wall 
(1975) also notes that the representative's behavior is 
affected by the interaction effect of both internal and 
external demands. While a negotiator must bargain with 
outsiders, he also has to ~engage in intra-organizational 
bargaining (bargaining with members of his own group). On 
the one hand, he is expected to represent to the outsider 
his constituents' needs and requirements, and reflect the 
outsider's demands to his constituents. On the other 
hand, he must attempt to alter the outsider's preference 
so that it is more in line with those of his constituents, 
and vice versa. At times, the outcomes of negotiation 
between himself and the constituents become inputs to the 
negotiation between himself and the outsider, the outcomes 
of which then become new inputs to the next intra-group 
(internal) negotiation. 
As empirical marketing negotiation studies on the 
interaction effect of "inter" and "intra" forces are quite 
limited, related studies in social psychology are reviewed 
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to identify more clearly the interactive nature of the two 
forces. Frey and Adam (1972) believe that it would not be 
sufficient to analyze only the external conflict or only 
the internal conflict in isolation from the other. The 
two types of conflict in bargaining situations are 
strongly interrelated and should be considered together. 
In their study, they found that (1) a cooperative vs. an 
exploitative perception of one's opponent and (2) 
constituent trust and distrust have an interactive effect 
on bargaining behavior in general. The former factor is 
one aspect of external conflict and the latter factor is 
one aspect of internal conflict. 
In another study, Wall (1976) studied the intragroup 
and intergroup interactions via negotiation experiments. 
Bargaining orientation of the opposing representative 
(very cooperative, slightly cooperative, slightly 
competitive, and very competitive) was found to be 
interacting with gender of the targets to affect (1) a 
constituent's directive to the representative, (2) the 
representative's bargaining behavior, (3) the opponent's 
bargaining behavior, (4) the number of agreements reached, 
and (5) the amount of time spent in bargaining. 
Results of some other interaction studies are also 
included below. First, negotiators' visual accessibility 
is a moderator of the effects of accountability to 
constituents. In fact, accountability produces lower 
joint profit when the negotiators are negotiating face to 
face (Carneva.le, Pruitt, and Seilheimer 1981). When 
resistance to yielding (required by the constituents) is 
high, an expectation of cooperative future interaction 
orientation will enhance BRPs' total individual profit 
outcome (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). Finally, Keenan and 
Carnevale (1989) confirmed a carryover hypothesis: (1) 
ingroup cooperation would produce greater cooperation 
toward an out-group, and (2) in-group conflict would 
produce greater competitiveness with an out-group. This 
finding suggests that bargainers should try to foster 
within-group cooperation prior to solving between-group 
conflicts. 
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Clopton (1982, 1984), in an experiment to test the 
interacting effects of inter-group and intra-group 
influence, found that (1) seller concession behavior, (2) 
seller information, and (3) buying firm monitoring of the 
buyer on the negotiation behavior, interact to affect the 
buyer's negotiation behavior and outcomes. The profit 
obtained by buyers are affected by the behavior of the 
seller (competitive vs. coordinative) and the information 
the seller provides (clear vs. ambiguous messages) to the 
buyer. On the other hand, buyers' negotiating behavior is 
affected by the interaction effect of buying firm 
monitoring of buyer negotiating activity and seller 
information. 
After a description of the inter-group and intra-
. group concerns of a negotiator, let us turn to the issue 
of cultural differences and see how this would 




Power Distance and Collectivism 
According to King (1982), Chinese social scientists 
should draw more on the particular characteristics of the 
Chinese culture and hence, the sinicization of social 
theory is the norm rather than the exception. In this 
connection, scholars are expected to avoid relying totally 
on western social theories and they should try to develop 
their own innovative work towards that goal. Yang (1982) 
also criticizes Chinese psychologists' habitual 
suppressing of the indigenous way of thinking and con-
ceptualization, and their complacency with western 
theories and methods. When they detach their research 
from the Chinese cultural base, they cannot develop their 
own identity and go beyond the traditional context and 
confines of western psychology. The problems, theories, 
and methods developed by western psychologists are 
basically context-bound, and unconditional transplantation 
of these to the local Chinese context might not be 
appropriate. If Chinese psychologists can incorporate . the 
indigenous way of looking at things in their studies, they 
will be able to develop a more valid and appropriate set 
of theories. Chinese psychology is unique at least in 
several areas: (1) the issue of "face", (2) the concept 
of "Pao", (3) the concept of "Yuarn", (4) the influence of 
family, clan, and nationalism, and (5) the Chinese 
language. 
Yang (1986) argues that an "etic" approach, using 
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universal constructs, will not be able to unravel the 
psychological characteristics that are unique to the 
Chinese as a cultural group. In this connection, an 
"emic" approach using indigenous Chinese constructs should 
be emphasized. Studies along this line will uncover the 
specific psychological and attitudinal characteristics of 
the Chinese as a social-oriented group of people. A 
comprehensive understanding of psychology as a whole ' is 
not possible if we cannot develop psychology theories in 
different cultural contexts. with a clearer understanding 
on the universality and particularity of people's 
mentality and behavior, we will be able to develop a 
stronger and comprehensive global psychology. 
Several studies have empirically determined how 
cultural impacts have affected the perception and behavior 
of businessmen in their decision making. In Lee (1982), 
it was found that Chinese managers, as compared to western 
managers, are more concerned about ethical issues, how 
others see them, sense of security in social class, and 
self-imposed demand. In Chan and Lee (1986), it was found 
that the ethical position of salespeople in a Chinese firm 
would very much depend on their own moral standards; in 
the western organizational culture, their ethical position 
will depend greatly on contracts, stipulated rules, and 
sanctions. In another study by Chan, Lau, and Ip (1988), 
a business executive's ethical position was contingent 
upon (1) his cultural orientation (Chineseness), (2) 
significant others, and (3) his opportunity to act 
153 
unethically. 
Using an in-basket instrument, Tse et al. (1988) 
investigated how executives from different cultures would 
react to various simulated international marketing 
situations. They confirm that home culture has 
predictable and significant effects on executives' choice, 
decisiveness, and risk adjustment strategies. Based on 
the above, it seems that we cannot unconditionally borrow 
management theories developed in the West and use it in 
the particular Chinese context. 
Hofstede's Chinese Work Values 
The seminal work of Hofstede and his colleagues in 
the analysis of people's work-related values in different 
national culture is influential and could help in laying a 
theoretical background for this study. Two of his work 
values, namely power distance and individualism, have been 
tested in various Chinese cultural settings. In the 
discussions below, we will, see (1) why it is necessary to 
consider these two values separately from western theories 
and (2) how these two values affect the social behavior of 
the Chinese people. 
Relating to the first issue, the straight application 
of western management principles in the oriental culture 
is problematic, as mentioned in Hofstede (1980b; 1983; 
1987). In the U.S., management scientists tend to 
advocate participation in the manager's decisions. This 
is understandable, given the lower ranking of the united 
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states in the power distance scale (ranked 15 out of 40). 
Nevertheless, in the country with a larger power distance 
score, like Singapore and Hong Kong, we could expect a 
more "authoritarian" style of leadership with relatively 
less concern for participative management. Managers in a 
high power distance culture would find subordinates 
agreeing more frequently with Theory X and managers would 
behave more autocratically in order to be more effective. 
Similarly, the western theories advocate that people 
behave in such a way to maximize their own self-interest. 
These theories are unable to explain people's behavior in 
the collective countries whose major motive is to look 
after the interest of their group and they will have no 
opinions and beliefs other than the opinions and beliefs 
of their group. 
In Hofstede (1980a; 1980b) , countries dominated by 
the Chinese culture score considerably higher on the power 
distance and collectivism scale than countries in the 
western ' world. This finding offers important input to 
this study, as these two dimensions might help to explain 
why non-adaptive foreign negotiators are not performing as 
well as they should be in. many Chinese negotiation talks. 
Power Distance and Collectivism 
According to Hofstede (1980a), human inequality in 
areas such as prestige, wealth, and power are accepted 
differently in different countries. Inside an 
organization, inequality in power is functional and 
unavoidable. The level of the "right" power distance is 
determined basically by society. In his context, the 
question of power distance deals with perceptions of the 
superior's style of decision-making and of subordinates' 
fear of disagreeing with superiors (p.92). 
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other works of Hofstede on the issue of power 
distance are summarized below to give a more comprehensive 
description of his pictures of subordinates in a large 
power distance society (Hofstede 1980b; Hofstede 1983; 
Hofstede 1987; ~ Hofstede and Bond 1988): 
(1) Subordinates have strong dependence needs. 
(2) Subordinates expect supervisors to act 
autocratically. 
(3) An ideal supervisor to most is a benevolent autocrat. 
(4) Everybody expects superiors to enjoy privileges; laws 
and rules differ for superiors and subordinates. 
(5) Status symbols are very important and contribute 
strongly to the supervisor's authority with the 
subordinates. 
(6) Everybody knows where he or she stands in a system. 
(7) Objectives of persons in authority positions should 
be followed. 
(8) People will little power accept and expect that power 
is distributed unequally. 
The basic notion of power distance is further 
elaborated along the line of traditional Chinese cultural 
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values (Hofstede and Bond 1988; Bond and Hofstede 1989). 
First, the "wu lun" or the five cardinal relationships are 
related closely to power distance. The five basic 
relationships in Confucian ideology are ruler/subject, 
father/son, older brother/young brother, husband/wife, and 
older friend/younger friend. These relationships are 
based on mutual, complementary obligations: the junior 
partner owes the senior respect and obedience and the 
senior owes the junior partner protection and 
consideration. stability in Chinese society is based on 
unequal relationships between people; hence, countries 
dominated by the Chinese culture have high power distance 
scores (Hofstede 1980a). 
On the other hand, individualism describes the 
relationship between the individual and the collectivity 
which prevails in a given society (Hofstede 1980a, p. 
213). Different societies will have different degrees of 
individualism. This norm will strongly affect the nature 
of the relationship between a person and the grouping to 
which he belong. In a collectivist society, everybody is 
supposed to look after the interest of his or her ingroup. 
A person should have no opinions and beliefs other than 
the opinions and beliefs in their ingroup (Hofstede 1983). 
In addition, when people are not behaving as members of 
the family/ingroup, they will be rejected by society 
(Hofstede 1987). 
In the Chinese culture, the family is the prototype 
of all social organizations. A person is not primarily an 
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individual; he or she is a member of a family (or clan). 
In China, children are trained to restrain themselves, to 
overcome their individuality and to maintain harmony and 
well-being of the family. Usually, individuals are well 
integrated into strong and cohesive groups. Once inside 
an in-group, their in-group members will continue to 
protect and support a person in exchange for his 
unquestioning loyalty to the groups (Hofstede and Bond 
1988). This concept is quite remote to western theories 
on management behavior. Hofstede (1983) quoted the 
example of the word "duty", which implies obligations 
towards others in one's groups, does not appear at all in 
. U.S. leadership theories. 
Chinese cultural Values 
Contentions of various scholars on Chinese cultural 
values are presented below (Table 2.7) to present a 
general picture of how the collectivism and power distance 
dimensions affect the behavior of the Chinese. 
According to this literature, collectivism dominates 
in the Chinese culture. Familism/kinship is the norm and 
ethnocentrism is a general Chinese social behavior. The 
personal relationship in the Chinese context is 
hierarchical in nature. Whether certain behavior is 
acceptable or not depends on the person, but not the 
subject matter itself. The relationship between a person 
to another is a particular one, and being considered as a 
member in the in-group would make a whole lot of 
difference. People would make personal sacrifice for the 
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Table 2.7 
CHINESE CULTURAL VALUES: COLLECTIVISM 
AND POWER DISTANCE 
Literature Collectivism 
Fei (1947) hierarchical relationship (p.32) 
person specific (p.37) 
reciprocity (p.80) 
Fei (1948) personal relationship (p.12) 
Yin (1954) no individualism (p.113) 
no public-private distinction 
(p.121) 
mutual assistance (p.121) 
ethnocentrism (p.128) 
person specific (p.129) 
anti-foreign (p.131) 
blood relationship (p.148) 
Hsu (1971) solidarity (p.122) 
Wen (1974) family orientation (p.52) 
collectivism (p.S3) 
group interest (p.S4) 




ascriptive orientation (p.S3) 
familism (p.64) 
in-group difference (p.83) 
personal relationship (p . 247) 
collectivism (p.22) 
personal relationship (p.34) 
group orientation (p.S2) 
particularistic (p.346) 
relationship network (p.3S3) 
Hsu (1981) kinship group (p.396) 
Power Distance 
hierarchical relationship (p.32) 
old-young order (p.74) 




hierarchical relationship (p.180) 
father-son relationship (p.56) 
father's authority (p.262) 
hierarchical authority (p.52) 
obedience (p.54) 
command system (p.SS) 
senior orientation (p.SO) 
hierarchical orientation (p.S6) 




Table 2.7 (Cont'd) 
CHINESE CULTURAL VALUES: COLLECTIVISM 
AND POWER DISTANCE 
Literature Collectivism 
Sun (1983) ethnocentrism (p.363) 
we-they orientation (p.371) 
Yu (1983) egalitarian (p.82) 
harmony (p.82) 
Hsu (1983) kinship ties (p.349) 
Yang (1985) personal relationship (p.38) 
particularistic (p.38) 
Liang (1987) 
King (1987) personal relationship (p.96) 




hierarchical relationship (p.372) 
hierarchical order (p.73) 
father's authority (p.223) 
subordinate's conviction (p.223) 
father-son dyad (p.335) 
social status (p.38) 
submission to authority (p.42) 
aggression avoidance (p.208) 
Chien (1987) subordinate relationship (p.23) 
Lao (1987) sense of responsibility (p.101) 
co-operation in group (p.10l) 
Hsu (1988) kinship group (p.479) 
Yang (1988) sacrifice for the group (p.15) 
in-out group (p.19) 
Wen (1988) relationship network (p.32) 
in-out group (p.33) 
reciprocity (p.37) 
complacency (p.208) 





Table 2.7 (Cont'd) 
CHINESE CULTURAL VALUES: COLLECTIVISM 





in-out relationship (p.46) 
care for the group (p.47) 
egalitarian (p.47) 
person specific (p.56) 





in-out group (p.44) 
hierarchical difference (p.149) 
relation oriented (p.156) 
Yue (198~) person specific (p.156) 
responsibility to in-group 
(p.167) 
pen familism (p.182) 
Power Distance 
submission to authority (p.66) 
hierarchical style (p.139) 
class order (p.158) 
social conformity (p.160) 
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well-being of his in-group members, or the group he is 
affiliated to. When a favor is done to another person or 
party, a stronger personal tie is built. In many 
circumstances, reciprocity of favor is expected, and 
exchanges of favor will tend to build an even stronger 
bonding between the parties. 
As far as power distance is concerned, the 
hierarchical order in many social contexts is tacitly 
admitted and accepted. The father-son dyad is commonly 
observed and authoritarian leadership is the norm rather 
than the exception. In the Chinese culture, the 
following are accepted virtues: conformity, obedience, 
complacency, avoidance of aggression, and self control. 
So, it is natural that people low in the social ladder be 
less inclined to challenge the explicit and implicit wish 
of their superior, as compared to people in the western 
culture. 
Cross Cultural Management 
Academics in cross cultural management basically hold 
the view that both power distance and collectivism prevail 
in the Chinese organization (e.g. Hofstede 1980a; Saner-
Yui and Saner-Yui 1984; Chow, Inn, and Szalay 1987; Yau 




In the Chinese firm, the department head is seen as 
the paternal figure in the whole organization and the 
staff are the "children". Harmony with the boss is more 
important than actual performance as far as appraisal is 
concerned. Top level managers, like the head of the 
family, retain much personal power. The major emphasis is 
trustworthiness and loyalty and the prime concern is 
harmony and compliance. Employees are expected to act in 
obedience and remain submissive and passive. 
In each Chinese organization, there is an informal 
"naturally accepted hierarchy"; a person should know 
precisely where he stands in the hierarchy and to whom he 
owes respect and obedience. Importance attached to 
members in the hierarchy is usually based on status and 
seniority, also, the influence from the top is strong and 
continuing. Inside such organizations, highly centralized 
decision-making prevails, and the decision does not have 
to be rationally justified, or debated openly. Middle 
managers have little leeway in their style of management 
and operation. 
The Chinese believe that man should not try to 
overcome or master nature but has to learn how to adapt to 
it so as to reach harmony. Modesty and self-effacement 
are two important virtues that a subordinate should 
strictly adhere to. Circumstances have an important 
bearing upon what is right _and wrong, and compromise is 
inevitable (Yau 1988). The Chinese have a strong respect 
163 
for authority, which is rooted in Confucius's five 
cardinal relations (sovereign and minister, father and 
son, husband and wife, senior and junior, and between 
friends). They have to observe and follow the norms 
attached to each individual interpersonal relation. Under 
this kind of influence, the Chihese are conditioned to be 
more risk averse and not motivated to generate innovative 
ideas unless when instructed by managers high up in the 
power ladder to do so. 
As far as negotiation with the Chinese is concerned, 
some descriptive works can be found which analyze how the 
Chinese cultural values affect negotiation talks (e.g. 
Campbell 1987c; Wagner and ColI 1990; Warrington and 
McCall 1983; Shenkar and Ronen 1987). In many cases, the 
Chinese are reluctant to take responsibility for 
decisions. He who occupies a lower status in the 
hierarchy will do n~thing so as to avoid making any 
mistake. Usually, difficult and debatable points are put 
aside, thus affecting the negotiation efficiency. Group 
consensus is a way to evade responsibility, and parties 
involved would take great care in making any innovative 
moves, especially when the concerns of the high officials 
are not yet crystal clear. That is why a decision will 
have had to permeate several layers and levels of the 
bureaucratic ladders before it is being approved. 
Decisions can only be made as a result of lengthy con-
siderations and group consensus. 
According to Shenkar and Ronen (1987), each 
individual in the negotiation team will be conscious of 
, 
his position and potential in the social system or group 
framework. One should avoid overtly aggressive behavior 
which is not compatible to his status in the hierarchy. 
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The American task-oriented approach is therefore viewed by 
the Chinese as an unacceptable mode of behavior. This 
sort of emotional restraint will complicate a negotiator's 
efforts to judge the reactions of the Chinese. When the 
real need of the Chinese is behind the "black curtain", 
the foreign negotiator may erroneously give up some very 
profitable ventures. 
Collectivism 
On the other hand, the Chinese are very group-
oriented and continuing relationships are of great 
importance. Grouping can take a number of forms: family, 
clan, shared surname, home town, classmates, friends, or 
other share experience. within such relationships, there 
will be reciprocity with one favor repaid by another 
later. According to Lockett (1988), the Chinese physio-
logical needs are at a higher level than social belonging, 
while "self-actualization in the service of society" 
replaces Maslow's individually defined "self 
actualization". 
A Chinese businessman tends to develop personal 
friendship with his business partners and colleagues, and 
the establishment and maintenance of such linkage is an 
important task in his business endeavors. Harmony, 
cooperation, loyalty, reciprocity, and conscientiousness 
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are major Confucian values which affect every Chinese 
businessman. Based on Mun (1989b), familism is an 
important Chinese management style. Trust is highly 
related to closeness in the relationship network. The 
weaker the personal relationship between two persons, the 
less will be the trustworthiness granted. Under Confucius 
influence, harmony and order should always be stressed. 
The feeling of being in an in-group would bring in greater 
loyalty; and, members are willing to personally sacrifice 
so as"to achieve the well-being of the group. When faced 
with challenges from an out-group, members in the clan 
will foster even greater solidarity to fight for the 
group's benefit, vitality, and growth. 
When it comes to interpersonal relations, the Chinese 
doctrine of "favor doing" usually applies. Favors done 
for others are often considered as social investments and 
handsome returns are expected in future engagements. 
"Reciprocity" or "pao" between persons are basically seen 
as cause-and-effect relationship (Yau 1988). The act of 
giving favor will make a person entering a group as in-
group remember, and, once inside a group, he is expected 
to continuously give out and receive favors from other 
members in the group. Nevertheless, the Chinese are 
group-oriented only towards those people who are inside 
their group. They can be rather suspicious and cold to 
strangers with whom relationships have not been 
established. 
In the business negotiation context, life is made 
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easier if the Chinese negotiation team considers its 
counterpart as a "friend". In China, friendship would 
symbolize trust, loyalty, and sacrifice. Good 
relationships in China are crucial to the success of a 
business venture. The Chinese prefer to talk with 
friends, relatives, or people they consider as in their 
in-group. In China, business relationship is subsumed 
under the moralistic notion of friendship and the Chinese 
prefer to do business with friends but not acquaintances. 
They value business colleagues whom they interact 
regularly, and whose behavior are qualified as "friends' 
behavior". 
Relationship with the Chinese is a long-term matter, 
and is based on mutual benefit and guanxi. The Chinese 
are quick to detect the inner attitude and emotions of 
their negotiation partners. Their major concern in a 
business talk is to develop strong and long-term bonding 
with the entire person in front of them but not with the 
particular event or task at hand (Warrington and McCall 
1983). Though the Chinese develop close friendships 
slowly, foreigners may find it worthwhile to establish 
such mutual bonding as this relationship will last for a 
long period of time. 
Now, let us take a look at how the issues are 




Power and status' Consciousness 
Bond and Wang (1983) and Bond and Hwang (1986) 
suggest that the Confucian analysis has continuing 
validity toward an understanding of Chinese interpersonal 
behavior. Confucianism emphasizes the duty of officers to 
serve with dispassionate loyalty. In the Confucian 
tradition, relationship were accorded a position of 
paramount importance. The "wu lun", or the five cardinal 
relations discussed above, define the hierarchical 
relationship between people. In each regard, the senior 
was accorded a wide range of prerogatives and authority 
with respect to the junior. The parties involved are 
circumscribed by rules of appropriate behavior, which 
entail both rights and responsibilities. People are 
expected to follow the requirements of their role to 
achieve harmony. Usually, the source of authority in a 
hierarchy is not by rule of law but by the individual 
acting as the leader. 
In traditional Confucian teaching, each person has a 
ranking within an organization; any behavior to challenge 
the authority is suppressed from an early age. To avoid 
confrontation and conflict, the Chinese tend to moderate 
their public position when they are seen to hold a deviant 
position with respect to some other more important 
reference group (Bond and Wang 1983). Moreover, Bond and 
Hwang (1986) a ·lso expect that submission to control from a 
superior would be reinforced strongly in the Chinese 
culture and the subordinate's response would move closer 
to the position advocated by his boss. 
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Under the hierarchical structure of interpersonal 
relationships, we would expect Chinese subordinates to 
work smoothly when more authoritarian interactions are 
operating between themselves and their superior. In this 
regard, a Chinese subordinate may prefer autocratic 
leadership in which a respected leader makes powerful and 
decisive decisions. There are usually no detailed 
organizational charts and job descriptions in Chinese 
firms, with relationships between employees generally 
undefined. 
Subordinate performance is evaluated subjectively, 
and employees are expected to follow directly the commands 
issued from the top. That is why Bond and Hwang conclude 
that there exists a great power distance between leader 
and subordinates in the hierarchical social structure in 
Chinese organizations. Redding and Wong (1986) also 
support this contention and note that the leader's role 
has some overtones of that of the teacher. More often 
than not, the leader does not commit himself openly to a 
line of action, leaving the direction of his organization 
to personal intuition. In fact, the leadership style 
within Chinese companies is directive and authoritative, 
and subordinates are discouraged from making highly 
visible personal contributions which might suggest that 
they possess leadership quality. 
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other literature relating to the issue of power 
distance in the Chinese culture is reviewed, and a summary 
is presented in Table 2.8. It tends to lend support to 
the contention that power distance is a dominant mentality 
in the mind of the Chinese. 
In-out Group orientation 
Regarding collectivism, Redding and Wong (1986) point 
out the tendency of a "collectivist" society to promote 
the attachment of the individual to a group, with familism 
being considered as the model relationship. In the 
Chinese culture, personal relationships replace 
performance as a basis for management control. This 
notion is convergent with the differential order principle 
proposed by Fei (1948). In this view, people are not 
related to each other on some equal basis. Basically, 
people are at the cent er of a series of concentric 
circles, with the closest ones having the highest bonding. 
Rights and favors attached to different groups are granted 
according to the relative positions of people in these 
circles. 
Affected by the differential order principle, the 
type of relationship betwe·en two parties will determine 
the way resources should be allocated between them. If 
the relationship is an "in-group" one, the Chinese will 
adopt an egalitarian formula. When dividing resources 
with an "out-group" person, the Chinese will be more 
equitable in the allocation exercise. The equality or 







and Wan (1982b) 






and 'Lucca (1988) 
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Table 2.8 












1. authoritarian submission 
1. traditional 
2 • more conforming 
1. cohesiveness under 
authoritarian leadership 
2. create society acceptable 
impression 
1. humble or self-effacing 
person better liked 
1. effect of status of source 
1. moderation 
2 . keeping pure 
3. having few desires 
1. vertical relationship 
2. social order predetermined 
3. stability relationship 
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functions to maintain group integrity by lowering 
differences inside the group. The outcome of such a 
principle is to minimize conflict, especially when 
resources are limited (Bond and Wang 1983). The notion of 
in-out group difference is repeatedly discussed in 
contemporary works on Chinese cultural values. A 
representative set of these works is presented in Table 
2.9. 
Managerial Issues 
Effect of Power Distance 
The issues of power distance are constantly addressed 
by scholars in Chinese management. Mun (1985, p.251) 
notes that managers in China do not have the right amount 
of decision making power and they have to consult all the 
way to the highest level in order to have the final 
resolution. In Chinese enterprises, authoritarian 
leadership is the norm and power is attached to the people 
high up in the authority hierarchy. This is somewhat 
affected by the tradition Chinese culture in which order 
is stressed and age represents wisdom. owing to its 
specific authoritarian style, the whole decision making 
process is prolonged. Each layer in the long hierarchy 
takes a lot of time to digest the material presented to 
them, and consensus has to be sought among various 
departments and agencies. This affects the efficiency of 
business operation in the enterprises. This situation is 
Table 2.9 
STUDIES ON IN-GROUP AND 
OUT-GROUP DIFFERENCE 
Source Topic Investigated Major Findings/Conclusion 
Ho (1982) Asian relational concept 1. interpersonal emphasis 
2. reciprocity of obligation, 
dependence and esteem 
Hwang (1987a) Face and favor 1. multiple standard 
2. guanxi establishment 
3. a favor for a favor 
4. third party 




Collectivism 1. situation-centered 
Triandis, et Collectivism 
al. (1986) 
Wheeler, Reis, Collectivism 
and Bond 
(1989) 
Leung and Rewarding Contribution 
Bond (1982) 
Bond, Leung, Reward distribution 
and Wan 
(1982a) 
Leung and Reward allocation 
Bond (1984) 
Leung and Dispute resolution 
Lind (1986) 
Leung (1987) Dispute processing 
2. consider implications for others 
3. sharing resources 
4. attached to in-group 
5. involved to others' lives 
6. past experience enhances concern 
1. familism 
2. interdependence 
3. deal with stranger differently 
1. fewer but longer interaction 
2. group and task interaction 
3. greater disclosure 
1. moderate overt response 
2. group harmony and integrity 
1. consider group's requirement 
2. egalitarian assignment 
3. fatalism 
1. equality for in-group 
2. equity for out-group 
3. harmony in in-group 
4. willingness to sacrifice 
1. individualists prefer adversary 
procedure 
2. collectivists dislike 
confrontation 
1. prefer bargaining and mediation 
















Table 2.9 (cont'd) 
STUDIES ON IN-GROUP AND 
OUT-GROUP DIFFERENCE 
Topic Investigated Major Findings/Conclusion 
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2. not pursue a conflict with 
in-group 





1. goal of in-group 
2. particularism 
3. perceived social support 
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further complicated by the fact that Chinese managers are 
more indirect than western managers as far as 
communication is concerned. Affected by the traditional 
oriental intrinsic or implicit way to communicate with 
others, Chinese managers prefer not to state precisely 
their expectations and concerns to the foreign businessmen 
(Mun 1985, p.260). The two interact together and make 
doing business with Chinese managers comparatively more 
difficult and less efficient. 
The position of a person in the Chinese management 
'~ierarchy also determines whether he or she would have to 
sacrifice or to enjoy a lot of the privilege attached to 
that status. The Chinese place great emphasis on order: 
superior-subordinate, elder-younger, and high-low social 
status. Superiors are usually assumed to have more 
wisdom, while subordinates have to work hard, and to 
loyally carry out the task assigned by superiors. Under 
such a situation, the superior has absolute authority. 
The organization structure is rather flexible; the addi-
tion and deletion of certain units can be made easily, 
usually depending on the relationship of the persons 
concerned with the decision maker high up in the authority 
ladder. In the Chinese organization, the socially 
accepted power distance is great. position in the 
hierarchy represents ability, achievement, and value. 
Subordinates are expected to be loyal and obedient to the 
managers and they would carry out orders and demands from 
above without much questioning. 
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In a paper discussing the impact of culture on the 
performance of organizations, Redding (1985, p.66) 
postulates that behaviors (including work performance, 
organization, management, leadership, finance, and 
external relationship) of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs 
are influenced by their cultural values and concepts. 
These concepts include, among other things, self-control, 
responsibility to family, conformity, social ranking, and 
"familization" of corporation. These values are directly 
affecting various organization behavior such as: vertical 
cOoperation, horizontal cooperation, conformity with 
organizational goal, and control in organizations. 
with respect to the issue of organizational culture, 
Hwang (1987b) claims that Chinese entrepreneurs generally 
adopt the authoritarian leadership style. In order to 
maintain their power and status, they will exercise a lot 
of control on the subordinate. In the course of directing 
the staff, the superior will control much of the necessary 
information. Hence, the subordinate will have to seek 
information and approval from the leader from time to 
time, thus delaying the efficient flow of work in the 
organization. In addition, the amount of information 
released and degree of approval obtained are to a large 
extent depending on the estimated loyalty of the 
subordinate. In this connection, many of the creative and 
ingenious ideas from below are suppressed. 
Interacting with this high power distance factor, the 
insensitive incentive scheme in the PRC further deters the 
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motivation and innovativeness of managers in China (Mun 
1988). Under the market mechanism, managers are awarded 
by high salary, benefits, and professional status. When 
the effort is not commensurate with the reward, staff will 
be less motivated to take risk, nor to challenge the 
validity of the present system and the directive from 
superiors. If the system of promotion is determined 
mainly by the personal subjective preference of high power 
executives, the subordinates will tend to do less to avoid 
annoying the superior, thus affecting the pace of 
advancement and modernization. 
In addition to the above, the Chinese are very 
conscious about each person's position in the hierarchy 
too. Basically, the Chinese will respect rank, age, and 
experience. They will not question opinions of superiors 
and they will also continuously consult their superiors in 
business dealings. This mentality leads to the following 
situations: (1) indecisiveness of Chinese negotiat~rs, (2) 
bureaucratic management style, and, (3) negotiators being 
mutually dependent in their decisions (Kindel 1990). The 
study by Tse et al. (1988) also confirms that PRC 
executives prefer authoritarian decision styles while Hong 
Kong and Canadian executives prefer a participative 
management style. 
Effect of Collectivism 
According to Shih (1985), the Chinese ' family 
organization is anti~foreign. Once a person is attached 
to a group, the independent status of that person fades 
177 
and the person is, to a large degree, represented by the 
group. The person is deemed to live for the group and he 
or she is expected to sacrifice for that group. The 
existence of that person is mainly defined by the in-group 
and the group will provide the base and value of existence 
for that person. When a decision or judgment has to be 
made, the Chinese will first consider the relationship of 
the counterpart to him or to his in-group. The result is 
largely person specific. Generally, priority will be 
~iven to the in-group members. In much in-group trading, 
a contract is not required as the two parties have great 
confidence in doingb\lsiness with "insiders". 
In addition, the issue of familism also influences 
the future of a person in the management ladder. In many 
cases, only sons or relatives of the enterprise leader 
would have the opportunity to enter the core of the 
authority circle. out-group members, though having good 
qualifications and being of high caliber, would be 
assigned to consultative or staff positions only. This 
would be a way to prevent the out-group members from 
gaining access to the confidential information of the 
organization, and to minimize their potential threats to 
in-group members. 
To provide some plausible explanations of the 
phenomenal success of economic development in Southeast 
Asia, King (1985) examined Weber's thesis of· the 
incompatibility of Confucianism with economic development, 
and suggested that Confucian values are, in fact, the 
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driving forces leading to the economic development in 
South East Asia. Specifically, King introduces the notion 
of "vulgar Confucianism", which is a set of beliefs of 
values driving the Chinese to unconditionally work hard 
for the family or in-group -members. In fact, this vulgar 
Confucianism has induced norms of solidarity in the in-
group which consequently generate high productivity in 
corporations or factories in those South East Asian 
countries dominated by Confucian values. 
This contention was partially verified by Nyaw (1987) 
who compared the management orientation of South East 
Asian Chinese Managers vis-a-vis western businessmen. 
According to Nyaw (p.142), the Chinese managers prefer to 
do business with close friends or in-group members, and 
foreign businessmen will be less likely to break into the 
Chinese business circle. As far as contractual 
relationship is concerned, the Chinese depend greatly on 
personal relationships. Emphasis is placed on verbal con-
tract, and arbitration is more popular than litigation in 
case of business disputes. Moreover, the Chinese 
entrepreneurs will give more preference to friends, 
relatives, and long-term customers. 
The issue of family and kinship groups in the context 
of in-group relationship in the Chinese society is 
considered by other marketing academics too. In the 
Chinese society, the family is supposed to be the basic 
social and economic unit. Relationships begin with the 
immediate family or in-group and then radiate to the 
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extended family, and so forth outwards. Friendship ties 
and social connections are major determinants of business 
relationships. Once inside an in-group, members are 
mutually obligated to help one another. One's fortune has 
to be shared with other members, and one is expected to 
improve the well being of other group members through 
one's contacts or authority. That is why western 
businessmen operating in such a society should be prepared 
to foster strong personal relationships and to build up 
trust in order to facilitate a smooth negotiation and to 
conclude a deal (Tan 1990). 
According to Kindel (1990), sensitivity to Chinese 
cultural values is a source of competitive advantage. 
Basically, the Chinese are suspicious of strangers and are 
hesitant to enter into a contract with unknown parties. 
Nevertheless, strong trust can be developed which lasts 
for a very long period of time. Foreigners can enjoy the 
fruit of this friendship, if they can successfully pass 
the initial hurdle and become in-group members in the 
Chinese relationship web. This in-group out-group differ-
ence is confirmed in the study conducted by Tse et al. 
(1988)j which found that ~RC executives were significantly 
more inclined, for the sake of maintaining long-term 
exchange relationships, to agree to a joint venture with a 
competitor than either Hong Kong or Canadian executives, 
who were less inclined to repay their friends. 
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Impacts on China Business Negotiation 
Several empirical studies which have related the 
issues of power distance a~d collectivism to the topic of 
China business negotiation are discussed below. According 
to Brunner and Taoka (1977), businessmen very strongly 
agree that in establishing good business relationships 
with the PRC, some knowledge of Chinese history and 
culture is helpful. In their survey, respondents were of 
the opinion that the Chinese would not take the initiative 
to develop close personal relationships with foreigners 
who represented international business firms in the PRC. 
The study by Tung (1982) also confirms the above 
contention. Experience in trading and prior relationship 
with the Chinese enhances the probability of success of 
future negotiations. It is also suggested that as the 
Chinese are concerned with building long-term 
relationships, foreign firms must be prepared to commit 
their time, money, and resources in fostering a pleasing 
working environment with the Chinese. 
Lee and Lo (1988) replicated the Brunner and Taoka 
(1977) study to investigate American businesspeople's 
perceptions of marketing and negotiation in the PRC. 
Among other recommendations, the followings are some of 
the points suggested: (1) include at least one "Chinese" 
executive in the negotiation team to provide the necessary 
background on the Chinese history, culture, and customer, 
(2) adopt a patient mentality to cooperate with the 
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Chinese so as to avoid unnecessary frustration, (3) 
establish and intensify relationships with the Chinese (in 
front of and behind the negotiating table), and, (4) try 
to favor the Chinese side so as to receive favorable 
treatment in future deals. 
These views are supported by Brunner and Koh (1988), 
who believe that foreign negotiators should recognize that 
the Chinese will, in the course of negotiation, try to 
offer friendship and close ties with their counterparts. 
The building of long lasting friendships is required to 
support a business deal as the Chinese believe that a 
strong bonding will tie both parties to an obligation to 
help each other in case that such need arises. If this 
sort of friendship is missing, or if close ties are not 
developed between the two negotiating parties, it is quite 
unlikely that the talk will become successful. 
Viewing the China trade negotiation along the line of 
intra-group influence, there is ample evidence that the 
Chinese have a long line of authority, and negotiators 
must have approval from their superiors before any 
concrete decision is made (Brunner and Koh 1988). Often, 
the foreign businessman has to do a major favor (like 
making a sUbstantial price discount) to set a stage for 
their Chinese negotiators to show to their superiors that 
they are doing a good job (Lee and Lo 1988; stewart and 
Keown 1989). In order to evade criticism from above and 
to avoid confronting their Chinese superiors, the Chinese 
negotiator would rather make group decisions than 
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individual decisions. That is why both Brunner and Taoka 
(1977) and Brunner and Koh (1988) note that: (1) the 
Chinese bureaucracy is slow in making decisions, (2) the 
Chinese negotiators require more interaction than is 
normally expected before fully trusting the American firm, 
and (3) the PRC officials are reluctant to reveal their 
true positions. 
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Independent and Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Based on the literature discussed above, three 
independent variables were selected for inclusion in this 
study: friendship, job status, and nationality. 
The friendship variable is chosen because its 
presence or absence accounts for a lot of variation in the 
perception, attitude, and outcome in a negotiation talk. 
If friendship is involved in the inter-group dyad, we 
would expect to see the following outcomes: 
(1) adoption of the win-win orientation, 
(2) utilization of mutual gain negotiation strategies, 
(3) long-term business relationship, 
(4) awareness of the needs of the other party, 
(5) application of clean and honest strategies, 
(6) exchange of favor and benefits in the deal, 
(7) trust and coordination in negotiation, and, 
(8) open and frank communication. 
It is expected that friendship will help develop a 
better set of negotiation styles and better business 
performances in a typical negotiation exercise. In fact, 
the friendship variable was adopted in cross cultural 
studies including Bond et al. (1985) and Hui (1988). 
Job status would affect intra-group relations and 
negotiation styles, according to the literature. In any 
negotiation, participants have to deal with both external 
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executives and internal constituents. The status of a 
boundary person would affect his or her perception and 
behavior. First, the role perception (especially role 
conflict) of a subordinate would be different from that of 
a superior. A corporation's control mechanism and 
decision making style would generally correspond to the 
respective rank of the employees. In general, a 
subordinate is influenced by the superiors in areas 
including: (1) their support, (2) their trust, (3) the 
respect given, (4) their friendliness, and (5) the intra-
group relations. 
The use of a person's status as a treatment is found 
in Bond et al. (1985), Herman and Kogan (1968), Kogan, 
Lamm, and Trommsdorff (1972), and Jackson and King (1983). 
It is found that the status variable can explain the 
variation of both perception and attitude of subjects in 
the above studies. Based on the discussions above, we 
have reasons to believe that job status would have its 
impact on vari~us dependent variables in this negotiation 
study too. 
owing to the very nature of this study, nationality 
is another essential independent variable. The employment 
of ethnic Chinese by MNCs in China business negotiation 
has been suggested by various researchers. The merits of 
Chinese-Chinese negotiation are based on the following 
beliefs: 
(1) Chinese prefer doing business with Chinese, 
(2) overseas Chinese are deemed to be patriotic, 
(3) foreigners will try to exploit Chinese whenever 
possible, 
(4) Chinese understand the PRC better, 
(5) Chinese can communicate better with the PRC execu-
tives, 
(6) Chinese can handle the "face" dynamic better, 
(7) behind-the-scenes exchange of ideas, and, 
(8) bridging the cultural and language gap. 
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Though there are many merits attached to the employ-
ing of ethnic Chinese in the talks, there are demerits 
too. In general, Chinese are more conforming and more 
risk averse. If these drawbacks are significant, the MNC 
top management should redefine the role played by ethnic 
Chinese and design more appropriate personnel strategies 
to alleviate the effects of these drawbacks. 
Under the influence of power distance and collectiv-
ism, it is also expected that the interactions of (1) 
nationality by friendship, and (2) nationality by job 
status would generate respective changes in the dependent 
variables. This will be discussed in full in the next 
section on Research Hypotheses. At the outset, we can 
reasonably speculate that the effects of friendship and 
job status on various dependent variables are contingent 




The three sets of literature discussed above (China 
business deals and negotiation; boundary position: power 
distance and collectivism) have also suggested a list of 
dependent variables for inclusion in this study. Broadly 
speaking, these variables can be grouped under two major 
areas of concern in China business negotiation: management 
styles and business performance. 
Management Styles 
The development of a win-win attitude is always a 
concern in China trade negotiation. It has been said that 
when one is doing business in China, one should try to 
develop good guanxi with the Chinese. If the Chinese take 
a foreign partner as an insider, business would be a more 
natural outcome. 
The rules of the game in China negotiation talks is 
to attain collective interest for the two parties. In all 
circumstances, a foreign businessman should be able to 
demonstrate to the Chinese negotiators that the deal is 
beneficial to the Chinese side as a whole. They have to 
help the Chinese negotiation partner to justify the case 
before the Chinese top management too. with respect to 
this, foreign executives have to detect the real concerns 
of the Chinese, and to foster a favorable attitude on the 
Chinese side through the principle of "equality and mutual 
gain". This win-win attitude is extremely useful in China 
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business as the Chinese will reward those persons who have 
helped them before. Conversely, the Chinese negotiators 
can become very tough if this win-win attitude is absent 
in the talks. 
Second, a positive attitude is of paramount 
importance too. Basically, a positive attitude will earn 
genuine respects from the Chinese. In addition, a gesture 
of coordination and good will are beneficial in fostering 
a strong bonding with the Chinese. In winning a contract 
in the PRC, a good personal connection and relationship is 
considered as a necessary condition, as suggested by many 
academics and practitioners. 
Third, conformity is another management style which 
has been constantly referred to in China negotiation 
talks. Under the Chinese cultural influence, autonomy 
means vulnerability. Many low-level decisions have to be 
considered high up in the authority hierarchy, as the 
Chinese (especially lower ranked executives) would tend to 
conceal their real opinions. In relation to this, Chinese 
negotiators exhibit a strong inclination to rely on group 
consensus and high level directives in their daily 
decisions. In fact, conforming to dominating views and 
consulting key executives are two common tactics used by 
the Chinese in China trade talks. Of course, these 
tactics are detrimental to the efficient and satisfactory 
conduction of negotiations in China. When a number of 
persons in a negotiation exercise are always suppressing 
their opinions and conforming to the views of others, it 
is quite unlikely that an optimal decision could be 
reached. 
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Risk aversion is another management style which is 
often adopted by Chinese business negotiators. While 
conformity relates more to a person's compliance to oth-
ers' views and opinion, risk aversion relates more to a 
person's concern over the risk of exposure attached to a 
move. Basically, the Chinese are more risk averse than 
westerners. In China, avoiding responsibilities and 
comments from superior is supposed to be the golden rule. 
In case of doubt, the Chinese negotiators would prefer not 
to do anything than to risk their reputation and future in 
the hierarchy. This situation is becoming more complex 
when a foreign party is involved this is attributed to 
the traditional mistrust brought up by the notion of 
foreign exploitation. In addition, the insensitive reward 
system in China provides inadequate incentives for the 
Chinese to take extra risk. with respect to that, MNC 
managers should try to minimize the negotiators' worry, 
and give them extra support to lower their perceived risk. 
If this risk factor is not handled properly, the 
negotiation environment will be hampered, and the overall 
business performance will be affected. 
Business Performance 
The four factors mentioned above relate to the man-
agement styles of negotiators, while the two factors dis-
cussed below relate more to the business performance of 
negotiation talks. These two factors are, namely, 
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perceived efficiency and perceived satisfaction. 
Basically, the business performance variables are 
considered as the key concerns of marketers in any 
negotiation. In principle, all negotiators would like to 
build up a highly efficient and satisfactory negotiation 
environment. While these business performance variables 
are expected to be influenced by one or more of the 
independent variables discussed learlier (friendship, job 
status, and nationality), it is also logical to think that 
the management style variables mentioned above would also 
have effects on them. 
The issue of efficiency is a basic concern in China 
business negotiation. From the literature discussed 
above, we can find ample evidence to suggest that many 
good projects are postponed or canceled due to the issue 
of inefficiency. The Chinese bureaucracy is slow and 
massive, with diffuse commands issuing from various layers 
within the hierarchy. More often than not, few people 
(both western negotiators and Chinese' executives) are 
absolutely sure about which are the salient issues and who 
has the final say to a project proposal. The case studies 
on Chinese business deals mentioned earlier have also 
pointed out that the Chinese take a very long range view, 
and impatient foreign businesspeople often find it 
extremely frustrating to deal with such a huge 
bureaucracy. Negotiators are generally caught in the 
middle -- ' chasing after the venture might lead to 
additional waste of time and energy, but giving up the 
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venture might mean a big opportunity foregone. 
In this connection, whoever can better understand the 
needs, goals, and behavior of the Chinese counterpart 
would be at a better position than his competitor in 
getting a satisfactory outcome. The more a negotiator 
understands the Chinese characteristics, the better he or 
she can communicate the selling points of the MNC. When 
the cultural and communication gap is bridged, the two 
parties can tackle the core of various issues surrounding 
the negotiation talk. Under this scenario, a better 
result can be expected~ Nevertheless, this matching 
process is both expensive and time consuming, and market-
ers have to constantly balance cost with potential benefit 
and make their decisions accordingly. 
Apart from the issue of efficiency, foreign negotia-
tors in China are also concerned with the overall long-run 
satisfactory working relationship with the Chinese. As 
discussed above, the Chinese take a very long range view 
on matters (high context emphasis). To a foreigner, a 
transaction is completed once the contract is signed (low 
context emphasis). However, to a Chinese, the signing of 
a contract is just a part of the continuous business 
relationship. In this connection, foreign negotiators are 
advised to pay more attention to the overall perceived 
satisfaction of the negotiation partner in the long run. 
This endeavor is beneficial to the foreign executives as, 
though the Chinese are slow to establish strong bonding 
with others, the established bonding will be hard to break 
by others. In this regard, foreign negotiators have to 
try to understand the real concerns of the Chinese, 
justify to the Chinese why the venture is beneficial to 
them, and sustain the long-run satisfaction between the 
two parties. 
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In sum, altogether six dependent variables will be 
studied in this study. The "win-win attitude", "positive 
attitude", "conformity", and "risk aversion" variables are 
management style variables which describe the mentality 
(or psychic stages) of the executives in China business 
negotiation. On the other hand, the "perceived efficien-
cy" and "perceived satisfaction" variables are referred to 
as business performance variables which describe the 




Negotiation includes a mixture of conflicting and 
collaborative concerns. A negotiator has to defend the 
self-interest of his/her. constituents and at the same time 
engage in joint problem solving with the negotiation 
counterpart. constituent members and other social units 
are generally involved and have strong influence over the 
negotiator. 
Bagozzi (1978) views exchange as a dynamic social 
process functioning under social and psychological 
constraints, and the outcomes of exchanges are contingent 
upon bargaining, negotiation, power, conflict and the 
shared meanings between the social actors. Specifically, 
four classes of determinants are hypothesized by him: 
social influence, social actor characteristics, third-
party effects, and situational contingencies (Bagozzi 
1979). Graham (1980) adopted this social psychological 
perspective and suggested that economic and psychological 
variables and their interaction can be employed to explain 
and predict the outcome of business negotiations. Rich 
implications for practitioners and researchers can be 
derived by examining how external conditions and internal 
processes are affecting the negotiation outcome. 
In the business negotiation context, we can often 
observe the impact of external variables on internal 
negotiations as well as the impact of internal variables 
on external negotiations. More often than not, business 
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representatives are acting as interfaces between employers 
and customers. They are considered as occupying boundary 
positions and they have to handle demands from parties 
which are usually diverse and conflicting. Their success 
depends greatly on their ability to meet the needs of 
their own constituencies and their negotiation partners 
(cf. Walton and McKersie 1965; Deutsch 1973; Neal and 
Bazerman 1985; Bazerman and Lewicki 1985; Pruden 1969). 
Among inter-group influences, trust, concession 
giving, and reciprocity are three specific variables being 
considered by social psychologists. As far as intra-group 
influences are concerned, we can see that topics receiving 
the most attention are representational role, effect of 
constituents, and status of negotiators. A negotiator's 
successfulness is affected also by the interaction effect 
of both internal and external demands, and we can also 
find studies which consider the interacting effects of 
inter-group and intra-group influence (Clopton 1982, 
1984). 
In addition to the impacts of inter-group and intra-
group influence, one would as well expect that the issue 
of culture would a~so affect the outcome of a negotiation. 
Two major Chinese cultural elements are considered in this 
study: collectivism and power distance. First, Chinese 
people would treat in-group members differently from 
persons further away from their relationship circle. 
Second, the Chinese people are group and status conscious. 
The behavior of a person is acceptable or not depending 
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not only on the behavior itself, but on (1) whether the 
group will perceive that behavior as appropriate, and (2) 
the relative ranking of that person in the social or 
managerial hierarchy. In sum, in-out group membership and 
status of the negotiator will definitely have implications 
on the processes and outcomes of negotiation talks in 
China. 
Drawing on the conclusions from the marketing, 
psychological, and cultural literature, three independent 
variables were selected: friendship, job status, and 
nationality. In conjunction with this, by studying the 
existing descriptive studies, surveys, and case analyses 
on China trade deals and Chinese business negotiations, 
six distinct and important dependent variables were 
identified: win-win attitude (a favor-rendering and 
synergistic-exchange-of-benefit orientation); positive 
attitude (a cooperative mentality); perceived efficiency 
(the basic and practical bottom-line in the negotiation); 
perceived satisfaction (a long-term working relationship); 
conformity (a submissive and complying decision style); , 
risk aversion (exposure avoidance tendency). Based on the 
literature reviewed, several hypotheses are formulated. 
An overall presentation of the hypotheses developed 
in this study is shown in Table 2.10. The rationale 
behind these hypotheses is discussed below. 
The bulk of the literature indicates that a 
friendship relationship would lead to an integrative 
problem solving orientation which would then generate a 
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Table 2.10 
HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
i 
INDEPENDENT Win-Win Positivel Perceived Perceived Conformity Risk 
VARIABLES Attitudel Attitudel Efficiencyl Satisfactionl Aversionl 
I I I I I 
Friendship (F) * * * I * 
I 
Job Status (S) I * * 
I 
Nationality (N) * I * * * 
I 
F X N * * I * * 
I 
S X N I * * 
I 
I 
Note: * = relationship hypothesized 
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win-win attitude leading to giving or exchanging of 
favorable treatments for both parties. This sort of 
integrative philosophy would also foster a cooperative, 
efficient and satisfactory negotiation environment (Pruitt 
1981; Deutsch 1983). The aforementioned points are well 
supported by the literature in marketing and international 
business. A summary is listed below: 
(1) "Good relationship" leads to "effectiveness is sales 
interaction" (Weitz 1981). 
(2) "Integrative approach" generates a "win-win attitude" 
and "satisfactory long-term outcomes" (Banks 1987). 
(3) "Reciprocity" builds Iflong lasting relationships" and 
"satisfactory results" (Houston and Gassenheimer 
1987) . 
(4) "Long-term relationship" is related to "negotiation 
performance" (Dion and Danting 1988). 
(5) "Interpersonal interaction" insures the "continuity 
of the dyadic relationship" (Anderson and weitz 
1989). 
(6) "Mutual gain strategies" generates a "more efficient 
negotiation process" (Nielsen 1989). 
(7) "Relational selling" brings a positive and 
reciprocating perception (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 
1990) . 
(8) The norm of reciprocity applies in the marketing 
context (Hallen, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed 1991). 
(9) "Trust and relational . exchange norms" develop a 
positive and win-win attitude in negotiations (Dant 
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and Schul 1992). 
These contentions are well matched with issues relat-
ing to reciprocity, trust, and conciliating strategy 
(manifestation of a friendship relationship), which have 
been discussed in detail in the chapter on literature 
review. 
In sum, when friendship is involved in an inter-group 
negotiation talk, we will expect to see that negotiators 
can discuss with a clear understanding and appreciation 
of others' concern, and a win-win attitude and a positive 
attitude will be fostered. with these benefits, the 
negotiation environment will become more efficient and 
satisfying. 
Subjects negotiating with their friends will be 
more inclined to adopt a win-win attitude, a 
positive attitude, perceive a higher level of 
efficiency and a higher level of satisfaction 
than will subjects not negotiating with their 
friends. 
In the marketing literature, we can also find 
sufficient evidences to support the notion that the job 
status of boundary role persons (BRPs) and their 
interaction with the superior (intra-group relation) would 
have bearings on their perception, attitude, and strategy 
while they are carrying out the daily sales and 
negotiation work. The following summarizes some pertinent 
works of marketing academics on the issue of intra-group 
relationship. Special emphasis is placed on how 
subordinates (salesmen or negotiators) are affected by the 
interaction between their superiors and themselves. 
(1) "Supervisor's monitoring strategies" relate to a 
negotiator's "concessions made" and "negotiation 
strategy" (Clopton 1984). 
(2) Salespeople's satisfaction towards supervisors 
affects their commitment and propensity to leave a 
firm (Futrell and Parasuraman 1984). 
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(3) Close and mutually satisfying relations with the 
supervisor leads to better motivation and commitment 
to perform a good job (Tyagi 1985). 
(4) "Organization culture in management practices and 
decision making styles" builds cooperation and 
staff's involvement in a sales team (Weitz, Sujan, 
and Sujan 1986). 
(5) "Organization climate involving support, trust, re-
spect, and friendliness" is related to role clarity 
of the salesman (Kohli 1989). 
(6) The boundary position of a front-line salesman gener-
ates much role conflict to his daily endeavors and 
negotiations (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 1990, 
p. 351) • 
(7) The internal (or intra) superior-subordinate 
relationship determines the degree of "conformity" 
and "risk aversion" in a negotiation process (Kale 
and Barnes 1992}. 
Actually, in a negotiation, an executive is trying to 
reach agreement with the opposing side on the one hand, 
and to represent his reference group on the other. 
Generally, a representative is not free to compromise or 
to act on his own accord, as his action and strategy are 
to a large extent influenced by his intra-group members. 
The more a person is accountable to the outcome of a 
negotiation talk, the more likely will the person adhere 
to group norm and not to take excessive risk in his 
negotiation strategy. The abovementioned issues would 
have an even bigger effect if the negotiator is having a 
lower job status. The literature indicates that 
subordinates are reluctant to venture, while leaders are 
more willing to change and deviate from the initial 
positions. Subordinates tend to consult more with their 
negotiation partner and more often fail to achieve 
consensus. For the superiors, they are less concerned 
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about the displeasure of subordinates and would shift from 
the previous negotiation position (Herman and Kogan 1968; 
Kogan, Lamm, and Trommsdorff 1972; Jackson and King 1983). 
Subjects having a lower job status will 'be more 
conforming to their colleagues and more risk 
averse than will subjects having a higher job 
status. 
In the Chinese culture, harmony and compliance are 
considered as social norms. Under the notion of group 
orientation, members care very much about whether their 
decisions are conflicting with that of the group. In 
general, the Chinese are unwilling to take responsibility 
for decisions. They prefer doing nothing so as to avoid 
making any mistakes. Parties involved would be very cau-
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tious when making creative and aggressive moves, and group 
consensus is used to evade responsibility. As far as 
social behavior is concerned, the following are accepted 
virtues: conformity, obedience, complacency, aggression 
avoidance, and self control (Yin 1954; Wen 1974; Hsu 1981; 
Yang 1988). That is why we would expect to see Chinese 
executives being more conforming and more risk averse than 
Western executives (Hofstede 1980a; Hofstede and Bond 
1988) . 
Such conforming Chinese executives are not receptive 
to £oreigners. Normally, group-orientation applies only 
to people whom the Chinese consider as being in their in-
group. When negotiating with people of a different 
nationality, Chinese could be rather suspicious and cold, 
especially when relationship has not yet been established. 
Under the Chinese cultural influence, ethnocentrism is the 
norm. Whether certain behavior is acceptable or not 
depends on the characteristics of a person (such as his 
nationality), but not on t .he behavior per se (Wang 1984; 
Wang 1986; Wang 1988; Lee and Lo 1988). In addition, 
negotiators of the same nationality could discuss issues 
with a clearer understanding and appreciation of each 
other's concerns. Under such a situation, negotiators 
will be more likely to share, or at least understand, the 
values, beliefs, and needs of the other party. They will 
be more familiar with the style, practices, and customs of 
the negotiation counterpart, which is helpful in 
generating a more efficient and satisfactory negotiation 
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environment (Wells 1977; Tung 1984). 
H3a: Chinese subjects will be more conforming to 
their colleagues and more risk averse than will 
western sUbjects. 
H3b: Chinese subjects will perceive a higher level of 
efficiency and a higher level of satisfaction 
than will western sUbjects. 
Compared to westerners, the Chinese are more 
collective in their social behavior. More often than not, 
the result of a social interaction depends on "who" but 
not on "what". Personal relationship is often stressed 
and "friends" are expected to be willing to sacrifice 
personal interests for the benefit of the in-group. Being 
an insider in the relationship network would make a lot of 
difference. Multiple standards are socially accepted and 
guanxi establishment is considered as the rule of the 
game. When the Chinese negotiate with a friend, it is 
expected that they will tend to adopt a win-win attitude 
and a positive attitude (cf. Fei 1948; Hsu 1988; Yang 
1985; King 1987; Hui and Triandis 1986; Leung and Bond 
1984) . 
Conversely, it is also expected that, for ethnic 
Chinese in MNCs, when they are negotiating with their good 
friends in China, they might be more conforming to their 
intra-group members if there are negative feelings towards 
the venture. Similarly, they would become more risk 
averse. The reasons behind this are two-fold. First, the 
Chinese friend in China would tend to demand a lot of 
"unreasonable" favors on the ethnic Chinese and it is very 
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probable that the ethnic Chinese would try to evade this 
by complying with and conforming to colleagues in the firm 
(Wang 1986). Second, as discussed in Lee (1989; 1990), 
ethnic Chinese in a MNC may face a split-loyalty problem 
-- they are employed by the MNC, and at the same time they 
may well also treat China as their motherland. The role 
conflict would become even greater when the Chinese 
negotiation counterpart is a good friend of theirs. In 
such a situation, it is quite likely for these ethnic 
Chinese negotiators to take lesser risk, and to conform 
more to their MNC colleagues, especially when there are 
negative comments towards the venture. This strategy 
would demonstrate their impartiality and loyalty to the 
firm. 
H4a : Chinese subjects negotiating with their friends 
will be more inclined to adopt a win-win 
attitude and a positive attitude, as compared to 
western subjects. 
H4b : Chinese subjects negotiating with their friends 
will be more conforming to their colleagues, and 
will be more risk averse, as compared to western 
subjects. 
The Chinese are considered to be high in the power 
distance scale and they are quite status conscious. In 
the Chinese hierarchy, order or ranking are important 
considerations. People with a higher status are the ones 
making the real decision; obedience, suppression and 
submission are considered to be virtues of a subordinate. 
Under the power distance influence, the father-son dyad is 
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the dominating ideology and subordinates are conditioned 
to obey instructions and orders from the top. In general, 
humble and self-effacing persons would be rewarded better. 
That is why Chinese negotiators having a lower job status 
are expected to conform more, and to avoid risk as far as 
possible (cf. Fei 1947; Hsu 1971; Sun 1983; Yang 1988; 
Yang 1981; Bond, Leung, and Wan 1982b). 
HS: Chinese subjects with a lower job status will be 
more conforming to their colleagues, and be more 
risk averse, as compared to western subjects. 
From Table 2.12, we can see that some variables are 
not hypothesized to have relationship between one another. 
First, friendship is hypothesized to have its influence 
more on customer-salesman issues such as a win-win 
attitude and a cooperative mentality (Hypothesis 1). 
Nevertheless, there is not much evidence supporting that 
friendship will affect a negotiator's conformity and risk 
aversion behavior, which are expected to be influenced 
more by internal (intra) issues such as firm's evaluation 
on the project and the bargaining power of the negotiator 
in the firm. 
Second, there is no reason to expect that the job 
status of negotiators would have great impact on their 
win-win attitude, their positive attitude, their perceived 
efficiency and their perceived satisfaction towards the 
venture. Literature on intra-group relations mainly 
support the notion that status in the intra-group dyad 
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would affect a negotiator's "internal marketing" 
considerations -- motivation, commitment, role, conformi-
ty, and risk aversion (see Hypothesis 2). 
Third, while "being a Chinese" is expected to affect 
the perceived efficiency, the perceived satisfaction, the 
conformity, and the risk aversion behavior of an ethnic 
Chinese negotiator (i.e. Hypotheses 3a and 3b), there is 
no support for the speculation that a westerner could be 
less integrative, coordinative, or cooperative. In fact, 
these mentality are considered as standard requirements 
for both Chinese and westerners doing business in China. 
Lastly, while the friendship and nationality 
variables are expected to have impact on the perceived 
efficiency and perceived satisfaction of a negotiator 
(Hypotheses 1 and 3b), we have no grounds to hypothesize 
that these two variables are interactively affecting the 
independent variables. In this connection, friendship and 
nationality are postulated to have additive effect on 





Totally three pretests were conducted before the main 
study was launched. Altogether 192 full-time 
undergraduate business students, 57 part-time 
undergraduate business students, and 103 participants in 
executive training programs were included in the pretests. 
The main objectives of these pretests were: (1) refinement 
· of items to be used in the main study, (2) evaluation of 
the experimental manipulations (Perdue and Summers 1986), 
and (3) accumulation of experience in conducting the final 
experiment. 
Based on the result of the pretests, the formal 
experimental design and the questionnaire used in the 
study were finalized. The instrument adopted in this 
research is shown in Appendix II. The pretest also 
indicated that the entire experimental procedure could be 
finished in 20-30 minutes. In the three pretests, there 
were no evidences that subjects could correctly guess the 
real motive of the study. 
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Subjects 
The membership list of the Hong Kong American Chamber 
of Commerce (1990-1991) was used as the major sampling 
frame for this study. Altogethe~ 195 subjects were 
interviewed based on this list. Before the selection 
exercise, members not having any marketing/sales/business 
negotiation experience were removed from the frame, as a 
number of these people had indicated in a small pilot test 
that they could not put themselves in the scenario and 
were unwilling to respond to the questionnaire. This 
group comprised mainly lawyers and accountants. A letter 
soliciting the subjects' cooperation was first sent to 
each respondent. They were then followed up by telephone. 
If possible, appointments were made over the phone. If a 
respondent rejected the interview, the person next to him 
or her on the sampling frame would be approached as a 
sUbstitute. To obtain the desired response rate (240), 
respondents were asked to $uggest names of business 
associates for inclusion in the sampling frame. Care was 
taken to ensure that the responses of the referred re-
spondent would not be affected by the person making the 
referral. As an incentive to boost the response rate, the 
researcher guaranteed that a summary report would be sent 
to the respondents at the completion of the study. The 
profile of the respondents is presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
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The hypotheses generated in the previous section were 
tested via the experimental approach. A number of 
negotiation studies have been conducted through 
experiments because variables under consideration can 
easily be manipulated (Bazerman and Lewicki 1985) . . 
According to Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987), experiments on 
negotiation are suitable for developing and evaluating key 
variables in hypotheses. Under the experimental setting, 
constructs can be efficiently tested for their relation-
ship with the manipulated treatments. As a result, 
clear-cut evidence about causes and effect may be 
obtained. In summary, negotiation experiments can 
generate (1) precise manipulation of the hypothesized 
independent variables, with other influencing variables 
kept basically constant, (2) careful identification of the 
changes in the dependent variables, which is usually 
difficult to accomplish in field settings, and, (3) novel 
strategies being tried out in exploratory environment 
before putting in practice in the market. While realism 
is one drawback of the experimental approach, it is deemed 
that such risk could be accepted if differences between 
the experiment and the real setting do not have serious 
impact on the relationship found between the independent 
and dependent variables (Pruitt 1981, p.11) . . Deutsch and 
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Krauss (1960) also agree that if the main purpose of the 
study is intrinsic plausibility, the experimental method 
is a good choice. When the chief purpose is the building 
up of a theoretical cause-and-effect generalization, 
experiments using relatively selective samples are also 
deemed appropriate (Morris, Paul, and Rahtz 1987; Sawyer, 
Worthing, and Sendak 1979; Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 
1981; McGrath and Brinberg 1983). 
This approach has been adopted in many negotiation 
and conflict resolution studies in the social 
psychological context. Thompson, Mannix, and Bazerman 
(1988), Leung (1987), and Bond et al. (1985) are good 
examples. For the two latter studies, the issue of 
culture (in fact, nationality) is specifically considered 
as to its effect on subjects' reactions and perceptions 
with respect to various manipulations. In the marketing 
negotiation literature, we can also trace the experimental 
tradition (cf. Angelmar and stern 1978; Graham 1980; 
Graham et al. 1988; Clopton 1984). 
In this research, the scenario method was used due to 
the following reasons. First, this method is easy to 
administer. It can allow a relatively complex event to be 
organized and structured. Furthermore, for dyadic 
encounters between strangers in the laboratory setting, it 
would be impossible or impractical to manipulate 
treatments such as friendship, cooperative behavior, or 
status in a managerial hierarchy. In this circumstance, a 
scenario or a verbal representation of the situation would 
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be more appropriate to detect subjects' responses or 
perceptions towards the different treatments (Bond, Leung, 
and Wan 1982). 
In this study, subjects were asked to assume that 
they were employed by a MNC, and their duty was to 
negotiate with the Chinese on a possible joint venture 
between the two parties. In the joint venture, the MNC 
would be responsible for introducing technology and know-
how to China, while the Chinese firm would invest in raw 
materials, plant and equipment, and labor. The scenario 
was designed in such a fashion for two reasons. First, 
this scenario represents a typical case in Chinese 
business negotiation (cf. Hendryx 1986a; Grow 1987a; Grow 
1987b; Langston 1984; Langston 1985). Second, according 
to Lee (1989; 1990), Chinese working in MNCs and Chinese 
working in Hong Kong firms display virtually the same sort 
of attitudes, indicating that working place bears an 
insignificant effect on this type of Chinese business 
study. Hence, the MNC context can be applied in the 
developing of scenarios to be adopted in this study. 
To examine the effects of the three basic variables, 
namely friendship, job status, and nationality of 
subjects, a 2x2x2 factorial design was adopted in this 
study. Factor I was the friendship of the negotiation 
counterpart with respect to the subject: friend vs non-
friend. Factor II was the job status of the subject in 
the negotiation team: subordinate vs. superior. Factor 
III was the nationality of the subject (Chinese vs. 
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western). The basic experimental design is shown in Table 
3.2. 
Friendship 
Lower job Status 





Friend Non-Friend Friend Non-Friend 
xlll x211 xl12 x212 
x121 x221 x122 x222 
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Procedure 
Altogether 120 Chinese and 120 Westerners (American 
and British) were interviewed. All interviews were 
administered in their offices. Before arrival at the 
respondent's office, one of the various scenarios was 
randomly selected and the respondent was requested to 
respond to the questions based on the material presented 
in the respective scenario. 
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After reading the instructions, respondents were 
asked to read the scenario carefully. Before answering 
the closed-ended questions in the questionnaire, 
respondents were also asked to elaborate freely their 
general feeling about the joint venture. This served as a 
warm-up exercise and a device to allow respondents to 
express their additional thoughts other than the 
dimensions measured in the closed-ended questions. When 
the subjects had answered all of the questions relating to 
their perceptions of the respective negotiation scenarios, 
they were asked to respond to questions with respect to 
manipulation checks and demographic classifications. At 
the end, three open-ended questions were asked to obtain 
respondents' views on negotiation with the Chinese and to 
check whether respondents had guessed the underlying 
motives of the experiment. The questionnaire, including 





The factor of friendship was manipulated within the 
negotiation scenario in the questionnaire. In the friend 
condition, the respondent was told that the leader of the 
Chinese negotiation team was a good friend of his or hers. 
The respondent and the negotiation partner had met in 
business venture three years ago, and they had become good 
friends since then. In the course of the negotiations, 
they had the opportunity of meeting each other frequently 
in various social occasions, and a better friendship had 
been developed between them. 
In the non-friend condition, the respondent was told 
that the leader of the Chinese negotiating team was an 
acquaintance he or she had met before. The two of them 
had met in a business venture three years ago. However, 
they did not get to know each other very well, and they 
had not seen each other since. In the course of the 
negotiations the two of them had the opportunity of 
meeting each other frequently in various social occasions, 
but actually their friendship had not developed much. 
This friendship manipulation was tested in the 
pretests. Subjects in the friend conditions perceived the 




The factor job status was also manipulated within the 
negotiation scenario in the questionnaire (Appendix II). 
In the low job status condition,the respondent was told 
that the company negotiation team comprised the 
respondent, the respondent's superior together with other 
persons from the company. The respondent was also told 
that his or her superior had expressed, in several 
unofficial meetings, some of his reservations with respect 
to the joint venture. 
In the high job status condition, the respondent was 
told that the company negotiation team comprised the 
respondents, the respondent's subordinate, together with 
other persons from the company. Similarly, the respondent 
was told that his/her subordinate had expressed, in 
several unofficial meetings, some of his reservations with 
respect to the joint venture. 
In the pretests, subje.cts in the high job status 
condition perceived themselves to be having a higher 
status as compared to subjects in the low job status 
condition. 
Nationality' 
Nationality by birth was used as a criterion to 
separate the whole sample into two. This criterion was 
chosen as it would operationally impossible to manipUlate 
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the nationality of a person. Despite the fact that 
subjects were not randomly assigned to different 
"nationality" treatment, the adoption of nationality by 
birth as a dependent variable have been used widely in 
many cross-cultural social psychological and marketing 
studies (e.g. Leung 1987; Bond et al. 1985; Triandis at 
al. 1988; Campbell et al. 1988; Graham et al. 1988; Tse et 
al. 1988). Both of its main effect and interaction effect 
on other dependent variables would be considered. Of 
course, the fact that "nationality" was not randomly 
assigned t~ subjects should be noted when we are looking 
at the ultimate finding of the study. 
In this study, altogether 120 Chinese and 120 Western 
respondents were interviewed. Here, American and British 
executives were pooled to form the Westerner group. The 
combining of both American and British executives to form 
a western group was deemed to be acceptable based on three 
points. According to Hofstede (1980, p.l04 and p.222), 
American and British executives are very much closer to 
each other (on both the power distance and collectivism 
dimensions) as compared to Chinese executives. Second, 
the combining of executives of the two nations into one 
group had been adopted in Chan and Lee's (1988) cross 
cultural ethical study and the result was proven to be 
successful. Last, eliminating either American or British · 
from the study would result in a big decrease in the size 
of the Westerner sample. This would affect greatly the 
analysis and results of the study. 
Operationalization of Dependent Variables 
In this study, attempts were made to generate a set 
of variables to measure the perceptions of respondents 
under different treatments. Measures that had been 
developed in the Western culture were not borrowed 
directly in this study, as according to Negandhi (1983), 
attitude, beliefs, values, and need hierarchies are 
different in different societies. Along this vein, the 
adoption of ready made concepts and loosely conceived 
operational measures are dangerous. Parameswaran and 
Yaprak (1987) also note that the same scale may have 
different reliabilities in different cultures, and it is 
recommended that measures have to be pretested before 
their being adopted in cross-national studies. 
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As far as the Chinese managerial style is concerned, 
it has been suggested that the literature in the Chinese 
context should be referred to. The sole reliance on 
theories and methods developed via an American perspective' 
would be inappropriate in visualizing the relevant and 
salient dimensions (Hofstede and Bond 1988; Adler and 
Graham 1989). 
Measures to be included in this research were 
developed using Churchill (1979) as a reference. The 
literature that generated the pool of potential items 
included various negotiation studies, Chinese cultural 
studies discussed in the previous chapter, and also the 
Chinese trade negotiation cases shown in Appendix I. 
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Items were added, deleted, and modified based on the three 
pretests conducted before the formal study. Coefficient 
alpha and factor analysis were two devices adopted to help 
in the generation of the final set of items to be included 
in the questionnaire. Basically, two major areas of 
concern were studied: management styles and business 
performance. They are briefly discussed below. 
Management Styles 
Win-Win Attitude 
The win-win attitude construct comprises the 
following dimensions: (1) special favorable treatments, 
(2) trying to work harder to help, (3) special forms of 
advantage, (4) more help, and (5) making things easier. 
positive Attitude 
The positive attitude construct comprises the follow-
ing dimensions: (1) placing emphasis on mutual benefits, 
(2) be co-operative and accommodative, (3) not playing 
harmful tricks, (4) preparing to work harder to complete 
the negotiation, and (5) adopting a helpful attitude to 
develop harmony. 
Conformity 
The conformity construct comprises the following 
dimensions: (1) trying not to challenge the expressed wish 
of the colleague, (2) following the colleague's directions 
so as to make ' him gain "face", (3) trying not to convince 
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the colleague even if you disagree with him, (4) remaining 
silent, and (5) not voicing out disagreement. 
Risk Aversion 
The risk aversion construct comprises the following 
dimensions: (1) avoiding criticism, (2) not revealing real 
opinion, (3) following colleague's idea for he is the one 
to be blamed if something goes wrong, (4) keeping quiet so 




The efficiency construct comprises the following 
dimensions: (1) ability to discuss the core of the matters 
quite directly, (2) negotiations probably won't take a 
long time to complete, (3) not expecting too much delays 
and doubts, (4) the negotiation partner would not have to 
exercise much patience and indirectness, and (5) not 
expecting much time consuming get-togethers. 
Perceived Satisfaction 
The satisfaction construct comprises the following 
dimensions: (1) negotiating with an optimistic frame of 
mind, (2) the negotiation partner would negotiate with an 
optimistic frame of mind, (3) expecting the venture to be 
successful, (4) the negotiation partner would expect the 
venture to be successful, and, (5) expecting that the two 
parties will have other opportunities to cooperate in 
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business in the future. 
In addition to the dependent variables discussed 
above, two items were included to serve as manipulation 
checks for the friendship and job status treatments. They 




Scale Development and Pretests 
A multiple-item scale was developed for each of the 
dependent variables in the study. The items were 
generated from a review of the relevant literature: 
descriptive studies, surveys, and case analyses. 
Pretesting of these items was performed in the three 
pretests mentioned above. Additions, deletions, and 
modifications were made based on the result of these 
pretests. The statistical examination of the pretest data 
included the calculation of means, correlation matrices, 
exploratory factor analysis, item-to-total correlations, 
and coefficient alpha (Churchill 1979; Perdue and Summers 
1991). Ultimately, 30 items were finalized to 
operationalize the six constructs under consideration. 
They were included in the questionnaire used in this study 
(see Appendix II). 
Differences of Sub-samples and Experimental Groups 
As the final data set comprised data coming from the 
main sampling frame and from referral, the two samples 
were compared along several major dimensions including 
sex, education level, age, number of years of selling 
experience, ' number of years of working experience, ranking 
in corporation, and amount of time involving in foreign 
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trade negotiation. If great discrepancy exists in one or 
several of the areas mentioned above, the findings of this 
study should be used with great care. 
Similarly, the U.S. sub-sample and the British sub-
sample were compared too, along the aforementioned 
dimensions. This serves to test if there are significant 
problems in pooling the two sub-samples to form the 
western group. 
In this study, the analysis of variance test (ANOVA) 
was used as its major method of study. Before running the 
ANOVA test, the various experimental groups would be 
compared along various major dimensions: sex, education 
level, age, number of years of selling experience, number 
of years of working experience, ranking in corporation, 
and amount of time involving in foreign trade negotiation. 
If the experimental groups were found to be differing in 
any of these dimensions, the dimension{s) would be 
included in the analysis as covariate(s). with this 
analysis of covariance test (ANCOVA), the groups were made 
to be more homogeneous, thus increasing the power to 
identify "significant" independent variables in the study. 
Stated differently, main effects and interaction effects 
are adjusted for chance differences on the covariates that 
are related to the dependent variables. 
In this experimental study, randomization was 
employed on "friendship" and "job status". To adjust for 
the possible difference$ between groups before the 
experiment, the suggested ANCOVA test is supposed to be a 
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good method to help reducing the bias on the dependent 
variables that is predictable from the covariates (Huitema 
1980, p.13). 
Dimensionality and Discrimination 
This study adopted the method suggested .by Gerbing 
and Anderson (1988) in handling dimensionality and 
discrimination. They suggest the application of 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to provide a stricter 
interpretation of dimensionality of scales in a study. 
Basically, the traditional methods such as coefficient 
alpha, item-to-total correlations, and exploratory factor 
analysis are inadequate in assessing dimensionality and 
discrimination. The internal consistency and external 
consistency assessment of dimensionality should be the 
first step in the establishment of meaning for the 
constructs under consideration. After the dimensionality 
of a set of scales has been acceptably established, or 
different dimensions are confirmed to be unique measure-
ments of respective specific facets, we could then ascer-
tain the construct validity of these scales (Bagozzi and 
Phillips 1982; Singh and .Rhoads 1991; Kumar, stern, and 
Achrol1992). 
Multiple Group Analysis 
In this study, responses from two distinct groups of 
respondents were gathered: the Chinese and the Westerners. 
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To inquire about the stability of parameters across these 
two sub-samples, a stacked LISREL analysis was applied 
(Joreskog and Sorbom 1984; Hayduk 1987). Here, the two 
cultural groups were stacked together for simultaneous 
estimation. This approach allows some of the parameters 
to be constrained to be equal between the groups while 
other parameters vary between the groups. If we want to 
test whether the measurement properties of the two groups 
are invariant, we can examine if (1) the factor pattern 
and (2) loadings are equivalent across the two groups 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988). In this connection, we can run a 
simultaneous analysis and study the fitness of the meas-
urement model with the desired invariance constraints 
specified for the two groups. By so doing, we would be 
able to see if differences exist in operationalization of 
the constructs across samples (Anderson and Narus 1990). 
Specifically, this study adopted the method suggested 
by Netemeyer, Durvasula, and Lichtenstein (1991) to 
determine whether the factor structures were invariant 
across the two cultural groups. Briefly, the data from 
the two samples were stacked and two models were estimated 
(Joreskog and Sorbom 1989). The factor pattern was 
specified to be invariant across the two groups in the 
first model (Model I) while the factor loadings across the 
two groups were constrained to be equal in the second 
model (Model II). 
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Analysis of Variance Test 
While the LISREL approach was adopted to achieve 
dimensionality and discrimination for the scales used in 
this study, the ANOVA method was used to investigate the 
main and interaction effects of the independent variables 
of this research: friendship, job status, and nationality. 
The major reason for not using the LISREL procedure in 
this context is that, theoretically, we would expect to 
see interaction effects existing between the variable 
under consideration. In this connection, it is not quite 
appropriate to use LISREL other than the examination of 
construct validity of the measures (Bagozzi and Warshaw 
1990). According to some researchers, ANOVA seems to be 
the dominant approach for the analysis of intervally 
scaled dependent variables in experimental designs for the 
time being (e.g. Perdue and Summers 1986; Bentler and 
Bonett 1980). The interactions between factors implied in 
the factorial design are difficult to be handled by 
LISREL. 
In experimental designs, care has to be taken in 
addressing the assumptions in analysis of variance: 
normality, homogeneity of variance, and independence. 
Concerning the normality assumption, this study adopted 
the suggestion of Hayes (1963, p.239 and p.378): cell size 
should be relatively large (around 30). If the cell size 
is large enough, the issue of normality would not generate 
big problem to the statistical inference. Moreover, Kirk 
(1982, p.75) also notes that the F test associated with 
ANOVA is quite robust with respect to violation of the 
normality assumption, especially when the cell sizes are 
all equal. 
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To handle the assumption of homogeneity of variance, 
this study adopted the suggestion made by Hayes (1963, 
p.379) and Kirk (1982, p.77): equal cells size for the 
eight experimental groups. The assumption of homogeneous 
variance can be violated without much risk, if the number 
of cases in each experimental group is the same. In other 
words, theANOVA test is pretty robust with respect to 
violation of this assumption if we have equal number of 
observations in the samples. For the study, all cell 
sizes were equal. 
As for the assumption on independence, the subjects 
in this study were randomly assigned to the treatments of 
"friendship" and "job status II • Random assignment can even 
out the idiosyncratic characteristics of subjects over the 
different treatments under investigation, and prevent the 
outcome of the experiment being selectively biased by 
these characteristics. In this study, the subject could 
not be randomly assigned to different "nationality". In 
this connection, the used of ANCOVA mention above might 
help minimize the bias on the dependent variables that is 
predictable from the covariates. Nevertheless, the bias 
could not be totally eliminated and results have to be 




This chapter presents the specific results of various 
tests mentioned in the previous chapter. First, the 
analysis of differences between the two sub-samples 
(listing- and referrals) is presented, followed by the 
analysis of difference between the eight (2x2x2) experi-
mental groups. Then, the U.S. sub-sample and the British 
sub-sample are compared. Fourth, manipulation checks are 
presented. Fifth, results in relation to dimensionality 
and discrimination are shown. Last of all, the findings 
from the ANOVA test are exhibited. 
Differences of Sub-samples and Experimental Groups 
The two sub-samples, namely the sample from the 
American Chamber of Commerce listing (n=195) and the 
sample from referral (n=45), were compared along several 
major dimensions: sex, education level, age, number of 
years of selling experience, ranking in corporation, and 
amount of time involved in foreign trade negotiation. 
Through One-Way ANOVA and Chi-Square tests, it was found 
that these two sub-samples did not differ significantly 
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(a=O.5) in any of these dimensions. An examination of the 
feedbacks on the qualitative questions also revealed that 
the referral group was in no circumstances different from 
the American Chamber of Commerce group. 
The eight (2x2x2) experimental groups were also 
investigated to see if they were significantly different 
from each other along the following dimensions: sex, 
education level, age, number of years of selling 
experience, number of years of working experience, ranking 
in corporation, and amount of time involved in foreign 
trade negotiation.-· Similarly, through One-Way ANOVA and 
Chi-Square tests, it was also found that these eight 
groups · did not differ significantly (a=O.05) along anyone 
of these dimensions. Seemingly the experimental groups 
were quite homogeneous before the experiment, and the 
difference in dependent variables after the experiment 
could be attributed to the treatments, and to the 
treatments alone. In this situation, there was no need 
for us to include any variables in the ANOVA test as 
covariates. 
A comparison of the U.S. sub-sample and the British 
sub-sample is presented in Appendix III, along the dimen-
sions comprising sex, educational level, age, number of 
years of working experience, number of years of selling 
experience, and amount of time involved in foreign trade 
negotiation. By One-Way ANOVA and Chi-Square tests, it 
was found that these two sub-samples only differed 
(a=O.05) in one dimension: number of years of experience. 
- -------- - -----_. 
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The British sample on the average had more working 
experience than the U.S. sample. (The situation is not 
unexpected when we consider the long British influence in 
Hong Kong. It seems that most British businessmen 
stationed in Hong Kong have been working here for quite 
some time. On the other hand, most of our U.S. 
businesspeople were newly assigned to this part of the 
world to develop business here.) 
At any event, this difference would not have 
generated big problems to this study because of two 
reasons. First, U.S. subjects and British subjects were 
randomly assigned to the eight experimental groups. Chi-
Square analysis indicated that nationality of the subjects 
(U.S. vs. British) was not related to their experimental 
sub-group status. Basically the subjects of the two 
nationality were randomly assigned to the eight 
experimental sub-groups and the random exercise can help 
reduce the bias generated. 
Second, as mentioned above, the eight experimental 
sub-groups did not differ significantly (a=O.05) along any 
of the dimensions tested. This adds extra support to our 
argument that the "working experience difference" had not 
generated much bias to our analysis. 
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Manipulation Checks 
The manipulation check for the friendship condition 
was evaluated based on the subjects' response on the 
statement "I would consider my negotiation partner (Mr. 
Chang) as a good friend of mine". A high score on this 
item indicates that the subject perceived the negotiation 
partner as a good friend, and vice verse. Subjects in the 
"friend" condition perceived the negotiation partner as a 
good friend significantly higher than did subjects in the 
"non-friend" condition (see Table 4.1). The item means 
are: 4.87 (for friend condition) and 2.95 (for non-friend 
condition) . 
The manipulation check for the job status condition 
was evaluated based on the subjects' response on the 
statement "compared to myself, my colleague (David) has a 
higher status in the firm". A high score on this item 
indicates that the subject perceived himself/herself 
having a lower job status, and vice versa. Subjects in 
the "high job status" condition did in fact perceived 
themselves as having a higher job status than subjects in 
the "low job status" condition (see Table 4.1). The item 
means are: 5.19 (for low job status condition), and 1.73 
















































Dimensionality and Discrimination 
The issue of dimensionality and discrimination is 
presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. First, the two 
sample groups (Chinese vs~ westerners) were stacked and 
the invariance factor pattern test was performed using 
LISREL VII (Joreskog and Sorbom 1989). From Table 4.2, we 
can see that all lambda values in the stacked Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) for the two sample groups are 
significant at a=0.05. Hence we can conclude that all 
indicators yield significant loadings, and the internal 
consistency criterion is passed. The Goodness-of-Fit 
Index (GFI) and the Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) 
values for the two samples (Chinese and westerners) could 
be considered as acceptable (cf. Anderson and Narus 1990). 
Here, the chi-square value for the equal factor pattern 
test is 257.08 (d.f.:230, p=0.106), indicating that we 
could accept the hypothesized invariance of factor pattern 
of the two groups (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). 
To test whether the factor loadings of the two 
samples (Chinese and westerners) were invariant, the same 
data sets were stacked and the result of the CFA is 
presented in Table 4.3. The chi-square value for this 
stacked model is 299.17 (d.f.:248, p=0.014) indicating a 
bad fit. Nonetheless, as the chi-square test in LISREL 
analysis is considered to be too stringent, a chi-
square/d.f. ratio of 3 or 2 or less has been advocated as 
an acceptable level of fit for confirmatory factor models 
- ---------- _._----- --- -.-
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Table 4.2 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR 
MEASUREMENT MODEL: 
INVARIANT FACTOR PATTERN 
Chinese Sample Westerner S am12le 
Standard standard 
Parameter Coefficient Errors Coefficient Errors 
Lambda" 1.126 0.141 0.931 0.119 
Lambda2, 1.109 0.130 1.235 0.108 
Lambda31 1.061 0.122 0.923 0.113 
Lambda42 0.560 0.106 0.975 0.091 
LambdaS2 1.023 0.100 0.985 0.095 
Lambda62 0.961 0.103 0.805 0.091 
Lambda73 0.677 0.083 0.875 0.126 
Lambda83 0.535 0.081 0.779 0.115 
Lambda93 0.686 0.080 0.122 0.104 
Lambda,O 4 0.299 0.091 0.722 0.120 
, 
Lambda11 4 0.631 0.133 0.423 0.098 , 
Lambda124 0.557 0.126 0.283 0.068 , 
Lambda13 S 1.116 0.101 0.986 0.083 , 
Lambda14 ,S 1.071 0.096 0.986 0.082 
Lambda1S 5 0.665 0.098 0.800 0.107 , 
Lambda166 0.717 0.108 0.996 0.110 , 
Lambda176 0.861 0.112 0.797 0.111 , 
Lambda186 0.413 0.084 0.656 0.103 , 
phi21 0.111 0.113 -0.020 0.104 
phi31 0.221 0.116 -0.023 
0.109 
phi41 0.197 0.130 0.202 
0.114 
phiS, 0.108 0.108 0.103 0.101 
phi61 0.399 0.109 0.288 
0.103 
phi32 0.806 0.067 0.659 
0.088 
phi42 -0.557 0.131 -0.483 
0.110 
phiS2 0.320 0.099 
0.375 0.091 
phi62 0.080 0.120 
-0.108 0.112 
phi43 -0.555 0.137 -0.360 
0.122 
phiS3 0.411 0.099 
0.301 0.103 
phi63 -0.088 0.127 
-0.156 0.117 
phiS4 -0.216 0.123 
-0.154 0.116 
phi64 0.427 0.138 
0.358 0.121 









Table 4.2 (cent'd) 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR 
MEASUREMENT MODEL: 











































PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR 
MEASUREMENT MODEL: 




Coefficient Errors Coefficient 
1.022 0.090 1.022 
1.187 0.082 1.187 
1.000 0.083 1.000 
0.834 0.069 0.834 
1.012 0.069 1.012 
0.076 0.068 0.076 
0.791 0.067 0.791 
0.625 0.064 0.625 
0.711 0.063 0.711 
0.480 0.070 0.480 
0.534 0.074 0.534 
0.365 0.059 0.365 
1.039 0.064 1.039 
1.024 0.062 1.024 
0.724 0.072 0.724 
0.878 0.078 0.878 
0.817 0.079 0.817 
0.514 0.066 0.514 
0.123 0.113 -0.025 
0.199 0.114 -0.005 
0.177 0.142 0.170 
0.106 0.109 0.091 
0.423 0.104 0.259 
0.823 0.059 0.664 
-0.667 0.117 -0.469 
0.326 0.098 0.382 
0.082 0.117 -0.081 
-0.677 0.121 -0.398 
0.399 0.097 0.299 
-0.096 0.120 -0.177 
-0.244 0.133 -0.191 
0.440 0.138 0.359 













































Table 4.3 (cont'd) 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR 
MEASUREMENT MODEL: 









(Netemeyer, Durvasula, and Lichtenstein 1991; Carmines and 
McIver 1981). With this criterion, we can claim that the 
data fit the hypothesized invariant factor leadings model 
well. With this additional finding, the conclusion of 
invariant factor pattern for the two samples is further 
confirmed. 
In the course of fitting the above models, several 
error terms were allowed to correlate: theta deltas (4,7), 
(7 , 8), (8, 9), (11, 12), and (2, 15). This suggested that 
some unmeasured common causes were present. The possible 
reason for this to occur is method variation (e.g. that a 
single questionnaire is used). However, as parameter 
estimates were low in magnitude, we may be able to claim 
that external confounds are not serious (Bagozzi 1982; 
Singh 1988). 
To determine the discriminant validity of the 
measurement model, the method suggested in Bagozzi and 
Warshaw (1990) was adopted. For all phi coefficients 
shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, we can see that they are 
all significantly less than 1.0. That is to say, for any 
phi coefficient, when we add it to two times its 
corresponding standard errors, we will always obtain an 
amount which is less than unity. Putting it differently, 
each phi value is less than 1.0 by an amount greater than 
twice its respective standard error. Since similar method 
(a single questionnaire) was employed, this yielded a more 
stringent test of discriminant validity. As the test is 
considered as a conservative one, we can confidently 
I 
deduce the discrimination among the various dependent 
variables in this study. 
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In this dimensionality and discrimination analysis, 
items having low correlation with their respective 
construct and items correlating highly with other 
theoretically unrelated constructs were deleted. The 
final set of items used in the subsequent analysis of 
variance test are shown in Table 4.4. Alpha values of the 
scales included in the final analysis are also presented. 
We can s~e that these scales could be considered as rather 
reliable: with a values ranging from 0.65 to 0.85 (Adler 








OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Operationalizations 
I'm inclined to give special favorable 
treatments to Mr. Chang in the course 
of the negotiations. 
I'm prepared to work a little harder to help 
Mr. Chang in the negotiation talks. 
If possible, I will try to make things easier 
for Mr. Chang in the talks. 
I will not try to convince David even though 
I think the venture may have its advantages. 
9 Though I think that the venture may be 
beneficial for the company as a whole, 
I'll probably remain silent as David 
has indicated his reservations. 
10 Even if other information reveals that 
13 
David is wrong, I'll probably not voice 
my disagreement in our own internal meetings. 
As David has indicated his reservations, I'll 
try to follow his idea as he is the one to 
be blamed if the result proves otherwise. 
14 I would probably keep quiet in the talks so 
that nobody can find fault on me if mistakes 
are made in this negotiation exercise. 
15 Do nothing would probably be a good strategy 
16 
in this negotiation exercise to evade 
complaints from others for making a bad 
decision. 
I'll place special emphasis on the issue 
of mutual benefits in the talks. 
19 I'm prepared to work hard to complete the 
negotiation. 
20 I'll adopt a helpful attitude to develop 














Table 4.4 (cont'd) 
OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The negotiations probably won't take a 
long time to complete. 
23 I would not expect too many delays and 
doubts between the two parties in the 
course of the negotiations. 
25 Not much time consuming get-togethers 
27 
and talks will go on in the course of 
the negotiations. 
Overall, I expect that Mr. Chang would 
enter into the negotiations with an 
optimistic frame of mind. 
29 Mr. Chang will expect that the venture 
will be successful. 
30 Besides this negotiations exercise, I 
expect that the two parties will have 
other opportunities to cooperate in 









Results of Experimentation 
Totally three independent variables (friendship, job 
status, and nationality) and six dependent variables 
(win-win attitude, positive attitude, perceived 
efficiency, perceived satisfaction, conformity, and risk 
aversion) were included in this study. Results of 
analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) with respect to the 
independent variables are summarized in Table 4.5. 
Detailed results of the ANOVA tests are presented in . 
Appendix IV (Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 15). 
Friendship 
Friendship has a significant main effect on win-win 
attitude. This effect is in the hypothesized direction: 
subjects negotiating with their friends will be more 
inclined to adopt a win-win attitude than will subjects 
not negotiating with their friends. The win-win attitude 
scale means are: 3.98 (for friend condition), and 3.38 
(for non-friend condition). 
Friendship has a significant main effect on perceived 
satisfaction too. This effect is in the hypothesized 
direction: subjects negotiating with their friends will 
perceive a higher level of satisfaction than will subjects 
not negotiating with their friends. The perceived 
satisfaction scale means are: 4.53 (for friend condition) 
and 3.95 (for non-friend condition). 
In this analysis, we can see that subjects 
Table 4.5 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTATION 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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negotiating with friends will perceive a somewhat higher 
level of efficiency. The perceived efficiency scale means 
are: 2.36 (for friend condition) and 2.19 (for non-friend 
condition). However, this difference was not significant 
at a=O.OS. 
Similarly, friendship has no significant impact on 
the positive attitude variable. 
Job status 
Job status has a significant main effect on risk 
aversion. This effect is in the hypothesized direction: 
subjects having a lower job status will be more risk 
averse than subjects having a higher job status. The risk 
aversion scale means are: 1.85 (for lower job status 
condition), and 1.43 (for higher job status condition). 
In this analysis, we could also see that subjects 
with lower job status would be somewhat more conforming to 
their colleagues (scale mean of lower job status 
group=1.98 vs. scale mean of higher status group=1.8S) . . 
However, this difference was not significant at a=O.05. 
Nationality 
Nationality has a significant main effect on 
perceived efficiency. This effect is in the hypothesized 
direction: Chinese subjects will perceive a higher level 
of efficiency than will western sUbjects. The perceived 
efficiency scale means are: 2.59 (for Chinese subjects) 
• 
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and 1.96 (for western subjects). 
This analysis indicates a significant nationality 
main effect on perceived satisfaction too. This effect is 
also in the hypothesized direction: Chinese subjects will 
perceive a higher level of satisfaction than will western 
sUbjects. The perceived satisfaction scale means are: 
4.41 (for the Chinese group) and 4.07 (for the western 
group). 
Nationality-Friendship Interaction 
The nationality by friendship interaction has a 
significant impact on conformity. The marginal means for 
this interaction are presented in Appendix IV: Exhibit 7, 
and the interaction is graphically presented in Appendix 
IV: Exhibits 8 and 9. From the exhibits, we can see that 
Chinese subjects negotiating with their friends would be 
most conforming to their colleagues while western subjects 
negotiating with their friends would be least conforming 
to their colleagues. 
Tests of simple main effects of nationality and 
friendship revealed two significant simple effects. The 
test of friendship within nationality revealed a marginal 
friendship effect within the westerner condition (F=3.391, 
d.f.:1/118, p<O.068). The test of nationality within 
friendship resulted in a significant nationality effect 
within the friendship condition (F=10.522, d.f.:l/118, 
p<O.002) . 
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From the above, we can see that western subjects 
would be significantly less conforming to their colleagues 
when they were negotiating with their friends. Stated 
differently, when the negotiation partner was considered 
as a friend, western subjects would be significantly less 
conforming to their colleagues, as compared to Chinese 
sUbjects. There was no difference in conformity between 
western subjects and Chinese subjects, when they were 
negotiating with non-friends. 
The finding that (1) Chinese subjects will be more 
conforming and (2) that western subjects will be less 
conforming to their colleagues when they are negotiating 
with their friends is interesting. This will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
This analysis also indicates that the nationality by 
friendship interaction has a significant impact on risk 
aversion. The marginal means for this interaction are 
presented in Appendix IV: Exhibit 12, and the interaction 
is graphically presented in Appendix IV: Exhibit 13 and 
14. From the exhibits, we can see that western subjects 
negotiating with their friends would be the least risk 
averse among the four groups. 
Test of simple main effects of nationality and 
friendship revealed two significant simple effects. The 
test of friendship within nationality revealed a signifi-
cant friendship effect within the westerner condition 
(F=4.739, d.f.:l/118; p<O.031). The test of nationality 
within friendship resulted in a significant nationality 
effect within the friend condition (F=7.477, d.f.:l/118, 
p<O.007). 
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Similar to the above, western subjects would be 
significantly less risk averse when they were negotiating 
with friends, as compared to negotiating with non-friends. 
Chinese subjects did not differ in terms of risk aversion, 
when they negotiated with either friends or non-friends. 
On the other hand, when the negotiation partner was 
considered as a friend, western subjects would become 
significantly less risk averse, as compared to Chinese 
~ubjects. There was no difference in risk aversion 
between western subjects and Chinese subjects, when they 
were negotiating with non-friends. 
The finding that western subjects will be less risk 
averse (as compared to Chinese subjects) when they are 
negotiating with their friends is interesting too. Again, 
this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
However, the nationality by friendship interaction 
has no significant impact on win-win attitude. Both 
Chinese and western subjects would be more inclined to 
adopt a win-win attitude towards friends (than towards 
non-friends), but these two groups did not differ from 
each other along this win~win attitude scale. 
Moreover, the nationality by friendship interaction 
has no significant impact on positive attitude. 
Nationality-status Interaction 
This analysis does not reflect that the nationality 
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by job status interaction is having a significant impact 
on either conformity or risk aversion. Nevertheless, we 
can see that, in general, the Chinese (especially subjects 
in the low job status condition), would be somewhat more 




Evidence for the Hypotheses 
A summary of the results of the analysis of dependent 
variables is presented in Table 5.1. Some hypotheses are 
supported, some are not supported, and the rest are 
supported in "direction" only. Nevertheless, no 
unexpected significant relationships are found. 
The analyses provide partial support for hypothesis 
1. Subjects negotiating with their friends would be more 
inclined to adopt a win-win attitude than would subjects 
not negotiating with their friends. In addition, subjects 
negotiating with their friends would perceive a higher 
level of satisfaction thari would subjects not negotiating 
with their friends. 
While subjects negotiating with their friends did 
perceive a somewhat higher level of efficiency, this 
difference was not significant. with regard to positive 
attitude there was no significant difference between the 
two friendship conditions: friend vs. non-friend. 
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported by the results 
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averse than were subjects having a higher job status. 
Subjects having a lower job status were somewhat more 
conforming to their colleagues, but the difference was not 
significant. 
Hypothesis 3a also receives partial support from the 
data. First, with regard to conformity there was a 
significant difference between the Chinese group and the 
western group. with respect to risk aversion there was no 
significant difference between the Chinese group and the 
western group (though the hypothesized direction is 
correct). 
Hypothesis 3b is supported by the data. Chinese 
subjects did perceive a significantly higher level of 
efficiency and a highly level of satisfaction than western 
sUbjects. 
On the other hand, hypotheses 4a is not substantially 
supported by the data. First, both western executives and 
the Chinese executives would adopt the same win-win 
attitude towards their friends. One plausible explanation 
is that if a foreigner wants to do business in china, he 
has to do as the Chinese do. As the "exchange-of-benefit 
orientation" is a norm in the Chinese community, a foreign 
businessman doing business in China will likely do the 
same thing in order to be competitive. In addition, as 
practically everybody knows that doing business in the PRC 
is by no means an easy task, to adopt a positive attitude 
is a standard requisite in China trade talks. Nobody 
would forego this good opportunity when he has the chance 
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to negotiate with a good friend in China. 
Nonetheless, hypothesis 4b receives support from the 
data. For the conformity variable, a nationality by 
friendship interaction is revealed. Chinese subjects 
negotiating with their friends would be most conforming to 
their colleagues while western subjects negotiating with 
their friends would be least conforming to their 
colleagues. For this interaction, there are three 
plausible explanations. First, when a Chinese negotiator 
is negotiating with his friend, he would consciously or 
subconsciously take greater care so as to manifest his 
impartiality towards the split-loyalty effect (Wang 1986; 
Lee 1989; Lee 1990). Appealing to group consensus would 
be a way to support his impartiality. Second, the demand 
for impartiality would become stronger when one of the 
colleagues has indicated his reservation towards the 
venture. In this situation, the other constituent members 
would regard "friendship" as the basic motive behind the 
Chinese negotiator's action. So, the Chinese negotiator 
would try to conform to his colleagues so as to evade 
criticisms. Last, when a western executive is negotiating 
with his Chinese friend, it is very natural for him to 
strongly rely on this friendship to develop his 
negotiating strategy. Facing this golden opportunity, 
this negotiator would not give up this trump card easily, 
even if one of his colleagues has expressed some of his 
reservations towards the venture. 
In relation to risk aversion, a nationality by 
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friendship interaction is also discovered. contrary to 
the above, the Chinese negotiators did not differ much in 
the two friendship situations (friend vs. non-friend). 
The significant interaction was resulted from the risk 
taking attitude of western subjects while negotiating with 
their Chinese friend. Apparently the western executives 
would like to grasp this golden opportunity to develop the 
venture with the Chinese, even if it might be risky to do 
so. 
For hypothesis 5, though we did not observe a 
significant nationality by status interaction on the 
issues of conformity and risk aversion, the following 
points are noted. In the two job status conditions, the 
Chinese were somewhat more conforming than the westerner. 
Second, Chinese subjects having a lower job status were 
the most conforming group. Last, western subjects having 
a higher job status were the least conforming. 
with respect to the issue of risk aversion, we can 
see that the Chinese subjects were somewhat more risk 
averse than the western sUbjects in the two job status 
conditions. Moreover, the Chinese executives having a 
lower job status were more risk averse than Chinese 
executives having a higher job status. Similar to the 
issue of conformity, western subjects having a higher job 
status were the least risk averse. 
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Discussion of Findings 
Management Styles 
Win-Win Attitude 
As far as win-win attitude is concerned, there is a 
clear friendship effect. Both western and Chinese 
executives will adopt a win-win attitude when they are 
negotiating with their friends. This does not necessarily 
mean that westerners are as collective as the Chinese. A 
speculative reason is that westerners, while doing 
business with the Chinese, will adopt a win-win attitude 
towards their Chinese friends in order to "do as the 
Chinese do". They have to do this in order to develop 
closer ties with the Chinese, and to realize the 
particular favor for which they are entitled to once the 
ties are established. 
Positive Attitude 
For the positive attitude construct, no main effects 
or interaction are observed. Its appears that negotiators 
of both cultures will try to be as co-operative as possi-
ble, no matter which condition is operating. Scale means 
in all conditions are very high, indicating that all 
parties would be highly co-operative in negotiation with 
the Chinese. 
Conformity 
The situation for conformity is a bit more complex. 
Results of this study suggest that both nationality and 
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friendship are interactively affecting the conformity of a 
negotiator. Overall, the Chinese are more conforming than 
the westerners. However, Chinese executives negotiating 
with friends will be most conforming to their colleagues. 
In a collective society, this findings is contradictory to 
the general feeling at first glance. In the above, we 
have inferred that the major reason for this high 
conformity is that the negotiator wants to demonstrate his 
impartiality: the friendship between the two counterparts 
will not affect the ultimate outcome of the negotiation. 
When a MNC Chinese executive is negotiating with his 
friend in the PRC, negative opinion in the MNC will make 
the executive become more conforming to the views of his 
colleagues. In other words, when there is a negative 
feeling in the MNC about the venture, the friendship with 
a member in the Chinese team will be harmful to the 
outcome of the negotiation talk. The ethnic Chinese will 
try to avoid expressing his opinion towards the venture, 
thus leading to less-than-optimal decisions. Nonetheless, 
he will try his best to develop an efficient and 
satisfactory long-run working relationship, despite the 
split-loyalty effect. 
Though job status may have some implications on 
conformity, its importance is not as great as expected. 
Nevertheless, two points are noted in this study: (1) 
Chinese executives are more conforming in general, and (2) 
Chinese executives having lower job status are more 
conforming than those having higher job status. 
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Risk Aversion 
The situation for risk aversion is even more complex 
than conformity. First, there is a clear status main 
effect. For executives in both samples, people having a 
lower job status will take less- risk. 
Moreover, there is also a nationality and friendship 
interaction effect. Basically, the Chinese are somewhat 
more risk averse than westerners. However, Chinese execu-
tives negotiating with friends are not taking sUbstantial-
ly more risk than those negotiating with non-friends. It 
is believed that the rationale operating behind the issue 
of conformity also applies here. In this study, it was 
found that western executives negotiating with their 
friends would take the greatest amount of risk. This is 
quite plausible as westerners negotiating with a Chinese 
friend will like to take this good chance to develop 
business in China. The chance will be greatly decreased 
if friendship has not been developed at all. 
Here, job status also has some implications on risk 
aversion, but its importance is not substantial. Two 
remarks can be made in this connection: (1) Chinese 
executives are more risk -averse in general, and (2) 
Chinese executives having a lower job status are more risk 




A clear nationality effect is observed for perceived 
efficiency. Though both national groups perceived that 
doing business in China would not be efficient, the west-
ern group would deem it extremely inefficient to negotiate 
with the Chinese. 
Friendship has a mild impact on perceived efficiency. 
It appears that though executives may recognize the 
usefulness of a friend in China trade talks, the 
negotiation environment in China is so complex that having 
just a good friend in the PRC is insufficient. A Chinese 
executive, as compared to a western executive, would be 
better received by the Chinese side. It seems that they 
could be able to discuss with a better understanding and 
appreciation of other's concern. 
Perceived satisfaction 
Both friendship and nationality are important in this 
context. The friendship between the two parties can lead 
to an integrative and coordinative environment, which in 
turn will generate a satisfactory result. Under a collec-
tive influence, it is expected the Chinese will tend to 
treat the business friends better, and the whole negotia-
tion process can be conducted under a positive atmosphere. 
In the Chinese context, ethnocentrism is a dominating 
concept. Hence, it is not surprising to see that when a 
Chinese is negotiating with a Chinese, a more pleasing 
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atmosphere will prevail. In fact, it is said that the 
Chinese can be quite hostile to foreigners, especially 
when friendship has not yet been fostered. 
Summary 
The discussions above can be summarized as follows: 
1. Friendship is important in generating a win-win 
attitude in international trade negotiations. 
2. The importance of adopting a win-win attitude in 
China trade negotiation is well received by 
executives in both cultures. 
3. Practically all executives will adopt a positive 
attitude when they are negotiating with the Chinese. 
4. Nationality has a big impact on perceived efficiency. 
Foreigners find it very inefficient to negotiate with 
the Chinese. 
5. Friendship has a small impact on perceived efficiency 
only. 
6. Both friendship and nationality have a big impact on 
perceived satisfaction. 
7. If members in the MNC have reservations towards a 
venture, a Chinese negotiator will tend to conform 
more to colleagues in the MNC if he or she is a 
friend of the negotiation counterpart. 
S. Job status has a small impact to negotiators as far 
as confo.rmi ty is concerned. Chinese are more 
conforming than westerners, and Chinese having a 
\ .. 
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lower job status will be the most conforming of all. 
9. Lower job status of a negotiator will make him or her 
becoming more risk averse. 
10. A western executive, when negotiating with a friend 
in China, is willing to take a higher level of risk. 
11. The Chinese will probably take lesser risk than the 
westerner, and the Chinese having lower job status 




This study clearly demonstrates that culture has 
implications on the attitude and perception of a business 
executive in a negotiation context. Negotiators have to 
understand these cultural differences and to apply this 
knowledge in negotiation with people from another culture. 
The more an executive can appreciate the particular con-
cerns and objective of the counterpart, the more he can 
formulate appropriate negotiation strategies. This abili-
ty to foresee criteria and reactions of another party will 
induce better cooperation and more effective use of mar-
keting resources, which will be beneficial in matching 
needs and wants of the two negotiating parties. 
Parties involved in an international business negoti-
ation are not only concerned with quantitative (or produc-
tive) consideration. More often than not, they are also 
influenced by personal and social preference, habits and 
customs. In this connection, it is often said that the 
"John Wayne" competitive .and adversary negotiation style 
would not be appropriate in the international business 
environment. Misreading of the local culture and failure 
to recognize a different negotiation style will result in 
friction and impasse which are detrimental, to the outcome 
of a negotiation. When a deeper appreciation of the 
other's subtle consideration is gained, the probability of 
success will be enhanced (cf. Hall 1960; Hofstede 1980a; 
Tse et al. 1988). 
Despite the fact that there are a lot of cultural 
differences between westerners and the Chinese, several 
rel~tionships are found to be operating to both groups. 
They are summarized as in the following: 
1. Friendship will generate a win-win attitude and 
perceived satisfaction. 
2. Job status will affect executives' risk aversion 
attitude. Lower job status executives will tend to 
be more risk averse. 
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3. All executives will hold a positive attitude when 
they are negotiating with the Chinese, regardless of 
which friendship or job status condition they are in. 
Unique Chinese Cultural Values 
Results of this study support the notion that Chinese 
do have their indigenous way of thinking and there are 
particular characteristics in the Chinese culture as far 
as negotiation is concerned. It seems that unconditional 
transplant of western theories to the local Chinese con-
text would not be totally appropriate. Researchers and 
academics might have to adopt an nemic" approach to uncov-
er the specific psychological and attitudinal traits of 
the Chinese, with respect to the issue of cross cultural 
marketing negotiation~ 
Consistent with findings of previous collectivism 
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research, this study also confirms the impact of friend-
ship and nationality on key issues including building a 
win-win attitude, improving perceived efficiency, and 
improving perceived satisfaction. The Chinese are group-
oriented and friendship will lead to a win-win attitude. 
Under the doctrine of reciprocity, a win-win attitude will 
foster one's relationship tie with the inter-group 
members, and this tie will then generate continuous 
synergistic exchange of benefits. If the Chinese consider 
a person as a friend, life will become easier for him as 
good relationship is crucial in Chinese business. 
Furthermore, friendship in China is a long-term matter, 
and it is worth to establish such linkage. 
In fact, kinship and ethnocentrism are general 
Chinese norms. Personal relationship in China is 
hierarchical, and "who" is usually more dominating that 
"what". This relationship is a particular one -- the 
possession of which will make a lot of difference. other 
things being equal, a person can sacrifice personal inter-
est for his in-group members. , Nevertheless, once inside 
an in-group, reciprocity of benefit is expected, and the 
exchange of benefit will establish an even stronger bond-
ing. 
Under this collective influence, relationship is 
considered as far more important than contract to bind the 
parties together. Generally, Chinese prefer doing busi-
ness with friends, relatives, and long-term customers. 
Therefore, it" will be difficult for foreigners to break 
262 
into the Chinese business circle. Westerners who want to 
do business with the Chinese must prepare to build up 
strong relationship and trust in order to facilitate an 
efficient negotiation. 
Results of this study also confirm the issue of power 
distance in the Chinese culture. Generally speaking, the 
Chinese are more conforming and more risk averse. In 
addition, lower ranked executive will be more conforming 
to their colleagues and will take even lesser risk. 
Under the Chinese cultural influence, harmony, 
compliance, loyalty, submission, and trustworthiness are 
accepted virtues. Centralized decision making prevails 
and Chinese managers are conditioned to be more risk 
averse. The department head is seen as the paternal 
figure: obedience and harmony with the boss is the rule of 
the game. Subordinate should have a strong respect for 
authority; modesty and good relationship with the superior 
are important keys for promotion. For the Chinese, the 
father-son dyad is so strong that authoritarian leadership 
is considered as the norm. People low in the authority ' 
ladder will seldom challenge the explicit and implicit 
wish of their superior. 
One interesting finding of this research is that, 
when faced with negative comments from other colleagues, 
Chinese negotiators will be the most conforming of all, if 
friendship is involved between the ethnic Chinese 
negotiator and the PRC counterpart. One explanation is 
that the negotiator would like to avoid the criticism (for 
having split-loyalty) by conforming to the idea of his 
colleagues. When friendship between the two negotiators 
conflicts with in-group harmony, the ethnic Chinese 
negotiator will sacrifice that friendship and conform to 
the group norm. 
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To summarize, we can see that MNC Chinese negotiators 
will tend to appeal to authority or group consensus when 
an important and controversial decision is to be made. In 
this circumstance, the opinion of that negotiator is 
suppressed and the negotiation outcome would be influenced 
mor~ by other intra-group members in the negotiation team. 
This study also indicates that Chinese managers in 
general are indirect, and westerners have to guess what is 
behind the scene. In order to avoid criticism, Chinese 
subordinates will tend to do nothing. They are not moti-
vated to take risk, and to challenge the validity of the 
system and the directive from superiors. If they have to 
make a concrete proposal, they will require a lot of 
information and support from the inter-group members. In 
general, no single person is willing to expose himself to 
risk, thus generating an inefficient working environment. 
On the other hand, the Chinese are group oriented. 
Decisions are made based on the relationship between the 
other party to him, or to his in-group. A foreigner will 
find it extremely difficult to "break the ice" and "open 
the door". In order to enjoy the favorable treatments, 
the foreigners have to successfully pass the hurdle and 
become in-grotip members in the Chinese relationship net-
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work. However, this is not easy to achieve as the Chinese 
are rather suspicious to strangers and unknown parties. 
Implications to MNCs 
This section comprises three major portions. The 
first one relates to confirmed findings to long accepted 
strategies of practitioners in China business negotiation. 
The second portion discusses findings that are not con-
verging with the traditional wisdom of China trade ex-
perts. Finally, the last portion covers views generally 
taken for granted by MNCs but are not confirmed by this 
study. In all cases, implications for top management of 
MNCs will be drawn to guide them in their future decisions 
in China business talks. 
First, the contention that friendship will generate a 
win-win attitude and a long-lasting working relationship 
is supported by the data. Based on this finding, the 
following implications can be drawn. From a general China 
business negotiation perspective, probably the first rule 
for a foreign negotiator doing business with the Chinese 
is to establish and intensify relationship with the 
Chinese, either in front of or behind the negotiating 
table. Businessmen have to become good friends with the 
Chinese if they want to do long-term business in China. 
It has been said that earning the name "old friend" should 
be an executive's goal in 'the negotiation exercise. In 
addition, it is the foreigner who should take the 
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initiative to work out a smooth working guanxi. Once the 
ball game has started, the Chinese will, from time to 
time, offer friendship and close ties with their 
counterparts. 
Basically, a reciprocal relationship will generate 
friendship, which will foster a - stronger reciprocal 
relationship. In negotiation talks, the Chinese will 
emphasize mutual respect, cooperation, and an enduring 
friendship. Westerners have to recognize that the 
ultimate and long-term outcome of the business talk 
depends on relationship, but not formal written contracts. 
Whenever possible~ a westerner should favor the Chinese 
side so as to receive favorable treatments in future 
deals. If the westerner has become an insider, the 
Chinese will reward him when opportunity arises. Usually, 
gifts will be exchanged as a gesture of status, respect 
and to "give face" to the Chinese side, which is helpful 
in fostering a better business relationship. 
In addition, the Chinese will always stress mutual 
benefits at the negotiation table. Incentives such as 
free technical assistance, foreign site visits, marketing 
support, or price cuts are valued highly by the Chinese. 
The MNC may want to build up better friendship and better 
long run working relationship by giving these incentives 
to the Chinese side. 
Another confirmed finding of this study is that 
Chinese-Chinese negotiation outperforms westerner-Chinese 
negotiation in areas such as perceived efficiency and 
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perceived satisfaction. In this connection, the use of a 
Chinese "old friend" to act as middleman and the inclusion 
, of ethnic Chinese personnel in the team to bridge the 
cultural gap are two meaningful tactics. The Chinese 
executive in the team can provide the group with the 
necessary background on the Chinese history, cultural 
value, negotiation styles and hidden languages (Hall, 
1960). The employment of Chinese executives has another 
benefit: the Chinese officials tend to think that Chinese 
executives are patriotic and will not cheat their mother 
country. with this change, the negotiation environment 
may become more efficient. 
Trustworthiness is supposed to be another reason why 
Chinese would like to deal with friend and people of the 
same nationality. The Chinese place trust and honesty 
high in the priority list. They prefer to talk business 
with people whom they can trust: people having the reputa-
tion of putting all cards on the table. An image of 
dishonesty is extremely harmful in China business negotia-
tion, as information will be spread among the Chinese 
quickly and a new reputation cannot be established easily. 
This study also confirms that Chinese executives are 
more conforming than western executives. In fact, the 
literature on China trade negotiation has included many 
examples on the conforming attitude of Chinese 
negotiators. Under the influence of power distance, 
Chinese negotiators 'are reluctant to express fully their 
own position in a business deal. They will seek approval 
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from their superiors before any concrete decision is made. 
Here, the foreign ' negotiator has to do a major favor to 
set a stage for the Chinese negotiators to prove to their 
boss that they are doing a good job. More often than not, 
group decisions are required to evade criticism and avoid 
direct confrontation with the Chinese superior. To cut 
through the web-like layers of red tape and to obtain good 
results, it is advisable for a foreign businessman to 
clarify the requirement and specifications stipulated by 
Chinese superiors, and to prove that the foreign firm can 
meet the requirement and specification. If superiors do 
not find that a business venture is of value to them, the 
Chinese subordinate will never commit himself in the 
negotiation talk. In this connection, it is suggested 
that a foreign negotiator should be able to spell out in 
detail the possible benefits and drawbacks of the venture 
so as to provide the Chinese subordinate with the 
necessary tools to protect himself and to win the support 
from his superior. If possible, important documents 
should be prepared in both languages and enough copies 
should be made available to all decision makers. 
Lastly, this study also confirms that lower ranked 
subordinates will tend to be more risk averse, as suggest-
ed in most literature in social psychology and China trade 
negotiation. This finding has two implications to MNCs: 
(1) try to reduce the risk perceived by lower ranked 
negotiators on the Chinese. side, and (2) make sure the 
risk taking responsibility of the ethnic Chinese negotia-
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tor is commensurate wit·h his or her status. 
In this study, we can see that the building of a 
positive attitude is stressed by all executives, no matter 
whether they have already developed friendship with the 
Chinese, and no matter which job status they are having. 
In this regard, foreign negotiators cannot rely solely on 
building a positive attitude as their ultimate weapon to 
compete in China. Actually, this is considered a standard 
practice and the marginal benefit generated would not be 
as great as what many businessmen have expected. Nonethe-
less, the relationship would be hampered if it is not 
handled properly. 
"Face giving" would be an example to illustrate the 
argument made above. Generally face giving is considered 
to be a good method to establish a positive attitude in 
China. Usually the Chinese do expect that foreign senior 
officers should visit them -- to give them face. If the 
face dynamic is handled properly, a positive and 
cooperative attitude will be established. This contention 
is correct to a certain degree. This is especially true 
in the case that causing the Chinese to lose face would 
greatly damage the mutual inter-relationship. But, giving 
a lot of "face" to the Chinese would not be as effective 
as one has expected. The success of a negotiation in 
China depends on many other things, in addition to "face 
giving". To put it differently, when everybody is giving 
face to the Chinese, the "face giving" tactic will not be 
highly produGtive or rewarding. 
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One finding of this study is that friendship between 
MNC ethnic Chinese executives and the PRC negotiators will 
make the executives become more conforming and more risk 
averse. While (1) including an ethnic Chinese may help 
generate a more efficient and satisfactory negotiation 
environment and (2) friendship may help generate a win-win 
attitude, these two will interact and make the ethnic 
Chinese conform more with other colleagues and take lesser 
risk than they should have. In this connection, three 
recommendations relating to recruitment, job assignment, 
and internal communication are suggested. First, the MNC 
should have reservations in employing Chinese negotiators 
who have established very strong friendship with the PRC 
side. Second, these ethnic Chinese, if employed, . should 
be assigned to handle external communication and 
representational functions. The decision making functions 
might have to be handled by people who are free from the 
split-loyalty role conflict (Lee 1989; 1990). Last, 
ethnic Chinese should be briefed by top management on the 
split-loyalty issue and be assured about their specific 
value, function, and position in the China negotiation 
game. But so doing, the role conflict experienced by the 
ethnic Chinese can be reduced. 
In this study, it is revealed that a western execu-
tive negotiating with a friend in China would take an 
exceptional amount of risk. While we cannot conclude 
whether this risk taking behavior is detrimental to the 
venture on the whole, it is necessary for MNCs to investi-
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gate deeper into the rationale behind this phenomenon. 
Naturally, for any well managed business enterprise, it is 
not healthy to be exposed to excessive risk. 
This study is not able to confirm several hypotheses 
which are suggested by literature. First, westerners and 
Chinese would both adopt a win-win attitude, when they 
negotiate with their friends in the PRC. It seems that 
western executives would place the same amount of emphasis 
as the ethnic Chinese, if they have the chance to do 
business with their friends in China. The traditional 
thinking that Chinese would be more cooperative (compared 
to westerners) with another Chinese friend is question-
able, especially in the China negotiation context. 
Second, practically all previous studies on China 
business negotiation emphasize the importance of friend-
ship in China trade deals. Nevertheless, while this study 
indicates that friendship can help generate a win-win 
attitude and a satisfactory working relationship, it is 
not conducive to creating an efficient negotiation envi-
ronment. As a remedy to the situation, MNCs of course ,can 
use ethnic Chinese because we have already pointed out 
earlier that Chinese-Chinese negotiation can result in 
generating a more efficient negotiation environment. 
However, MNCs have to take measure to alleviate the nega-
tive impacts and the split-loyalty role conflict involved. 
Third, though Chinese will tend to conform to views 
of their colleagues, there is no concrete proof that they 
are highly risk averse. Nor is there firm evidence that 
-~---~., ... _------ - -------- - -
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lower ranked Chinese are more risk averse. Under this 
scenario, MNCs may spend more effort in getting the views 
of the ethnic Chinese (as they would conceal their real 
opinion and conform to other colleagues) and they need not 
worry too much about their risk taking behavior. Another 
relevant issue is that though Chinese will tend to conform 
with their colleagues, there is also no concrete proof 
that lower ranked Chinese would be the most risk averse of 
all. When a clear understanding of the mentality of the 
negotiators is obtained, more precise and appropriate 
staffing, training, and directing strategy could be formu-
lated by MNCs to develop a better negotiation environment 
and to compete with other global competitors. 
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Value of The study 
Past research in cross cultural negotiation has been 
dominated by the western influence. Scales and study 
designs were all developed fro~ theories originated from 
major developed countries (mainly from the U.S.). While 
there are concerns over this over-dominance of Americani-
zation, little had been done to balance this influence. 
According to Frazier, Gill, and Kale (1989), it is 
dangerous to adopt such a narrow scope as the vast 
environmental difference and diverse behaviors from 
country to country would make generalization about 
international marketing deceptive. Alder and Graham 
(1989) also note that limitation of performing 
international marketing study based on theories and meth-
ods developed by American behavioral scientists. They 
recommend that theory and measures be derived from empiri-
cal studies of the Chinese if the study involves Chinese 
subjects. To correct for this over-dominance, they sug-
gest the inclusion of foreign (Chinese) researchers and 
the use of more inductive methods in foreign (Chinese) 
cultures to mitigate the limitation of traditional inter-
national negotiation studies. 
Another drawback of past cross-cultural negotiation 
studies is that "nationality" is considered as the only 
independent variable that affects the outcome of negotia-
tion talks. As noted by Adler (1983), a major problem in 
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common comparative designs is that the interactions be-
tween culture and other experimental variables are not 
considered at all. This will limit our understanding on 
the dynamics underlying the complex international negotia-
tion exercise. 
In this study, the Chinese -literature and indigenous 
perceptions were referred to as far as theory building, 
scenario development, and item generation are concerned. 
In fact, the Chinese cultural literature, Chinese trade 
studies, real-life case descriptions, and Chinese 
negotiation researches were studied in the generation of 
hypotheses in this study. Moreover, the operational-
izations of the scales were more vigorously and 
systematically examined in the pretests and in the main 
study. To the author's knowledge, no research on China 
trade negotiation performed so far has adopted a similar 
approach as this study. 
As a matter of fact, this study is supposed to be 
also the first study using the experimental approach to 
determine the effect of various independent variables 
(nationality, friendship, and job status) on various 
dependent variables in the Chinese business negotiation 
context. All of the previous studies are either descrip-
tive or correlational in nature. They are inadequate to 
suggest cause-and-effect relationships embedded in the 
complex negotiation exercise. 
with respect to research methodology, this study is 
also the first . one in China negotiation studies using the 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) approach to test for 
dimensionality and discrimination of the scales. When one 
is not sure about the reliability and validity of the 
scales used in a study, one cannot have great confidence 
in making any conclusion at all. In addition, many 
cross-cultural studies simply combined the data from two 
cultures together and no effort was spent in testing 
whether the factor pattern or loadings of the variables 
were similar or not. If this is not tested, we would 
never be certain whether we could compare the two data 
sets or not (Hayduk 1987, p.276i Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). 
To the practitioner, this study is also useful too. 
Several major findings were found: 
1. Friendship has a clear effect in developing a win-win 
attitude. 
2. Friendship between a MNC ethnic Chinese and the PRC 
counterpart is harmful if there is negative opinion 
towards the venture. The ethnic Chinese will be more 
conforming and take lesser risk. 
3. Lower job status will lead to risk aversion. 
4. A positive attitude is considered as a standard 
requisite in China~usiness negotiations. 
5. Chinese-Chinese negotiation outperforms American-
Chinese negotiation as far as perceived efficiency 
and perceived satisfaction are concerned. 
6. Friendship will lead to better perceived 
satisfaction, but it has a minor effect on perceived 
efficiency only. 
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Based on the findings above, negotiators (both Chi-
nese and foreign) are better guided when they are deciding 
their negotiation tactics. Various possible strategies 
have been discussed in the previous section. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
The research presented here is an initial attempt to 
analyze the influence of an inter-group factor 
(friendship), an intra-group factor (job status), and 
nationality on the various independent variables within 
the negotiation context. Results of this study show that 
nationality and friendship have an interactive influence 
on the conformity and risk averse variable. While the 
win-win attitude, perceived satisfaction, and perceived 
efficiency are affected by nationality of the negotiators 
(Chinese vs. western), only the former two variables are 
influenced by friendship.' For both the Chinese and the 
western groups, friendship will generate a win-win 
attitude and lower job status will make an executive 
becoming more risk averse. 
However, this research also points out certain ques-
tions and problems which offer some directions for future 
research. First, even though results of several analyses 
were ordered in the hypothesized direction, the findings 
are not significant from a statistical standpoint. This 
comprises the hypotheses relating ~o: (1) the interaction 
effect of nationality and friendship on the win-win 
attitude variable, (2) the interaction effect of 
nationality and job status on conformity, and (3) the 
interaction effect of nationality and job status on risk 
aversion. One possible explanation is that manipulations 
in this study was not strong enough to produce large 
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effects. In future research, a stronger manipulation 
could be used. In this current study, the friendship 
manipulated might have been strengthened if friendship 
between the negotiators were longer, and benefits had been 
reciprocated in several negotiations before this one. In 
relation to the job status manipulation, one approach 
might be to make the superior having an even higher job 
status, a father image, and a higher seniority. 
This study adopted the scenario approach due to its 
simplicity, efficiency, and ability to structure complex 
events. Nonetheless, another popular method -- the inte-
grative bargaining game may generate other advantages 
including: (1) observation of actual behavior, (2) 
identification of other process variables, and (3) meas-
urement of profits (Graham 1980). In future cross-cultur-
al studies, this dyadic approach could be considered, 
though the manipulation of treatments like friendship and 
job status might require more ingenious thoughts. 
Solicitation of subjects in this study were mainly 
based on the membership list of the American Chamber of 
Commerce. One benefit of using homogeneous subjects is 
that we can have a more powerful test of the independent 
variables in the experiment. The more homogeneous the 
entire group is, the easier and more confident we could be 
in identifying whether a treatment is having impact on the 
dependent variables. Nonetheless, if nationality is one 
of the independent variable, we would expect to see 
differences between the two sample groups. Perhaps future 
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research could include Chinese in the PRC as subjects. 
But, we have to take care that other confounds such as 
education, business knowledge, and negotiation experience 
are being controlled for. The objective is to obtain a 
group of Chinese which is identical to the western group 
in all other relevant aspects, except for the cultural 
values they carry. 
Conducting a series of experiments which systemically 
vary suspected crucial variables to assess their impor-
tance may be another research direction we could aim at 
(Sawyer, Worthing, and Sendak 1979). This contention is 
also proposed by McGrath and Brinberg (1983), who suggest 
that scientific information, including sUbstantive find-
ings, must be cumulative over different research studies 
and different researchers. By this type of replication, 
we can have a wider scope of understanding and we are more 
confident about the validity of our findings. 
Another possible avenue for future research is to 
conduct field surveys to replicate and further confirm the 
experimental results. New crucial variables could be . 
added, together with variables investigated in this study. 
with this survey study, researchers may also want to 
determine the structural relationships between (1) exoge-
nous to endogenous variables, and (2) endogenous to en-
dogenous variables. In this regard, the LISREL approach 
could be use to holistically test the measurement proper-
ties and the structural relationship between the con-
structs under ' consideration. 
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Case one: OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY 
otis is a 130 year-old multibillion dollar company which has 
operations in more than 100 countries. It has a long history of 
operation in China, with establishments well before 1949 and 
before World War II. It was among the first pioneers to do 
business with the PRC once China started to open its doors in 
1979. In 1982, otis and Tianjin Elevator Company formed a 
marketing joint venture to market otis equipment in China. 
After this initial friendship building cooperation, a new plan 
was proposed between otis and the Tianjin Elevator Company: to 
establish another full-scale manufacturing and service joint 
venture. In this business venture, otis and the PRC had 
different concerns. Like many global organizations, otis has a 
policy of global configuration and coordination of manufacturing 
activities, seeking the advantages of scale and balancing against 
the concern for local requirements and currency considerations. 
Its primary objective in China is to participate in the China 
market. The need for manufacturing in China to serve regional or 
global requirement is not its major motive in doing business in 
China. 
On the contrary, China's basic purpose for forming international 
joint venture with otis is to acquire advanced technology, 
foreign exchange, and management expertise. Hence, China would 
definitely favor manufacturing inside China, so as to foster its 
own industry and to earn extra foreign exchange for the country. 
Throughout the negotiation, three major hurdles were encountered. 
Nevertheless, both the U.S. and Chinese parties had tried their 
very best to be flexible, and to be as cooperative as possible, 
to bring the business deal into reality. First, the Chinese 
hoped to gain the ability to produce the more-advanced products 
in China in order to sUbstitute ' for imports and hence save the 
precious Chinese foreign exchange. They wanted to import more-
advanced techniques and produce more-advanced items in the first 
place. As far as otis was concerned, they wanted to initially 
transfer more primitive products and technology to China which 
could be able to meet the needs of the massive market. By so 
doing, the local requirements would be met with less technical 
problems and at a lower cost structure. More complex and 
advanced products could be transferred as the Chinese gained more 
experience in the transfer. After negotiation, the Chinese 
bought the otis' conservative but flexible plan. They drew up a 
technology transfer schedule emphasizing demands of the Chinese 
market and operational feasibility but not importing the latest 
technology in the initial period. 
Second, unlike many joint venture in China, the idea of true 
shared management was introduced in the agreement. The contract 
specified that the assent of otis, the minor partner, would be 
necessary for major decisions of the management board including: 
". 
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appointment of key management personnel, new product development, 
export sales, and potential ventures with new partners. This 
reflected the Chinese great cooperative attitude in the business 
venture. 
Third, the two negotiating partners had faced the most difficult 
issue in profit remittance and foreign exchange. The Chinese 
view joint ventures as sources of foreign exchange. The Chinese 
Renminbi (RMB) is a non-convertible currency and the Chinese 
government seldom converts fbreign businessmen's earnings to 
foreign exchange. The Chinese pressed for otis to agree on a 
stipulated level of exports from China, so as to help generate 
foreign exchange for China. Nevertheless, otis already had 
sufficient manufacturing capacity in the region, and it would be 
less economically advisable to accept exports from China. otis 
had tried hard to avoid agreeing to purchase a fixed amount from 
the joint venture in the contract. The two sides came to a 
compromise after much negotiation. The Chinese government did 
not have to guarantee conversion of RMB earnings and otis was not 
required to buy a fixed amount of products. otis' purchase 
obligation was allowed to base on quality, delivery, competitive, 
and market factors. The joint venture was required basically to 
balance its own foreign exchange. No restrictions were set on 
remitting earned profits as long as the joint venture could 
generate the needed foreign exchange to do so. 
with the help of the China International Economic Consultants 
(CIEC), a subsidiary of the China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC), which provided numerous 
suggestions to the two parties, a formal joint venture contract 
was signed in July 1984. Terms of the contract are for a period 
of thirty years and are renewable under mutual agreement. In the 
joint venture, 2,400 employees, four factories, a research cen-
ter, a corporate headquarter, and a nationwide network of market-
ing and services affiliates are involved. 
Case Two: McDONNELL DOUGLAS 
The McDonnel1 Douglas first negotiated a co-production deal with 
the PRC on 125 medium-range MD-82 aircrafts in 1979. The 
contract was then considered as among the largest commercial 
contract the Chinese had negotiated with westerners. In the 
course of negotiation, numerous hurdles were encountered. 
Nevertheless, through the cooperative attitude of the two 
parties, a sUbstantial contract was closed. A key to win the 
contract was the ability of McDonnel1 Douglas to offer extensive 
management training to local people up to the caliber required 
for the involving complicated manufacturing duties. The company 
had tried to establish closer relationships with the Chinese in 
every possible way. First, it sold outright two MD-80s to China 
for its routes from Beijing to Shanghai, Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 
addition, Mr. Gareth Chang, president of Mcdonnell Douglas China, 
and whose father was an acquaintance of Deng Xiaoping, had 
lectured widely in China at that time on management and the 
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function of private enterprise in the capitalist world to gain 
pUblicity for the company. Before the signing of the contract, 
some 300 Chinese engineers were sent to the Douglas manufacturing 
complex in Long Beach to ensure a comprehensive understanding of 
the complicated technical problems surrounding the venture. 
Translation of the final contract was a hurdle too. Mandarin 
lacks many of the technical and legal terms needed in the 
agreement. Moreover, qualified technical talents are missing due 
to the Cultural Revolution. To ensure accuracy, a Chinese 
translation was retrans1atedback into English. On the 500-page 
document, significant changes had been made on 100 pages. 
The Chinese shown their positive attitude towards the joint 
venture too. The Chinese wanted to actualize the deal as they 
wanted to establish a manufacturing base for commercial aircraft 
later. Besides the issue of buying cheaper aircrafts, the 
Chinese would like to get a partner to help sell their products 
into the international market eventually. As the venture was new 
to the Chinese, solution had to be created by both parties for 
arbitration of potential disputes, handling of liability 
insurance on aircraft built at the plant, airworthiness 
certification, and tax obligations. Beijing legal authorities 
were involved to accept submission from the venture. In effect, 
the China tax law was changed along with the development of the 
joint venture. Innovative ideas and tactics were constantly 
introduced when the two parties meshed their motives together. 
A long term perspective is considered as a key when one is doing 
business in China, and McDonnell Douglas has capitalized on this 
view. While many people would consider short-run profit as 
highly attractive, the company deems it far more important for 
them to have the way for future business. China is attractive to 
the company because of its great potential. In order to gain its 
way to China, management emphasized very much on corporate 
flexibility and persistence which actually helped them beat 
competition for the coproduction contract. 
According to Gareth Chang, McDonnell Douglas took the first 
initiation towards business in China in 1975, proposing a tech-
nology transfer contract to produce DC-9. A response came ex-
pressing interest after three years. A task force was then set 
up to handle the negotiation. Three delegations comprising China 
engineers fluent in English were set to Long Beach before the end 
of 1978. However, the negotiation was postponed due to the 
downward adjustment of the "Four Modernization" program in late 
.1979. At this point, Chang arranged the meeting between Deng and 
Sandy McDonnell, Chairman of the company, to reaffirm the steady 
progress of the negotiation. After that, the company took every 
opportunity to establish relationship with the Chinese including 
the selling of smaller aircrafts and the doing of public relation 
work in China. AFter a series of negotiations, the deal was 
closed which called for 25 medium-range MD-82 aircrafts and an 
option for another 15. It was potentially worth US$l billion, 
which was ranked the largest commercial contract with foreigners 
ever since. 
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Case Three: NATIONAL PRODUCTS 
The Fuyang Parts Plant is located on the outskirts of Shenyang, 
capital of the Liaoning province. It was established in 1940 as 
a supplier of small parts for tracks. By the early 1980s most of 
its equipment was old and obsolete. Much of the plant's 
customers complained about the quality, cost, and delivery 
problem of Fuyang Parts Plant. The management set out to find 
new die-casting technologies to improve the entire production 
process. 
In 1983, Mr. Xiu, the plant manager, set up a central study group 
to rethink the plant's production capabilities. The plant would 
like to introduce a more advanced die casting system to stay 
competitive with the South China factories. Similar to other 
technology transfer ventures, the plant would like to obtain 
manufacturing expertise, management strategies, and other 
scientific formulae from their foreign partner, whenever 
possible. When manager xiu learned that his old friend in the 
municipal government would visit Japan and the States as part of 
a Shenyang delegation, he took the initiative to ask his friend 
for help. He briefed his friend on the factory's requirement and 
prepared an overview of what the plant was seeking. 
National products, an American supplier of heating furnaces for 
small and medium-sized industrial firms, decided to follow up the 
request when they learned of the Fuyang project. In fact, the 
company had been seeking a point of entry into the China market 
for some time. As neither the US Department of Commerce nor its 
Hong Kong agent could tell them more about the Fuyang project, 
two teams were sent to the Fuyang plant to explore opportunity 
for business. The teams proposed to upgrade the Fuyang Parts in 
stages. The first phase would involve replacing the heating 
furnace, incorporating stands for new type of dies, and 
installing a larger cooling system. The second phase would 
involve adding an electric plating system and several presses to 
handle different aspects of the metal forming process. 
Components would come from three different US firms. The 
proposal also involved training Fuyang employees in the united 
states. The price of the project was estimated at slightly over 
US$8 million. 
In the course of negotiation, National Products had also taken a 
highly cooperative strategy to come up with a plan that best met 
the need of the Chinese. They spent most of their time and 
effort to design a new production configuration scaled specifi-
cally to the needs of the Fuyang plant. A seven-man team was 
sent to Shenyang that met regularly with xiu during the negotia-
tion period. Their discussions covered basic considerations 
like: delivery, training, warranty, service, and financial de-
tails. As it was National Product's first negotiation in China, 
the company had difficulty with both the Chinese procedure and 
pacing. Tension and friction were common, and the negotiation 
game was not the same as in the U.S. For example, every change 
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in the Fuyang and American positions had to be renegotiated and 
approved by numerous Chinese groups and bureaus. To overcome 
these hurdles, the American team tried to be as flexible as 
possible. In addition, the technical people had successfully 
established a good working relationship with the Chinese engi-
neers. This helped the American a lot in the final closing of 
the negotiation. 
In the event, the Japanese had exerted great competitive pressure 
on National Products. While xiu was asking assistance from his 
friend to solicit contacts in the states, several Liaoning 
provincial officials were putting together their own economic 
plan together with the Japanese Mitsubishi Group. The Group had 
long followed developments in China's steel industry, especially 
at Shenyang's Anshan Iron and Steel Complex, built by the 
Japanese in the 1930s. They had visited most of the Anshan-
related plants in the vicinity, including xiu's plant. Instead 
of working with the user, the Group had chosen to work with 
provincial and central government officials to upgrade the 
province's production capacity. The Japanese had a very 
attractive pricing strategy. The price of the Mitsubishi 
proposal was about half that of the American proposal. It was 
made possible if the Group could sell, as a package, several 
dozen furnaces to a number of factories in northern China. 
Actually, the Group had devoted much energy to forming a 
consortium of potential buyers having the same general needs and 
then trying to tie them up into a huge project. 
This competitive move affected the American business. The Fuyang 
plant is part of a complex network of suppliers in Shenyang. The 
plant receives energy, water, alloys and other inputs from 
upstream suppliers and the finished products are sold to other 
downstream customers near the region. Mitsubishi had been very 
successful in cultivating a reputation of quality and reliability 
in the region. As far as Fuyang's suppliers and customers were 
concerned, there was a good perception tilt towards the Japanese 
proposal. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese were facing two major objections. 
First, there were concerns about China's growing trade deficit 
with Japan. Second, and more importantly, as the Japanese were 
designing a general package for various plants having specific 
needs, they could not handle some specific but important 
questions raised by xiu. As risk was a major criterion adopted 
by Fuyang plant, the Japanese concept was declined eventually. 
The American proposal was not without pitfalls. The price of the 
project was higher, and the Fuyang people had to overcome 
hindrance from suppliers, customers, and other provincials 
officers. In this connection, the National Products had tried 
their best to supply with xiu various selling points: (1) hands-
on training (some in the United States), (2) less costly 
structure in the long run, and (3) proposal tailored to Fuyang's 
specific problems and requirements. 
As the American proposal was viewed as "safer", the contract was 
- -------- - - ----- --- -- ---- -
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granted to National Products in 1985. The contract called for a 
four-year phased development project beginning with the 
replacement of the heating furnace and including the eventual 
rehabilitation of the whole Fuyang plant. 
Case Four: SPD MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
The SPD Medical Technologies began its export business to China's 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) in early 1982. Its vitamin 
supplement product quickly made a name for itself. In 1984 SPD 
received the news that their contract would not be renewed. It 
took more than four months for the company to discover that the 
agencies under MOPH no longer had the funds or authority to buy 
health care products. The administrative and financial 
responsibility had been shifted to provincial, municipal, and 
county-level organizations. 
The SPD did not give up. In early 1985 it began a rigorous 
investigation to determine the appropriate Chinese organization 
which had the authority to buy vitamin supplements. During one 
of the visits, the SPD salespeople called on a local 
pharmaceutical manufacturer in Liaoning Province. The 
organization was known as China Pharmaceutical headed by Mr. Bu, 
who took up his appointment in 1983. He faced many difficult 
problems at the outset including the lack of authority and 
autonomy to run his business. But in 1985, many of the rules 
governing enterprise operations were changed, and managers began 
to have far more authority and flexibility to negotiate with 
foreign businessmen. 
When Mr. Bu met the SPD team in 1985, he was very interested in 
the company's products, especially the methods used by SPD to 
manufacture over-the-counter remedies and hospital drugs. He was 
also interested to purchase equipment and to license several 
procedures for its own facility. They met several times during 
the 1985 visit. The SPD people wanted a direct sales agreement 
but Mr. Bu was more positive and ambitious. He wanted to develop 
a joint venture between China pharmaceutical and SPD to 
manufacture the pharmaceutical products in the PRC. Mr. Bu 
needed four kinds of transfers: packaging technology, temperature 
control equipment for antibiotic preparation, licenses to produce 
certain SPD drugs, and management expertise. They reached a 
general agreement about these four areas rather quickly, and then 
they proceeded to establish guiding principle for operating the 
joint venture. 
In the course of negotiating the final contract, three major 
stumbling blocks were found. SPD wanted to include a technology 
development fee to help cover some of the firm's past development 
cost. To the Chinese, this fee was a double payment for the same 
goods. More importantly, the Chinese superiors and reviewers 
would question this payment for "soft product". To the Chinese, 
the enterprise would only purchase hard goods - machines, 
formulas, management know-how - not research. In order to play 
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safe, Mr. Bu consulted two officials in different provincial 
agencies and the Chinese finally proposed a lower figure which 
was acceptable to SPD. 
The second hurdle was that SPD requested contractual assurance 
that its formulas and manufacturing processes would be kept in 
confidence. They should be applied within the joint venture 
operation, and that they would be used in the manner as 
stipulated in the agreement. To protect the proprietary 
information, SPD lawyers also wanted to include some provisions 
that would set specific remedial measures in motion if some of 
the conditions were violated. The Chinese considered this issue 
with care and Mr. Bu finally turned to an outside agency, a 
municipal economic organization for help in drafting these 
guarantees. In this context, the Chinese had shown a big 
cooperation gesture. 
Convincing potential customers and other outside powers was the 
third, and supposedly, the biggest hurdle the joint venture had 
to overcome. Hospitals were Mr. Buls major target. He planned 
to gain access to the regional hospital associations to generate 
steady sales and cash flows. In so doing, the expenditure for 
the new production facilities could be more quickly written off. 
Though the hospital associations were having a rather big 
autonomy to select their supplier, they were also tied to the 
state Pharmaceutical Administration (SPA), which advised the 
association from time to time. At that time, the SPA was 
negotiating with a large Japanese firm on a general plan to 
develop several large-scale drug production and packaging 
projects, and the SPA worried that the SPD arrangement might 
affect this master plan. Hence, the SPA official counseled the 
hospital associations to be careful in signing agreements with 
China Pharmaceutical. Once the SPA had declared its basic 
objections to the joint ventures, several other agencies made 
further inquiries. Moreover, the China National Packaging 
Corporation wanted to know what materials would be used in 
packaging the new drugs and whether this met national guidelines. 
The China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation in addition 
requested a list of all materials the joint venture planned to 
use in the process and whether these chemicals were on the 
approval list. In these regards, Mr. Bu and his Liaoning patron 
stood firm. They answered all queries and insisted that China 
Pharmaceutical was well within its authority to close deals with 
SPD. 
Despite these bureaucratic stumbling blocks, the two firms 
finally signed a formal agreement in late 1986. SPD would 
provide equipment over a three-year period and would oversee 
management and training for five years. China Pharmaceutical 
would assign 40 percent of its existing facility to the new 
venture, provide expert labor, and be responsible for all on-site 
costing. The contract also included provisions to protect SPD's 
proprietary information, trademarks, and brandnames. SPD also 
agreed to train Chinese engineers in production techniques, 
quality control, and basic research. As common in other joint 
ventures, SPD would also sponsor Chinese engineers to visit the 
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state each year to receive training. 
Case Five: PEPSICO 
Coca Cola made its first and exclusive deal with a Chinese 
central government trading company in 1978. In 1979, when Deng 
Xiaoping began to give local and provincial agencies more 
autonomy, Pepsi grabbed the chance to enter the Chinese regional 
markets. It built two battling plants in Zhenghen and Guangzhou, 
with about the same production capacity as Coca Cola's four 
plants in China. 
To pitch for further business and to build up a strong friendship 
with officials in the PRC, Pepsico Chairman, Donald Kendall, 
formed a strong delegation to China in January 1986. Armed with 
a letter of introduction from former President Nixon (China's old 
friend), the Pepsico directors were able to meet Premier Zhao 
Ziyang in Beijing. The delegation to China included PepsiCo's 
three inside directors, seven outside directors, and an 
accompanying crew of 49. The tour in China mostly consisted of 
working lunches and dinners. In each city the directors were 
assigned particular Chinese officials. They are equipped with 
thick briefing books which described who had the power to 
negotiate and make decisions. In the course of dealing with the 
Chinese, the major objective was to develop personal and friendly 
relationship, which would definitely help out through the thick 
bureaucratic layers. Before the arrival of the directors, 
advance teams were set to nail down last-minute arrangements. 
One hundred and thirty cases of Pepsi-Cola and gifts of leather 
brief cases and wallets for China officials were used as door 
openers. 
In Shenzhen, the local Communist party secretary, Liang Xiang, 
praised the Pepsi bottling plant for generating export earnings 
for the special economic zone. In Guangzhou, Guangdong Province 
governor Ye Xuanping, who was major of Guangzhou when Pepsi 
agreed to build the plant there, greeted the directors in his 
office. 
In Shanghai, PepsiCo hosted Shanghai's former major, plus other 
municipal and party officials. In Fudan University, widely 
regarded as Harvard of China, . Kendall announced that PepsiCo 
would sponsor two Chinese students to attend Northwestern 
University, where they would be known as PepsiCo Fellows. He 
also endorsed a letter of intent to build a Shanghai bottling 
operation. 
In Beijing, the ' PepsiCo delegation joined US Ambassador Winston 
Lord and paid a visit to premier Zhao Ziyang. Kendall handed 
Zhou the Nixon letter, and conveyed the regards from Vice 
President Bush, another old friend of China. The premier assured 
China's open door policy and further proposed an international 
"cooperation in the food industry". 
312 
The friendship delegation was so successful that Robert Briggs, 
Pepsi's point man for China, summed up his view: "These eight 
days moved our effort ahead by at least 1~ years." 
Case six: aCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
In the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese planned to further 
establish its energy resources and sought assistance from U.S. 
companies to supply to them equipment and technology. accidental 
Petroleum Corporation was one of the American firms that had 
entered into collaborative arrangements with the Chinese on the 
exploration of Chinese energy resource. Even though the company 
was not among the first to enter the Chinese market, it had 
developed good relationship with the Chinese. In 1979, the 
company received approval from Chinese to act as a participant to 
examine the energy potential of China. 
According to Richard Chen, Occident's director of business 
development in China, long run profitability was the major reason 
behind the company's decision to engage in deal with China. 
Basically, it was the company which took the initiative to 
contact the respective ministries and corporations in China. 
After opportunities were spotted, the company went ahead to 
establish initiate contacts with the Chinese. Based on such 
initial contacts, further field visits and negotiations were 
organized. Where appropriate, the company was ready to follow up 
and make proposals. A Business Development Department was set up 
in the Beijing office whose job was focused on only China 
activity. This office helped accelerate the time in sorting out 
the preliminary set-up before the talks and in facilitating the 
efficient running of the negotiation. To assist in bridging 
culture differences between the two negotiating teams, the 
company tried to have the department run by Chinese-Americans. 
Though this might not help on the basic closing of a deal, it 
would help in the initial stages to get acquainted with each 
other, to understand each other, and to move faster to the core 
of the negotiation. In any event, the company would try to be as 
cooperative as possible so as to develop a good impression to the 
Chinese which would be highly valuable in the closing of a deal. 
accidental's past experience with Russia was also a major 
advantage. The Chinese felt. that a corporation having a long 
experience in dealing with a socialist country like Russia would 
be in a better position to understand China and to avoid doing 
things not acceptable to the web-like bureaucratic hierarchy in 
the country. In the Chinese context, risk is not preferred and 
official would try their best to spin it off or avoid it 
altogether. According to Chen, if the Chinese sensed that 
something was out of order, they would ask for postponement, even 
if everything was ready as far as the American company was 
concerned. This sort of delay was frustrating, especially when 
the American delegation deemed that everything was well organized 
and a lot of energy and effort had been spent already. 
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The situation was further complicated as the risk-averse Chinese 
were called on by many other foreign corporation who were also 
interested in dealing with China. The Chinese were confused as 
many corporations were pitching simultaneously, and presenting 
various conflicting pictures. It took the Chinese a longer 
period of time to sort out who were good partners, and who were 
just mediocre businessmen. 
In 1982, Occidental and China National Coal Development Corp 
(CNCDC) finally agreed to proceed with a feasibility study on the 
development of the coal mine site 500 km west of Beijing with 
proven reserves of 1.4 billion tones and an expected annual 
capacity of 15 million tones a year at full production. In 1984, 
the two sides were deadlocked over issues including salaries and 
guarantees from the Chinese to make up the difference in 
foreign-exchange earnings should they fall below the expected 
revenue level generated by the coal designated for export. 
By early 1984, rumors that the deal was on the verge of collapse 
were so strong that Occidental chairman Armand Hammer had to 
write to China's top leaders, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang promising that the project would definitely proceed. The 
Chinese had indicated their commitment too. In April 1984, Deng 
was reported by Xinhua Newsagency as telling Hammer that 
"cooperation with China involves very little risk because China 
is not a country lacking ability to pay. an the contrary, China 
has a large potential which has not yet been brought out." 
with strong commitment on both sides, Occidental and China 
finally signed their joint venture contract to develop one of the 
world's largest mines, the giant Antaibao No. 1 open-cut pit in 
the Ping Shuo coal mine in Shanxi province. The company took 
five years of negotiation to yield a firm deal - an investment 
cost of US$650 million. 
The two major stumbling blocks which held up the final agreement 
for more than one year was finally resolved. The China National 
Coal Import-Export Corporation signed an agency contract with 
Island Creek of China Coal (ICCC), a 50-50 partnership between 
accidental and Bank of China Trust and Consultancy Company, to 
sell its coal abroad. The contract stipulated that if they 
failed to sell all the coal the Chinese Corporation would pay 
accidental a minimum price based on the average coal price of 
selected coal-producing countries. 
On the salary issue, Chinese laborers would be paid US$7 an hour, 
or half of the US miners' wage. The wages would actually be paid 
to a labor organization, which would keep well over half of the 
earnings. As the money would be turned over to the state to help 
support the Chinese infrastructure costs, accidental was actually 
contributing to the infrastructure construction of China. 
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Case Seven: CONTROL DATA CORPORATION (CDC) 
Since 1971, Control Data Corporation CCDC) of Minneapolis, 
Minnesota has been actively interested in marketing computers to 
China. In 1978, CDC had mainframe computer sales that 
constituted about 6% of the total world mainframe computer 
market. On the other hand, since 1964, China has relied heavily 
on imports of computers. During the period 1964 to 1975 about 16 
different computers were sold to China. Ten of these were 
basically parts of seismic or geographical exploration systems, 
the types marketed by CDC. The company became interested in the 
PRC market about the time when U.8. and China rapproched in 1971. 
The initial CDC contact was a proposal to the Chinese Ministry of 
Science and Technology. 
The initial proposal submitted was both comprehensive and 
detailed to allow the Chinese to evaluate it commercially. Full 
information about CDC, its activities and its whole range of 
products were included. The proposal also indicated the firm's 
willingness to provide additional details, answer further 
queries, and arrange follow-up gatherings. 
At the time when CDC was exploring opportunities in the PRC, 
China had great demand for computers with specific applications, 
particularly in petroleum exploration. In 1979, China ranked 
about tenth in the world as an oil producer. Its search for oil 
had accumulated a great of seismic data. In this regard, CDC had 
exactly the type of product to meet China's processing need. The 
Chinese great need for large mainframe computers eventually 
induced CDC's huge marketing efforts beginning in 1970s. 
CDC's initial business objectives could be summarized as: to 
assess China as a potential market for the future, to determine 
the political climate for business, and to get China acquainted 
with the company. The company's strategy eventually developed 
into a twofold one: pursuing immediate prospects and future 
improving relationships with the Chinese corporation. The first 
part would mean aiming for immediate revenue and the second part 
would mean aiming for future sales, technical sales, and joint 
ventures. Besides short-run profits, CDC was clearly making a 
commitment to the future. They stressed the importance of 
maintaining an image of having interest in building a long term 
relationship with China. 
The issue of friendship was emphasized in difficult phase of 
negotiation. In order to develop linkage with China, CDC entered 
into an agreement in October 1971 with a Washington-based 
consulting firm which had good contacts with China Resources 
Company in Hong Kong as well as with many Chinese officials in 
China, for the purpose of strengthening the company's position in 
dealing with officials in China. In fact, one of the key persons 
in the consulting firm was a former acquaintance of Premier Chou 
Enlai, and thus was a position to be highly useful. 
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The company also developed various strategies to - help the Chinese 
getting to know CDC. In April 1972, CDC sent a letter to the 
China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation 
introducing CDC and its personnel. In their reply the Chinese 
indicated that they had received brochures and other materials 
forwarded to them by Chinese Resources. They also indicated 
their interest in CDC's products and asked for a price list. The 
CDC then informed the Chinese about the pricing of software and 
other pertinent materials to allow the Chinese to configure their 
specific system. . 
other CDC contacts included meeting with Chinese officials in 
Bucharest, Rumania and exchange of business views with China 
Resources officials over dinner in Hong Kong. The basic motive 
of these contacts was to familiarize Chinese officials and end-
users with ' CDC personnel and computers. When a group of Chinese 
computer engineers visited America in 1973, CDC had the chance of 
meeting face-to-face with Chinese decisions makers. The visit 
was considered as a nice encounter, and in a follow-up letter in 
1974, CDC went on to suggest the establishment of a series of 
seminars on computer facilities at a location to be designated by 
the Chinese. As before, the main purpose of these seminars was 
to establish friendship with the Chinese and to generate 
opportunity for both parties to get to know each other better. 
In late 1973, emphasize had been placed to the establishment of 
closer contact on a direct basis and CDC started to use 
terminology such as "old friends" in its sales letter. 
CDC had also taken any chance to minimize the perceived risk of 
the Chinese as risk is not preferred in the Chinese culture. In 
many cases, CDC tried very hard to convince the Chinese that the 
company's technology would continue to be state-of-the-art. 
During the negotiation, the Chinese asked very detailed questions 
about the CDC computer to be involved in the transaction. To 
each and every question, a detailed and comprehensive answer was 
supplied to help the Chinese negotiator to face any queries or 
criticisms from their own superior. Despite China's great need 
for the computer system, the Chinese preferred taking a safety 
posture and a final contract was not actualized. To help 
minimizing the risk, CDC added a third partner in the sale: 
Compagnie Generale de Geophysique (CGG). The basic asset of CGG 
was that the company had been selling oil exploration equipment 
to the Chinese for over ten years and had earned their respect. 
The CGG people were considered as old friends of the Chinese and 
hence, the CGG personnel was assigned to do much of the 
negotiating, particularly in the final closing talks. 
On August 14, 1974, a contract was finally signed between China 
National Technical Import Corporation (Techimport) and CDC for 
the delivery of two Cyber 172 system to the Chinese National Oil 
and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation. The total value 
of the contract was approximately U5$6.8 million. That turnkey 
package for the large national seismic data processing center 
located in the Beijing area was then considered as the largest 
contract signed by Techimport and a single computer manufacturer. 
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Case Eight: ELECTRONIC ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Electronic Associates, Inc. (EAI) is a developer and manufacturer 
of computer systems used in dedicated and general-purpose 
simulation applications for training and advanced research and 
development studies. Although EAI is considered as a small 
company - under US450 million in total sales per annum - it has 
over the past decades aggressively pursued the marketing of its 
products in the States and other parts of the world. 
In the Canton Fair in 1972, an aggressive salesman of EA! 
discussed with the Chinese concerning the establishment of an 
intercity network of CRTs for the exchange of digital 
information. The Chinese found this idea extremely interesting 
and were enthusiastic about this commercial deal. Through the 
years EAI's Marketing Department continued to mail the pertinent 
materials to various departments of the PRC. They also 
publicized in public media from time to time that China would be 
a promising candidate for purchasing the EAI equipment. Besides 
governmental organization, EAI also probed to determine whether 
technical universities and research centers in the PRC would be 
interested in the product manufactured by the company. Over a 
period of six years, no word was ever received with respect to 
the sales letters, nor in fact there was any indication that the 
literature was being read by potential buyers in the PRC. 
During the summer of 1977, Mr. Sanders, vice-president of 
Marketing, EA!, made a tour to the ASEAN offices. Having heard 
that the Bank of China in Hong Kong had served usefully as a 
gateway to the PRC market, he made an appointment with the 
director of the Bank. He was courteously entertained, and was 
allowed to make a presentation of the company's products. After 
receiving the brochures and catalogs of the products, Mr. Senders 
was assured that the material would be sent to the right authori-
ty in Beijing for decision. 
Moreover, EAI had relied on a third party to help develop 
additional contacts with China. Chori Trading Co., a Japanese 
trading corporation which had good relationship with the Chinese, 
was asked to channel some of EAI's literature to the proper 
technical agency for the comp~ny. Nevertheless, this was also 
accomplished without any immediate effect. 
In the meantime, the International Marketing vice-president in 
conjunction with EAI's office in Japan proposed a technical 
seminar in the PRC. They were able to conducted at last a very 
successful seminar on analog and hybrid simulation to Chinese 
officials in Beijing. All the above moves resulted in EAI's 
receiving an invitation in June 1977 from the Chinese to visit 
Beijing for further technical discussion on EAI's product. 
A group of three from EAI was dispatched to Beijing in September 
1977 including the vice-president of International Marketing, the 
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general manager of the Tokyo office, and a sales engineer who had 
a modest c~mmand of the Chinese language. Naturally, the 
Japanese m1ddleman was also included as the Japanese were well 
received by the PRC officials at that time. 
The delegation was hosted by a deputy dignitary of China and the 
discussions were attended by several scientists from the 
University of Harbin. The EAI group was intensively interviewed 
over a period of two weeks, and was asked to make presentation of 
the characteristics and functions of different EAI products. Its 
most advanced and largest analogy hybrid complex known as Series 
700 was included as the core subject for discussion. 
In the course of their discussion, EAI found that some young 
people were very open and were eager to acquire as much 
scientific knowledge as possible. They wanted very much the new 
computer and the technology coming with the end project. 
However, some members of the Chinese group were still reluctant 
to open up. Though the Chinese had not treated the EAI people as 
enemies, they were obviously on guard in terms of how much they 
wanted the American to really know what the real business 
undertaking was about. There were still others who were overtly 
politically oriented, and some questions were not addressed to 
business per se. 
In the negotiation, a lot of consideration was given to the 
determination of a right configuration. The Chinese were very 
thorough and a lot of investigation were taken, even for very 
small details in technical matters. In this connection, the EAI 
group had taken a persistent stance and they tried to be as 
patient as possible as they knew that that was the technique to 
negotiate with the Chinese. 
According to Sanders, playing on time was a major technique they 
had learnt in the business talks with the Chinese. The company 
had constantly indicated that they had commitment in the deals, 
they were not there for hurried business, and that they were 
t~king a long range perspective in the China business. 
At the end of a long period of extensive technical presentation, 
the Chinese were eventually convinced about the advantages of the 
EAI product and simply declared their intention to issue a 
purchase contract - a configuration of equipment which 
represented a top of the line in the series 700. An order in the 
amount of $4.47 million was announced. Price discussions were 
minimal until the final purchase order was drawn up and only a 
small discount to show good intention was requested. 
Case Nine: AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC;. 
American International Group (AIG) is the largest U.S. insurance 
company operating throughout the world. The People's Insurance 
Company of China .(PICC) is the state-owned insurance company in 
China that is entitled to underwrite insurances within China. 
. . 
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After the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, AIG wrote 
to PICC to explore business opportunities between the two 
companies. Periodic contracts were also made through an 
affiliate of the Plec based in Hong Kong, the Ming An Insurance 
Company. AIG was motivated to undertake their negotiation 
because they wanted to remain as a leader in the world's 
insurance business and they were of the opinion that the venture 
would bring in profit to the Group. 
In Spring 1975, AIG submitted a formal proposal to PICC and 
expressed their intentions to develop commercial relations with 
them. Copies of the proposal were given to representatives of 
PICC at the Spring 1975 Canton Trade Fair. The aim of this move 
was to solicit invitation for AIG senior management to visit 
Beijing. Five months elapsed before AIG received the formal 
invitation from the Chinese. A delegation from AIG was sent to 
Beijing in November 1975. The delegation was represented by Mr. 
Greenberg, president and chief executive officer, Mr. Manton, 
executive vice-president, and Mr. Freeman, regional manager for 
Far East operations. As a result of the visit, a ceremonial 
reciprocal exchange agreement was signed. The agreement served 
as a mechanism for continuing discussion, and to allow each party 
to know the counterpart better. This agreement also provided for 
a small amount of business and for some informal technical 
cooperation. 
In negotiation talks, AIG found that the Chinese was very 
cooperative and would like to be friendly with everybody. They 
were profit-minded and were anxious to have business with other 
countries. The image of being the biggest insurance company 
internationally did help the AIG a lot. The PRC would be able to 
participate in markets that they would not have access. In the 
period of negotiation, the PRC wanted to expand their service 
industry to earn more foreign exchange. In joining force with 
AIG, the Chinese would not have to invest a lot in set up 
facilities and contacts. As the two parties were having 
consistent interest, both parties were frank and open and 
negotiation was carried out smoothly. 
Though both parties were cooperative, the American had face the 
common hurdle in Chinese trade negotiation: competition. During 
the negotiation period, the people from PICC spent a week in New 
York. When the Chinese came to the States, they said they would 
like to visit other insurance companies too. Actually, the PICC 
people had made complimentary visits to every major competitors 
of AIG, and even to brokers that were not related to AIG. 
To minimize competitive pressure and to build up stronger friend-
ship, the American did try to be as helpful as possible. Shortly 
after the conclusion of the reciprocal agreement with PICC, the 
Group provided assistance when a Chinese-flag vessel was ap-
proaching the Panama Canal. There is a statute requiring vessels 
in waters under U.S. jurisdiction to give evidence of financial 
security sufficient for removing any oil pollution caused by the 
vessel. As the Chinese vessel approached the Canal, they cabled 
AIG for help. AIG arranged for the issuing of a bond to support 
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the Chinese. This incident greatly strengthened the friendship 
between the two parties. 
As the Chinese are risk-averse, the company's long association 
with China were valuable in the negotiation. The company was the 
first to contact the Chinese after the signing of the Shanghai 
Communique in 1972. The Chinese were well acquainted with the 
company. They know that the company had a whole staff or offices 
full of Chinese out in the Far East. They had cooperated for 
many years through their subsidiaries in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The Chinese felt that the AIG would understand them better, and 
the two partners were closer than the others. 
In 1980, a letter of intent was signed which covered a 50/50 
joint venture between AIG and PICC. The joint venture would be 
known as the China-American Insurance Company, with authorized 
capital to be US$25 million, and with US$5 million paid up. Each 
partners would initially contribute U8$2.5 million. The 
operation would operate worldwide, using the AIG global network 
of offices in 130 countries. It would insure different aspects 





The survey in which you are about to partici-
pate is sponsored by The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, and is concerned with Sales 
Negotiations. On the following page is a 
description of the situation surrounding the 
negotiation. 
PLEASE READ THE DESCRIPTIONS CAREFULLY. 
After you've read it, please answer the ques-
tions below based on the information given. 
PLEASE READ THE QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND ANSWER 
ALL OF THEM EVEN IF YOU FEEL UNCERTAIN ABOUT SOME 
OF YOUR ANSWERS. This' study is anonymous, and 
there are no right or wrong answers. Therefore 
please respond according to your own judgment. 




Assuming that you are employed by a multi-national firm, and 
that your current assignment is to negotiate with a PRC firm in 
China on a possible joint venture between the two firms. In this 
venture, your company will be responsible for introducing 
technology and management know-how to China, while the Chinese 
firm will invest in raw materials, plant and equipment, and 
labor. From an informal source, you know that the Chinese team 
is quite neutral towards this venture. 
Compared to other potential projects your company is 
considering, this venture is expected to generate an average 
amount of return at an acceptable level of risk. As the company 
is simultaneously considering several similar projects, there is 
no pressure whatsoever to accept or to reject this venture. In 
addition, there is no prior consensus within your company as to 
whether this venture is desirable or not. 
The leader of the Chinese negotiating team, Mr. Yee Chang, 
is a good friend of yours. The two of you had met in a business 
venture three years ago, and you have become good friends since 
then. In the course of the negotiations, the two of you have the 
opportunity of meeting each other frequently in various social 
occasions, and a better friendship has been developed between you 
and him. 
Besides yourself, your negotiation team comprises David Lee 
(your superior), together with other persons from the company. 
In several unofficial meetings, your superior, David, expressed 
some of his reservations with respect to this joint venture. 
I. with respect to the situation mentioned above, do you think 
that this joint venture would be an efficient and successful 
one? Please elaborate why. 
[ Note: Friend Condition + Low Job status Condition ] 
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Assuming that you are employed by a multi-national firm, and 
that your current assignment is to negotiate with a PRC firm in 
China on a possible joint venture between the two firms. In this 
venture, your company will be responsible for introducing 
technology and management know-how to China, while the Chinese 
firm will invest in raw materials, plant and equipment, and 
labor. From an informal source, you know that the Chinese team 
is quite neutral towards this venture. 
Compared to other potential projects your company is 
considering, this venture is expected to generate an average 
amount of return at an acceptable level of risk. As the company 
is simultaneously considering several similar projects, there is 
no pressure whatsoever to accept or to reject this venture. In 
addition, there is no prior consensus within your company as to 
whether this venture is desirable or not. 
The leader of the Chinese negotiating team, Mr. Yee Chang, 
is a good friend of yours. The two of you had met in a business 
venture three years ago, and you have become good friends since 
then. In the course of the negotiations, the two of you have the 
opportunity of meeting each other frequently in various social 
occasions, and a better friendship has been developed between you 
and him. 
Besides yourself, your negotiation team comprises David Lee 
(your subordinate), together with other persons from the company. 
In several unofficial meetings, your subordinate, David, 
expressed some of his reservations with respect to this joint 
venture. 
I. with respect to the situation mentioned above, do you think 
that this joint venture would be an efficient and successful 
one? Please elaborate why. 
[ Note: Friend Condition + High Job status Condition ] 
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BACKGROUND 
Assuming that you are employed by a multi-national firm, and 
that your current assignment is to negotiate with a PRC firm in 
China on a possible joint venture between the two firms. In this 
venture, your company will be responsible for introducing 
technology and management know-how to China, while the Chinese 
firm will invest in raw materials, plant and equipment, and 
labor. From an informal source, you know that the Chinese team 
is quite neutral towards this venture. 
Compared to other potential projects your company is 
considering, this venture is expected to generate an average 
amount of return at an acceptable level of risk. As the company 
is simultaneously considering several similar projects, there is 
no pressure whatsoever to accept or to reject this venture. In 
addition, there is no prior consensus within your company as to 
whether this venture is desirable or not. 
The leader of the Chinese negotiating team, Mr. Yee Chang, 
is an acquaintance you had met before. The two of you had met in 
a business venture three years ago. However, you did not get to 
know each other very well, and you haven't seen each other since. 
In the course of the negotiations the two of you have the 
opportunity of meeting each other frequently in various social 
occasions, but actually your friendship has not developed much. 
Besides yourself, your negotiation team comprises David Lee 
(your superior), together with other persons from the company. 
In several unofficial meetings, your superior, David, expressed 
some of his reservations with respect to this joint venture. 
I. with respect to the situation mentioned above, do you think 
that this joint venture would be an efficient and successful 
one? Please elaborate why. 
[ Note: Non-Friend Condition + Low Job status Condition ] 
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BACKGROUND 
Assuming that you are employed by a multi-national firm, and 
that your current assignment is to negotiate with a PRC firm in 
China on a possible joint venture between the two firms. In this 
venture, your company will be responsible for introducing 
technology and management know-how to China, while the Chinese 
firm will invest in raw materials, plant and equipment, and 
labor. From an informal source, you know that the Chinese team 
is quite neutral towards this venture. 
Compared to other potential projects your company is 
considering, this venture is expected to generate an average 
amount of return at an acceptable level of risk. As the company 
is simultaneously considering several similar projects, there is 
no pressure whatsoever to accept or to reject this venture. In 
addition, there is no prior consensus within your company as to 
whether this venture is desirable or not. 
The leader of the Chinese negotiating team, Mr. Yee Chang, 
is an acquaintance you had met before. The two of you had met in 
a business venture three years ago. However, you did not get to 
know each other very well, and you haven't seen each other since. 
In the course of the negotiations the two of you have the 
opportunity of meeting each other frequently in various social 
occasions, but actually your friendship has not developed much. 
Besides yourself, your negotiation team comprises David Lee 
(your subordinate), together with other persons from the company. 
In several unofficial meetings, your subordinate, David, 
expressed some of his reservations with respect to this joint 
venture. 
I. with respect to the situation mentioned above, do you think 
that this joint venture would be an efficient and successful 
one? Please elaborate why. 
[ Note: Non-Friend Condition + High Job status Condition ] 
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II. with respect to the situation mentioned above, please 
indicate your agreement/disagreement towards the following 
statements. There is no right or wrong answer. Please 
circle your answers to the questions according to the 
following scale: 






1. I'm inclined to give special favorable 
treatments to Mr. Chang in the course 
of the negotiations. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
2. I'm prepared to work a little harder to 
help Mr. Chang in the negotiation 
talks. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
3. I would probably give some special forms 
of advantages to Mr. Chang in the 
course of the negotiations. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4. I would be willing to give in a little 
more to help Mr. Chang close the deal. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
5. If possible, I will try to make things 
easier for Mr. Chang in the talks. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
6. I will try not to challenge the expressed 
wish of David, even though I think I'm 
right. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7. I will try to make David gain "face" by 
following his directions without much 
questions. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
8. I will not try to convince David even 
though I think the venture may have its 
advantages. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
9. Though I think that the venture may be 
beneficial for the company as a whole, 
I will probably remain silent as David 
has indicated his reservations. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
10. Even if other information reveals that 
David is wrong, I will probably not 
voice my disagreement in our own 
internal meetings. 6 5 4 3 2 1 






11. For this venture, avoiding criticism 
from the organization is more important 
than closing the deal. 
12. To play safe, I will try not to reveal 
my real opinion towards the venture. 
13. As David has indicated his reservations, 
I will try to follow his idea as he is 
the one to be blamed if the result 
proves otherwise. 
14. I would probably keep quite in the talks 
so that nobody can find fault on me if 
mistakes are made in this negotiation 
exercise. 
15. Do nothing would probably be a good 
strategy in this negotiation exercise 
to evade complaints from others for 
making a bad decision. 
16. I will place special emphasis on the 
issue of mutual benefits in the talks. 
17. I will be as cooperative and 
accommodative as possible in the 
negotiation talks. 
18. There is no reas6n for both parties to 
play some harmful tricks to each other 
in the negotiation talks. 
19. I'm prepared to work hard to complete 
the negotiation. 
20. I will adopt a helpful attitude to 













5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 4 3 2 1 






21. The talks will be highly efficient--that 
is, we'll be able to discuss the core 
of the matters quite directly without 
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much difficulties. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
22. The negotiations probably won't take a 
long time to complete. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
23. I would not expect too many delays and 
doubts between the two parties in the 
course of the negotiations. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
24. Mr. Chang won't have to exercise 
tremendous patience and indirectness in 
the course of negotiations, but instead 
he can come right out and say what he's 
trying to get at. 6 5 4 3 2 1 
25. Not much time consuming get-togethers 
and talks will go on in the course of 
the negotiations. 
26. Overall, I think I would negotiate with 
an optimistic frame of mind. 
27. Overall, I expect that Mr. Chang 
would enter into the negotiations with 
an optimistic frame of mind. 
28. I expect that the venture will be 
successful. 
29. Mr. Chang will expect that the venture 
will be successful. 
30. Besides this negotiation exercise, I 
expect that the two parties will have 
other opportunities to cooperate in 
business in the future. 
31. I would consider Mr. Chang as a good 
friend of mine. 
32. Compared to myself, David has a higher 
status in the firm. 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
654 3 2 1 
IV. Demographic Questions for Classification Purpose 
1. Sex (Please circle one): 
Male------ 1 Female------ 2 
2. Highest Education (Please circle one): 
Primary---------- 1 
Secondary-------- 2 
Some College----- 3 
College Graduate----- 4 
Postgraduate--------- 5 
3. Age (Please circle one): 




61 or above---------- 5 
- 4. Number of Years of Selling Experience: Years 
5. Number of" Years of Working Experience 
(including selling): 





7. Your position in the management hierarchy is: 
(Please circle one): 
Top Management------------------ 1 
Middle - Senior Management------ 2 
Middle Management--------------- 3 
Junior Management--------------- 4 
Others (please specify):-------- 5 
8. How long have you been in Hong Kong? 
9. Your nationality by birth is: 
Years 
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10. Percentage of daily working time involved in foreign business 
trade and negotiation: (Please circle your response.) 
0% 5% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
v. Open-ended Questions 
1. What do you think are the success factors in negotiating 
with the Chinese? 
2. Please suggest some strategy guidelines for foreign 
executives when they negotiate with the Chinese. 
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3. What do you think is the major objective of this survey? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH 
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APPENDIX III 















61 or above 
Number of Years of 
Selling Experience 
under 5 years 
5-10 
11-20 
Over 20 years 
Number of Years of 
Working Experience 
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